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ABSTRACT 
THE STORY OF BURLEY TOBACCO FARMING IN BETHEL, WATAUGA COUNTY, 
NORTH CAROLINA: CULTURAL MEANINGS AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS, (MAY 
2012) 
Jonathan Buchanan, B.A., University of Tennessee 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: Susan E. Keefe 
During the twentieth century, tobacco farming characterized the culture and economy 
of many southern Appalachian mountain communities, including Bethel, Watauga County, 
North Carolina. Since 2004, following the end of the federal tobacco program, tobacco 
farming in the mountains has all but ended.  In 2011, only three farmers raised tobacco in 
Bethel, the last tobacco farming community in the county. At one time, hundreds of farmers 
grew tobacco every year in Watauga County. What was once an important crop and way of 
life in the mountains is now gone. Although tobacco farming often provided partial portions 
of incomes in the mountains, tobacco farming, as part of diversified farm operations, was 
critical to the maintenance and sustainability of agrarian cultures and economies. Now, 
without tobacco farming, agrarian communities in the mountains face a tenuous future. This 
thesis examines the culture and economy of tobacco farming in Bethel, Watauga County, 
North Carolina from its origins, in the 1930s, to today. 
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DEDICATION 
“Burley would take it up then, mourning and mocking: ‘Have you reached the other shore, 
dear brother? Have you seen that distant land?’ And he would sing,  
 
Oh, pilgrim, have you seen that distant land?” 
 
- Wendell Berry, “That Distant Land,” in The Wild Birds, 1985, p. 110 
 
 
“Now, daddy sits on his front porch swinging, 
looking out on a vacant field. 
It used to be filled with burley tobacco, 
now he knows that it never will.” 
 
- Darrell Scott, “Long Time Gone,” 2000 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: BURLEY TOBACCO FARMING IN BETHEL, 
WATAUGA COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 
A statement of the problem 
Tobacco has a long history in America and in the Appalachian region. Famously, it 
was one of the crops Native Americans introduced to Europeans when Europeans began 
exploring, trading in, and then later settling, these already lived-in lands. The highlights of 
how the rest of this story goes are well known: eventually, by the mid-seventeenth century, 
American colonists were cultivating tobacco as a cash crop, and with European innovation 
tobacco production became a significant global export industry (Goodman, 2005). Global 
commercial tobacco farming was born in the Americas, reached great heights as a major 
industry of the mid-South in the United States, and continues to this day as a major global 
industry. This thesis concerns a segment of the historical and current global tobacco farming 
industry, specifically, the culture and economy of a tobacco farming, southern Appalachian 
mountain community: Bethel, Watauga County, North Carolina.  
Even though tobacco farming in the mountains has typically provided only partial 
portions of farming incomes throughout the twentieth century, tobacco has still had a 
significant economic and cultural impact (Griffith, 2009). In the 1930s and 1940s, spurred on 
by New Deal agricultural legislation that created the federal tobacco program, tobacco 
farming helped transition subsistence-based farmers in mountain communities such as Bethel 
toward a more full integration into the market economy. As farmers became fully integrated 
into the market economy throughout the twentieth century, the culture and economy of 
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tobacco farming perpetuated social and community connections and agrarian ways of life that 
otherwise would have been lost to modernization. Although tobacco farming in the 
mountains was typically part of diversified farm livelihoods and only provided portions of 
incomes, tobacco money provided for important cultural components, such as Christmas 
gifts, property taxes, college tuitions, etc. Moreover, since most tobacco farms in Watauga 
County were small in size, often just a few acres, family work continued to characterize some 
tobacco operations even as the use of migrant labor became more prevalent in the late 1990s 
and 2000s. In short, tobacco farming was a crucial element to the survival of agrarian 
cultures and economies in the mountains. 
Once the federal tobacco program ended in 2004, tobacco farming in the mountains 
became economically impractical. Without the program’s price supports and marketing 
quotas, which guaranteed a minimum price for tobacco crops on the one hand, and restricted 
the amount of tobacco individuals could grow on the other, thus limiting the overall amount 
of tobacco on the market, tobacco grown in the mountains, in small, one or two acre 
allotments, could not compete with tobacco grown by larger and more efficient operations. 
Consequently, most mountain tobacco farmers quit growing the crop after the end of the 
tobacco program in 2004. In 2011, only three farmers raised tobacco in Bethel. At one time 
in Watauga County, hundreds of farmers raised the crop. Going forward, I find that the loss 
of tobacco farming has contributed to the decline of the agrarian culture and economy of the 
mountains as a livelihood and way of life. Some emerging agrarian strategies in Appalachia, 
such as sustainable agricultural efforts, provide some hope for a renewed agrarian culture and 
economy. In the conclusion to this thesis, I suggest that these efforts have much to learn from 
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the history and development of the tobacco program/tobacco economy and that finding 
common ground between the two is key. 
An introduction: The culture and economy of tobacco in Bethel 
Bethel, in western Watauga County, North Carolina, is the county’s only remaining 
tobacco growing community. Since burley tobacco first came to Watauga County, farmers in 
Bethel have grown the crop. Although many Appalachian and mountain communities trace 
the roots of their tobacco economies to well before the twentieth century, burley tobacco was 
not an important cash crop in Watauga County until the 1930s and 1940s. To use an example 
from Chapter 4, Madison County, North Carolina, today about a two-hour drive from 
Watauga County, produced over 2.2 million pounds of burley tobacco on 2,186 farms in 
1929 (U.S. Census, 1930). Prior to that, in the late nineteenth century, Madison was one of 
North Carolina’s major bright leaf tobacco producers. Watauga County, however, had no 
such tobacco history. Just 54 farms reported growing tobacco in Watauga County in 1929, 
producing approximately 15,000 pounds on 20 acres (ibid.). Clearly, even within the 
mountains of North Carolina, agrarian cultures and economies developed differently. These 
statistics with regard to Watauga County’s late entrance into the tobacco economy, along 
with data collected from interviews in Bethel, point toward Bethel’s roots in subsistence-
based agriculture, an argument that is developed further in Chapter 4.  
Throughout the twentieth century in Bethel and Watauga County, despite tobacco 
farms being quite small, often a half-acre to two acres, tobacco farming was ubiquitous. In 
1969, some 777 farms reported growing tobacco in Watauga County (U.S. Census of 
Agriculture, 1969). After 1971, when the lease and transfer of quota provision became a part 
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of the burley program, tobacco production began to concentrate in areas most thoroughly 
involved in tobacco farming. In the case of Watauga County, leasing quotas could only take 
place within county lines, and the Bethel community was one of the places within the county 
where tobacco production trended towards, thus further engraining tobacco farming in 
Bethel, where it is still grown today.  
Bethel’s tobacco culture and economy was predicated on the inherent stability that the 
federal tobacco program provided for farmers. The tobacco program functioned to control the 
amount of tobacco on the market and its baseline price on the market. In practice, for 
example, this made burley tobacco grown on one acre in Watauga County competitive with 
burley grown on, say, 50 acres in Tennessee. The program allowed small tobacco farmers in 
the mountains the opportunity to receive a competitive price on their crops. This fact is 
crucial to understanding why and how tobacco farming continued into the twenty-first 
century in mountain communities. The program allowed these communities, such as Bethel, 
to maintain their social and cultural connections even as modernization, and later 
neoliberalism and free markets, began to change the structure of work and life in American 
agriculture. If the program had not existed or had failed in 1970 or in the mid-1980s, tobacco 
farming in the mountains would not have lasted as long as it did. 
By the 1990s, significant pressures from health organizations, fiscal conservatives in 
Congress, and free market and neoliberal advocates, worked to terminate the tobacco 
program. In 2004, the program ended, and the U.S. tobacco farming economy was finally 
deregulated. The effects of this decision were felt immediately. As the 2007 Census of 
Agriculture statistics clearly show, after the buyout, tobacco production in the mountains all 
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but ended. Watauga County, which in 2002 had 187 tobacco farms, in 2007, 3 years after the 
buyout, had just 11 tobacco farms. Its production fell from close to one million pounds, 
roughly its historic average, to barely 44,000 pounds in three years. Without the program, 
tobacco farming in the mountains was simply not viable economically. Tobacco prices were 
dropping, labor and input costs were rising, and things were too difficult for mountain 
farmers to profit from raising tobacco. Since most of these former tobacco farmers grew 
tobacco part-time or as a part of diversified farm work, losing tobacco money was not 
economically devastating to most livelihoods. But, I believe its cultural losses were 
substantial, because a tradition and way of life had been lost. This past year in Bethel, only 
three people raised tobacco, and Bethel is the last tobacco growing community in Watauga 
County. With the tobacco economy now in a new state of affairs, it is doubtful mountain 
tobacco farmers will raise tobacco in the years to come. What does this mean for the agrarian 
culture and economy of the mountains in the future? 
A note on terminology 
Throughout this thesis, a few words, phrases, and one place name, Bethel, are used 
that require some explication at the outset. For the purposes of this thesis, any use of the 
place name Bethel refers to the greater area of western Watauga County within which the 
community of Bethel is located. Historically, Arthur (1915) refers to this section of the 
county as Beaverdams, another community within what is now known as Bethel (see Map 
4.1). Today, Watauga County still employs the traditional name of the area, Beaver Dam, 
with regard to its voting precincts (“Watauga County Board of Elections: Precincts,” 2011). 
In practice, however, this area is most often called Bethel, and likely the use of this name 
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stems from the historic Bethel High School, which was built in 1934 and closed in 1965 
when Watauga County consolidated all high schools (Corbitt, 1976). During the years of 
Bethel High School, it stands to reason that Bethel became the de facto name of the Beaver 
Dam/Beaverdams area. I use the name Bethel in this thesis to refer to what is still officially 
the Beaver Dam township/voting precinct (see Map 1.1). 
Map 1.1. Watauga County townships (U.S. Census Bureau). Retrieved from: 
http://www2.census.gov/geo/maps/general_ref/cousub_outline/cen2k_pgsz/nc_cosub.pdf 
 
 
A few other important words and phrases also need clarification at this point. As is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, the federal tobacco program was not merely one 
program for all tobacco varieties, but several programs for each variety of tobacco (Mann, 
1975). Burley tobacco, therefore, had its own “program.” In most cases, any use of the phase 
“tobacco program” refers to the federal burley tobacco program, unless otherwise noted, or 
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unless the topic at hand is noticeably broad. For example, when the discussion concerns, say, 
“how free market ideologies helped undermine the tobacco program in the 1990s,” the use of 
the term “tobacco program” refers to all of the programs (burley, flue-cured, dark, etc.). Still, 
in most cases, any use of the phrases “tobacco program” or simply “the program” should 
point back to the burley tobacco program and burley economy. The context of the 
discussions, topics, and chapters in this thesis are clear enough to enable the reader to discern 
how to interpret the meanings of the phrase “tobacco program.” As an example, “the end of 
the tobacco program in 2004 is often referred to as ‘the buyout.’” In this case, the tobacco 
program refers to all the programs. Moreover, “the buyout” is the common name for the end 
of the program, because tobacco companies paid nearly ten billion dollars to tobacco quota 
holders, typically in ten years installments, to deregulate the U.S. tobacco economy and end 
the program (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5). The term, “the buyout,” is also used throughout this 
thesis in reference to the end of the program. 
Lastly, the phrase “mountain tobacco farming” and its derivatives are used throughout 
this thesis to denote the distinctiveness of burley tobacco farming communities in the 
Southern Appalachian Mountains from other burley producing regions. For the purposes of 
this thesis, “mountain tobacco farming” or “tobacco grown in the mountains” refers primarily 
to the mountain counties of Western North Carolina. This definition can also include Unicoi 
County, Tennessee and Johnson County, Tennessee, a neighboring mountain county of 
Watauga County, North Carolina. References to mountain tobacco farming in this thesis may 
also characterize the mountain portions of Tennessee counties which span the state line with 
North Carolina. This definition of mountain tobacco farming does not include counties in 
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eastern Kentucky, West Virginia, or the foothills and valleys of Virginia and Tennessee, 
though there may be similarities between these burley producing areas and the mountain 
counties of western North Carolina. 
Methods 
In my ethnographic research with tobacco farmers in Watauga County, I have 
primarily relied upon qualitative data for analyzing the culture and economy of tobacco 
farming in Bethel, Watauga County, North Carolina. In order to distill the qualitative 
information I have gathered, this thesis consists of my own words and observations about the 
meaning of what my informants, the tobacco farmers of Bethel, have told me through their 
words and actions (Bernard, 2006). For a topic such as this, gathering qualitative 
information, and using or supplementing with quantitative data analysis, provides a well-
rounded method for answering questions related to the statement of the problem, such as, 
“How did a stable tobacco price and market, over the course of the twentieth century, help 
maintain a farming culture in the mountains of western North Carolina?” Starting with these 
types of questions provides the baseline from which to begin qualitative research. 
The research for this thesis began in my first semester of graduate school, in the fall 
of 2010 in Dr. Fred Hay’s Appalachian Studies 5000 course, Bibliography and Research, 
with an exhaustive bibliography regarding tobacco farming in the southern Appalachian 
Mountains. In the spring semester of 2011, my focus for this project began to take shape in 
Dr. Susan Keefe’s Anthropology 5450 course, Qualitative Methods and Research. Over the 
course of the next year, I had many informal conversations with Watauga County residents 
with regard to tobacco farming, worked with one farmer in Bethel, Mr. Shelby Eggers, as a 
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participant observer, conducted interviews with current and former tobacco farmers in 
Bethel, and examined quantitative data related to the topic. 
Participant observation 
Participant observation is data collection in the field and can take many forms 
(Bernard, 2006). In qualitative research, participant observation typically involves fieldwork 
and field notes, taking photographs, and recording audio and interviews, etc. Bernard (2006) 
writes that participant observation “involves immersing yourself in a culture and learning to 
remove yourself every day from that immersion so that you can intellectualize what you’ve 
seen and heard, put it into perspective, and write about it convincingly” (p. 344). The goal, 
then, is to collect better and more accurate data from which to draw conclusions to the 
problem. 
My own method of participant observation has entailed fieldwork with a tobacco 
farmer in Bethel, Shelby Eggers. Beginning in late summer of 2011 and continuing through 
the winter of 2012, I traveled to Bethel during key times of the tobacco-growing season to 
see and participate in the process of raising a tobacco crop. This experience as a participant 
observer benefitted the research for this thesis greatly. For one thing, working with Mr. 
Eggers allowed me to develop better rapport with him. As Bernard (2006) writes, “just 
hanging out is a skill,” and in my experience in the field, hanging out, learning how to work 
tobacco, having conversations, and becoming friends all helped provide rapport, or trust, 
between myself and Mr. Eggers. Gaining trust, then, allowed me to gain a more full access 
into a part of Bethel’s farming culture. I was able to hear jokes, stories about farming in the 
community, was able to ask deeper and tougher questions, and ultimately, I believe, I was 
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able to draw more accurate conclusions. Developing rapport is a critical aspect of good 
research, because it provides the researcher access to a part of the culture under observation 
that is typically unavailable through other methods, such as one-time interviews. 
Interviewing 
The ways to conduct an interview for scholarly research vary. At one end of the 
spectrum, some are strictly structured, while at the other end, some interviews are wholly 
unstructured, yet, not informal (Bernard, 2006). Ethnographic interviewing often falls along 
the lines of unstructured or semistructured. In the first interviews with tobacco farmers for 
this thesis (the first interviews I had ever conducted), I relied upon an interview guide made 
up of questions that I thought pertained to the cycle of growing tobacco and the changes that 
have taken place in the tobacco economy over the years. As I got more comfortable 
conducting interviews and learned more about my topic, I relied less on a formal set of 
questions and more on an unstructured interview style to gather information. 
Whereas participant observation created rapport and provided an inside look into 
Bethel’s tobacco culture and economy, interviewing current and former tobacco farmers 
provided significant qualitative data in one sitting, typically, an hour to an hour and a half.  
The data gathered from these interviews in the spring of 2011, then, became the foundation 
for this thesis. These interviews provided information that is unattainable in any book or 
scholarly source, making this research unique within the field of anthropology and 
Appalachian Studies on the one hand, and bringing a new story to the greater fabric of work 
being done in agrarian/tobacco farming communities, on the other (Algeo, 1997; Benson, 
2012; Donaldson, 2011; Griffith, 2009; Kingsolver, 2011; Stull, 2009).  
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Quantitative data 
Qualitative data gathered through interviews and participant observation also 
prompted the addition of quantitative data to this thesis. Both interview and participant 
observation data shed light on factors of this research that I previously overlooked, was 
unsure about, or had not heard about. In these cases, agricultural census statistics, road maps, 
state extension documents, and previous scholarly research, among other things, greatly 
aided the development of the arguments put forth in this thesis. During the writing process of 
this project, when data collected from interviews left me with more questions than answers, 
quantitative data helped solidify the foundations of this thesis. Specific dates of events, such 
as the switch from acreage to poundage quotas in 1971 (see Chapter 3), were illuminated by 
quantitative data. U.S. Census of Agriculture statistics were also vital to this research. Many 
of my arguments, specifically regarding the subsistence-based culture and economy of Bethel 
prior to the 1930s, could not have been made if not for census data, which a) backed up 
information gathered in interviews and b) provided hard facts concerning the farming 
economy of Watauga County in the 1930s. Employing both qualitative and quantitative 
research, therefore, has greatly benefitted the arguments put forth in this thesis. 
Overview 
What does the loss of tobacco farming mean for the agrarian culture and economy of 
Bethel and other mountain communities going forward? I find that without tobacco and 
without the tobacco program, farming in the mountains as a livelihood and way of life will 
continue to decline. As one man from Bethel told me this past winter as we graded tobacco, 
“Anymore, farming is just a hobby.” Despite the fact that tobacco farming only provided 
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partial sources of incomes, tobacco was a critical means of keeping farms and farm 
communities actively working at farming as a job. It was part of a diversified operation, and 
many farmers were able to use combinations of tobacco, cattle, logging, and other work, to 
make a living. Without tobacco, that diversified system is less resilient and less economically 
feasible, and subsequently, the future of farming in Bethel is in doubt. Though there are 
hopes and possibilities that organic or sustainable agriculture can revive fading farming 
cultures and economies in the mountains, it remains to be seen whether these initiatives will 
create the type of long-term stability that the tobacco program did. Farming as a way of life 
survived in Bethel for so many years, because the tobacco program provided small farmers 
with competitive prices for their crops, and this prolonged the social and cultural connections 
of this place into the twenty-first century. For an agrarian culture and economy to reemerge 
in the mountains in the twenty-first century, attention must be given to the story of tobacco 
farming and the tobacco program.  
 CHAPTER 2 addresses the global economic framework within which the tobacco 
economy was, and is, situated. A brief examination of development, capitalism, and 
neoliberalism shows how globalization and economic policy have changed over the course of 
the twentieth century, leading to changes in the tobacco economy in places such as Bethel. 
Moreover, this chapter discusses complex systems theory/resilience thinking, which provides 
the framework for understanding globalism’s effects at the local level. 
 CHAPTER 3 outlines the structure and function of the federal tobacco program. The 
chapter examines how and why the program developed, how the program was maintained 
throughout the twentieth century, how key leaders were crucial to the success of the program, 
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and how and why the program ended. Because the federal tobacco program sustained 
mountain tobacco farming throughout the twentieth century, an examination of the tobacco 
program is critical for understanding the tobacco culture and economy of Bethel.  
 CHAPTER 4 examines the context of mountain tobacco farming in Bethel, Watauga 
County, North Carolina. The chapter discusses literature pertaining to rural communities, 
agrarian ways of life, and tobacco farming and combines it with quantitative and qualitative 
data regarding the historic tobacco culture and economy of Bethel and Watauga County. 
 CHAPTER 5 tells the story of tobacco farming in Bethel from the perspectives of 
Bethel’s tobacco farmers. The chapter examines how the culture and economy of tobacco 
farming has changed in Bethel from the early days of growing the crop, through the years of 
the program, and now to the deregulated tobacco economy years. For the most part, tobacco 
farming in the mountains is no longer possible, and this chapter explores why this is so.  
 CHAPTER 6 concludes this thesis by briefly exploring the possibilities of sustainable 
agriculture emerging in place of tobacco in the Appalachian Mountains. Are there other 
agricultural options for agrarian communities that once relied upon tobacco farming? The 
chapter discusses this question and puts forth ways in which sustainable agriculture 
movements might benefit from studying the development of the tobacco economy/federal 
tobacco program. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE TOBACCO ECONOMY FROM THE GLOBAL TO THE LOCAL 
Introduction 
In order to understand why tobacco farming has disappeared from the mountain 
economy, it is necessary to situate the tobacco economy of Bethel within a broader 
framework of Western economic policy and globalization, because, ultimately, these factors 
directly contributed to the decline of mountain tobacco farming. And so, this chapter 
undertakes an examination of development, capitalism, and neoliberalism in order to 
demonstrate how Bethel fits within this larger global economy. The discussion of 
neoliberalism and the changes it brought to the tobacco economy in the United States, then, 
informs a discussion of how complex systems theory provides a solid framework from which 
to view how the tobacco economy has operated over time. This chapter provides the global 
context within which the tobacco economy of Bethel operated. 
The first section of this chapter begins with a discussion of development. Scott (1998) 
writes that traditional development, as conceived by the ancient Greeks, for example, 
encompassed local knowledge and limits to growth, among other things, and differs greatly 
from present-day notions of linear development, or linear progress. A brief history of 
capitalism is important for understanding the context of burley tobacco farming in the 
Appalachian Mountains, because, on the one hand, tobacco produced in the United States, 
since Europeans first began cultivating the crop, has always been a global commodity 
(Goodman, 2005; Kingsolver, 2011). Therefore, the very existence of a commercial tobacco 
market in the twentieth century in Bethel can trace its roots to the global trade and the 
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expansion of capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, 
examining the processes of capitalism helps to make sense of the U.S. tobacco economy prior 
to the New Deal and informs how post-World War II development theories, epitomized by 
the Truman Doctrine, worked to create conditions that were conducive to the expansion of 
markets across the world. The merger of development and capitalism fostered a greater 
emphasis on production and efficiency and created economic changes and disruptions abroad 
and in the United States (Escobar, 1995). Moreover, this market ideology directly altered the 
course of American agriculture in the twentieth century, forcing hundreds of thousands 
people off of farms and eventually leading to the farm debt crisis in the 1980s, among other 
things (Dudley, 2000). 
The policies and ideologies that fueled the Truman Doctrine also led to the instability 
of underdeveloped nations’ economies, and by the latter decades of the twentieth century, 
and in a climate of economic instability, a new strain of capitalism that embraced free 
markets and free trade began to emerge: neoliberalism (Benson, 2012; Escobar, 1995; 
Harvey, 2005; Plant, 2010; Touraine, 2001). Plant (2010) writes that the neoliberal state:  
is not inspired by social justice; it is limited in scope; it is not designed to change 
relative positions of individuals and groups within society; it embodies a view of 
negative liberty; it is compatible only with a set of negative rights; it does not seek the 
achievement of specific ends such as social justice or social solidarity (p. 250). 
Neoliberalism embraces the idea that market solutions rather than government intervention 
should drive economic policy and actions. And yet, there are no clear reasons as to how the 
neoliberal principle of government non-intervention could apply, for instance, to the banking 
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crisis of 2008 (Plant, 2010). As Carlsen (2003) argues, this principle of government non-
intervention in the markets is a myth: although neoliberals espouse their disgust for 
government intervention, they do, in fact, use government to distort market conditions in 
order to create the “free market.” Subsidies, tax breaks, financing, and global trade 
organizations all work to keep the market “free.” Rather than benefitting the world’s poor, 
working classes, and middle classes, this neoliberal model concentrates wealth and disrupts 
traditional livelihoods (Carlsen, 2003). Neoliberal principles squarely oppose social 
justice/egalitarian/democratic initiatives and programs. As part of this neoliberal agenda, 
direct foreign investment in tobacco production by tobacco companies helped create the 
conditions necessary for undermining regulated tobacco production in the United States 
(Benson, 2012). These initiatives served to weaken support for the federal tobacco program, 
eventually leading to its end in 2004, and in the aftermath a new state of tobacco farming 
emerged. 
 Lastly, a discussion of complex systems theory provides a good framework from 
which to view the conditions that have characterized tobacco farming in the U.S. throughout 
the twentieth century. In this section, the adaptive cycle, which views systems in terms of 
four phases: reorganization, growth, conservation, and release, and is a counterpoint to 
models of linear growth, is explained and put forth as the best way to examine the tobacco 
economy. Grasping the basics of complex systems theory allows for an understanding of how 
and why the U.S. tobacco economy/tobacco program developed, sustained, and changed over 
time. This consciousness, therefore, can inform the possible future development of renewed 
agrarian cultures and economies in the mountains. 
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Development 
Traditionally, prior to the global rise of capitalism, which began with European 
expansion across the oceans, development implied the process of living and growing within 
the cyclical nature of life. For the ancient Greeks, development was restrained within the 
confines of a natural environment/ecosystem and social system (Schech and Haggis, 2000). 
This is not to say that these were static and insular societies, however, but that their 
development had limits, and as is shown in the next chapters, the cultural and economic 
structure of pre-1930s Bethel shares similarities with this mode of development. As the 
twentieth century progressed, the idea of development increasingly consisted of achieving 
progress in a linear, standardized fashion. Achieving “development” became the goal of 
modern economies, and this ideal subsequently influenced economic policy in the U.S. and 
abroad. Eventually, this framework created the conditions necessary for the expansion of 
neoliberalism around the world. 
We know from stories such as The Odyssey the extent that the Greeks traveled, but in 
such stories, we also find a dedication to native soil and family, as illustrated by Odysseus’s 
longing to return home. Perhaps more strikingly, this dedication is found within Penelope’s 
use of metis, or the practical experience that makes up knowledge, in determining the true 
Odysseus. Contrasting twentieth century agrarian standardization with the traditional 
development of the Greeks, James Scott (1998) posits that metis informs Penelope’s testing 
of Odysseus. She says to Eurycleia and the Stranger (the disguised Odysseus): “move the 
sturdy bed stead out of our bridal chamber—that room the master [Odysseus] built with his 
own hands” (Homer, 1996, p. 461). Upon hearing this remark, Odysseus becomes obviously 
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inflamed, because he shares intimate knowledge with Penelope that their bed is literally 
rooted in the ground, being crafted from the base of an olive tree. Thus, by acknowledging 
the history of their bed and the olive tree, Odysseus confirms his true identity to Penelope.  
Perhaps, then, if this scene may be framed in terms of development for the present 
argument, the metis displayed by Odysseus and Penelope, or the practical experience that 
provides their knowledge, indicates that holistic development encompasses a devotion to a 
specific place on the one hand, and a shared/specific knowledge of that place on the other, 
which can then inform life’s decisions. Within the life, death, decay, and rebirth cycle of life, 
this pursuit of development inherently encompasses diversity, adaptability, and complexity 
and rejects such things as standardization and lack of context (Scott, 1998).  
The American agrarian economy of the twentieth century encompassed aspects of 
both local context and standardization. Bethel’s pre-1930s subsistence-based economy, for 
example, more closely resembled the traditional economy that Scott (1998) credits to the 
ancient Greeks. To be sure, compared to the rest of America, and to other tobacco producing 
regions of Appalachia, Bethel was late in its involvement in the modern market economy 
(Algeo, 1997; Donaldson, 2011; Hatch, 2008). This point is explicated in more detail in 
Chapter 4, but for now, it suffices to say that even during Bethel’s transition to full 
involvement in the market economy post-1930s, its agrarian economy held over aspects of 
local knowledge and social connections from its traditional past.  
The catalyst that sparked Bethel’s transition to the market economy and allowed it to 
maintain its agrarian identity throughout the twentieth century was, ironically, an act of 
standardization: the development of the federal tobacco program in the 1930s. But, even 
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though this federal act standardized tobacco markets in the United States, it still allowed for 
regional differences, or local tobacco contexts. As is detailed in Chapter 3, the federal 
tobacco program did not encompass one program of price supports and production controls 
for all tobacco in the United States (Mann, 1975). Since different U.S. regions specialized in 
different varieties of tobacco (i.e., burley, dark, flue-cured, etc.), and since each variety had 
its own distinct growing, curing, and marketing differences, each variety of tobacco had its 
own federal tobacco program, managed by regional cooperatives (Mann, 1975). Although the 
tobacco program imposed standardization, the program still encapsulated local/regional 
knowledge and context. And, as is illustrated in more detail in the next chapter, the program 
safeguarded tobacco farmers from the unregulated forces of the markets, enabling the 
continuation of traditional ways of life in places such as Bethel (Benson, 2012; Griffith, 
2009; Stull, 2009; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998).  
With the onset of European expansion and capitalism during the Enlightenment 
period, development, then, became more associated with achieving linear progress (Schech 
and Haggis, 2000). In this way, development became less of a cyclical/natural process and 
more of an intention, whereby nation states imposed control and order on processes of 
development, or human advancement, at home and around the world (Schech and Haggis, 
2000). This development model lent itself to centuries of European colonization, to twentieth 
century distinctions between developed and underdeveloped countries, to goodwill 
development policies, and to corporate marketing strategies aimed at maximizing corporate 
profit (Benson, 2012; Escobar, 1995; Schech and Haggis, 2000). The hallmark of these 
initiatives, besides being fundamentally linked to trade and economic expansion, rests in their 
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linear attempts to impose some kind of standardization in order to achieve development. The 
problem is that these attempts often disrupt the cultural, economic, ecological, and social 
structures of communities around the world. Moreover, the world’s development problems, 
such as hunger, economic instability, and poverty, are not improving (Escobar, 1995).  
The notion of linear development differs from the type of traditional development 
that, like The Odyssey, embraced the natural turn of life and death and was based on 
specificity and local knowledge. According to Scott (1998), this notion of development, 
which embraces local social and ecological contexts, seems “ideally suited to postindustrial 
capitalism” (p. 354). In effect, perhaps it’s time we returned to life, and therefore 
development, within limits—a topic returned to in the conclusion of this thesis, with regard 
to the future of agrarian cultures and economies in the mountains (see Chapter 6). As of now, 
however, this is decidedly not the way the current tobacco economy is structured in the 
United States and around the world (Benson, 2012; Griffith, 2009; Kingsolver, 2011; Stull, 
2009). The current tobacco economy favors by and large more standardization, increased 
mechanization and efficiency, larger operations, and inexpensive labor. It is the opposite of 
Scott’s (1998) ideal.  
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Capitalism 
“He smiled and all his teeth were covered with tobacco stains, 
He said ‘It don’t do men no good to pray for peace and rain. 
Peace and rain is just a way to say prosperity, 
And buffalo chips is all it means to me…’ 
 
‘It’s faster horses, younger women, older whiskey, and more money.’” 
 
- Tom T. Hall (1975) 
 
In this section, a brief overview of capitalism, from its origins to its current neoliberal 
bent, provides the background for understanding the progression of the United States tobacco 
economy during the twentieth century. Reviewing capitalism’s nascent stages sheds light on 
government’s historic role in the marketplace. As trade expanded and the Industrial 
Revolution transformed the global economy in the nineteenth century, the role of government 
began to change as deregulated economic spheres came to characterize major industries, such 
as the tobacco industry, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In many ways, 
capitalism has come full circle since the time of these American monopolies: after a period of 
swift government involvement in the marketplace during the New Deal years and an 
extended period of government regulation in the tobacco economy during the twentieth 
century, the tobacco economy is once again deregulated and subject to the uncertainties 
deregulation brings. 
Just as Enlightenment thinking influenced notions of development, so too did its 
principles, such as individuality, empiricism, freedom, specialization, etc., crossover into the 
economic sphere and influence the rise of global capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. These principles fell hand in hand with the global expansion of European trade 
already under way, which, beginning in the 1400s, continued through the 1600s and into the 
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era of European colonization (Robbins, 2002). As part of this global trade, of course, stood 
tobacco, which was first grown commercially in the Americas by the Spanish in the sixteenth 
century and then by the British in the 17
th
 century (Greene, 1994). By the 1700s, the global 
European gold and silver trade had evolved into mercantilism, whereby states sought to 
protect and expand trade in order to prevent wealth from leaving their nations, and this led to 
the rise of protective economic legislation, the continued exploitation of cheap labor supplies 
(i.e., slavery), and the evolution of joint stock companies, among other things (Robbins, 
2002). Moreover, this era saw the rise of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, which 
combined with the mercantilist expansion of trade, transformed Britain, and eventually the 
rest of the Western countries, and ushered in the capitalist economy (Robbins, 2002). In this 
emerging climate of capitalism, commercial tobacco production began to flourish in the 
colonial United States and a culture and economy of growing tobacco developed (Greene, 
1994). 
Robbins (2002) writes that the capitalist economy requires “purchasing and 
combining the means of production and labor power to produce commodities…that are then 
sold for a sum greater than the initial investment” (p. 79). One central area where the 
capitalist economy differs from pre-capitalist economies is labor power. Eric Wolf (in 
Robbins, 2002) suggests that capitalism exists because the link between producers and the 
means of production has been cut, and thus those denied that access, to land for example, 
must then “negotiate with those who control the means of production for permission to use 
the land and tools and receive a wage in return” (p. 79). This use of labor turns peasants, for 
instance, into laborers and consumers, making the accumulation of wealth possible for those 
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who control the means of production. In the history of tobacco farming in the U.S., this 
includes slaves, tenant farmers, and migrant workers, who not owning their own land have 
had to negotiate with landowners (often other tobacco farmers) for their livelihoods and/or 
wages (Kingsolver, 2007). Furthermore, the state provides its power in capitalist economies 
to maintain labor control, provide infrastructure, and regulate competition (Robbins, 2002; 
Goodman, 2005).  
The role of the state regarding tobacco production has varied over the course of 
American history. American industry, including the tobacco industry for example, benefitted 
enormously in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from a relaxed regulatory 
climate. As is discussed at greater length in the next chapter, tobacco farmers prior to the 
New Deal legislation of the 1930s dealt with fluctuating market prices for their tobacco and 
were subsequently left with unstable economic livelihoods, because the U.S. tobacco 
economy was controlled by a monopoly, American Tobacco Company (ATC) (Stull, 2009; 
van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). ATC effectively controlled the means of production, and 
maximized their profit, by creating a tobacco economy in which tobacco farmers produced 
increasing amounts of tobacco that brought a continually lower and fluctuating price. This 
worked to the detriment of those farmers (Goodman, 2005; Greene, 1994). Although the 
ATC monopoly was broken up in 1911, tobacco farmers still experienced market volatility 
until the 1930s when the federal government created price supports and production controls 
for tobacco (the federal tobacco program) that worked to stabilize the market for farmers 
(Badger, 1980; Goodman, 2005; Mann, 1975; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). This 
program lasted until 2004, decades past the time when other federal support programs for 
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crops such as corn and wheat had ended. The next chapter details the development of the 
tobacco program, its structure, how it functioned, and how the program, in spite of a 
changing agricultural and economic climate, continued to function to the benefit of small 
tobacco growers until the end of the twentieth century. The tobacco economy has come full 
circle, and now, characterized by neoliberalism, it more closely resembles the deregulated 
tobacco economy of the early twentieth century. 
An emerging form of development and capitalism: neoliberalism 
Understanding how and why neoliberalism emerged is crucial for understanding the 
conditions that led to the downfall of the tobacco program and the loss of tobacco farming in 
the mountains. This section details how the ideology of the Truman Doctrine fueled a 
combination of development and capitalism that sought ever-increasing amounts of 
efficiency in production, ultimately leading to the farm crisis of the 1980s. In the aftermath 
of the farm crisis, neoliberalism emerged, claiming that marketplace “freedom” from 
government intervention would correct problems such as the farm crisis. Eventually, these 
neoliberal goals clashed with the New Deal-era tobacco program, and tobacco farming, like 
the textile industry of North Carolina, moved to where production was cheapest and most 
efficient, leaving small farmers, such as those in Bethel, unable to raise tobacco. 
After the end of World War II, global capitalism, recently regulated in the U.S. during 
the first half of the twentieth century, began to encounter significant change (Escobar, 1995). 
By the 1950s, due in part to the independence efforts of former colonies, the increasing 
recognition of human rights, and to counteract global socialist/communist movements, 
Western nations and institutions began combining market economics with development 
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agendas to maintain and expand market and labor control while bringing the underdeveloped 
world into modernity (Escobar, 1995). At the center of this effort stood the Truman Doctrine, 
highlighted by Escobar (1995) as the complete restructuring of world affairs. The Truman 
Doctrine-worldview institutionalized the hierarchy between developed and underdeveloped 
nations. In its linear, standardized zeal—the antithesis of Scott’s (1998) traditional mode of 
development—it sought to end hunger, end poverty, and bring the poor to modernization by 
way of greater production: “the key to prosperity and peace” (Escobar, 1995, p. 3). 
Moreover, Truman declared, the “key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous 
application of modern scientific and technical knowledge” (Escobar, 1995, p. 3).  
The effects of the Truman Doctrine had direct impacts on agriculture and industry in 
America and around the world. After the Farm Bill of 1954, which dismantled price supports 
and production controls for most commodity crops—but not tobacco—American farms 
began consolidating, relying more on mechanization and heavy machinery, and taking on 
more debt, among other things, in order to increase production and efficiency (Berry, 1993a). 
Greater production in American agriculture necessitated the need for more markets, which in 
turn were sought abroad. When the grain embargo occurred in the late 1970s, over-extended 
American agriculture went bust, sparking the farm crisis of the 1980s (Dudley, 2000). 
Dudley’s (2000) work, Debt and Dispossession, chronicles the farm crisis in the Midwest 
and how competition between farmers, farm consolidation, and increasing amounts of farm 
debt, among other things, contributed to this crisis. For the purposes of this thesis, Dudley’s 
work at once shows how the tobacco economy, because of the federal tobacco program, 
differed from the rest of American agriculture in the 1980s. Furthermore, it foreshadows how 
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the tobacco economy would look after the end of the program. Many of the same 
consequences of the 1980s farm crisis now characterize tobacco production in the U.S. 
(Benson 2012; Kingsolver 2011; Griffith 2009; Stull 2009).  
How and why did the tobacco economy succumb to several of the same consequences 
that stemmed from the farm crisis of the 1980s? The answer, as Benson (2012) thoroughly 
develops, concerns corporate influence and investment in foreign markets. When the 
developed world hit its recession in the 1980s, the underdeveloped countries took a blunt hit 
as well. Adjustable interest rates placed extreme burdens on developing nations, to the point 
that the repayment of debts—even on the interest—was impossible (Robbins, 2002). In 
attempting to restructure the repayment of debts, debtor nations often had to increase 
revenues by increasing taxes, devaluing currency, increasing exports, and by reducing 
spending on social programs, and this restructuring made domestic goods cost more, while 
money was worth less and health and social services became more expensive (Robbins, 
2002). Essentially, the debt crisis helped create the leverage that developed nations and 
institutions needed to liberalize underdeveloped economies. By the 1980s, out were state-
owned enterprises and redistributive development approaches of third world countries, and in 
came the free market backed by world institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank (WB) (Escobar, 1995). This had the effect of placing any 
development discourse under the umbrella of market economics and this inherently 
undervalued local social, cultural, and ecological conditions (Escobar, 1995). These 
development/investment strategies aimed at economic growth came to rest in the hands of 
those in power; Escobar (1995) explains that in underdeveloped countries “hunger similarly 
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grew as the capacity of countries to produce the food necessary to feed themselves contracted 
under the pressure to produce cash crops, accept cheap food from the West, and conform to 
agricultural markets dominated by the multinational merchants of grain” (p. 104). In regards 
to tobacco production, the vulnerability of foreign economies in the 1980s provided tobacco 
companies with the opportunity to expand international operations and create cheaper 
supplies of tobacco (Benson, 2012).  
Simultaneously in the U.S., the farm crisis itself opened the doors to calls for less 
regulated trade and production and for the expansion of free markets, ostensibly to maximize 
economic growth, and this is the free market agenda known as neoliberalism (Benson, 2012; 
Harvey, 2005). The neoliberal ideology underscores the point that government regulation of 
markets is a detriment to economic growth (Harvey, 2005). Moreover, free markets 
supposedly correct themselves in times of economic uncertainty, while government 
regulation causes disasters such as the farm crisis of the 1980s (Harvey, 2005). At its 
foundation, neoliberalism coalesces the processes of modern development and capitalism, 
because its key tenets hold that unregulated trade and production will promote economic 
growth and well-being in the underdeveloped world (a goal of Truman Doctrine-era 
development policies) while creating markets for the products of the developed world 
(creating, for instance, economic growth in the U.S.) (Harvey, 2005). But, this is not the case; 
neoliberalism has not led to sustained economic growth (Harvey, 2005; Plant, 2010). Instead, 
in the U.S. for example, neoliberalism has led to the loss of factory jobs and farm jobs which 
have moved to places where production is cheapest, while simultaneously increasing 
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corporate profits (Benson, 2012; Berry 1993a; Escobar, 1995; Hamilton & Ryan, 1993; 
Harvey, 2005; Touraine, 2001).  
The neoliberal economic trend has disrupted the agrarian culture and economy of 
Bethel in many ways. For example, since nearby North Carolina furniture factories have 
closed and moved offshore in recent years, logging and operating sawmills in Bethel, once a 
mainstay of Bethel’s diversified economy, have declined. There is no longer a local demand 
for lumber. So too, once tobacco production was deregulated in the U.S. after 2004, tobacco-
farming economies have by and large come to resemble other free market industries, 
including subsidized American agriculture. Where it still exists, tobacco production today is 
more concentrated, more efficient, more capital-intensive, and labor structure is more 
hierarchical (Benson, 2012; Griffith, 2009; Kingsolver, 2011; Stull, 2009). For places such as 
Bethel, where small, one or two acre tobacco patches were the historical norm, neoliberalism 
has all but ended the culture and economy of tobacco farming. Like the furniture and textile 
industries in the Piedmont of North Carolina, tobacco farming has moved to where 
production is cheapest and most profitable for corporations (Benson, 2012). 
Complex systems theory 
According to Walker & Salt (2006), systems entail “the set of variables together with 
the interactions between them, and the processes and mechanisms that govern those 
interactions” (p. 164-165). Central to systems thinking is the concept of resiliency, defined 
by Walker & Salt (2006) as “the amount of change a system can undergo (its capacity to 
absorb disturbance) and remain within the same regime—essentially retaining the same 
structure functions and feedbacks” (p. 165). Systems, whether in regards to an ecological 
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system, such as a lake or a forest, or a social system, such as the tobacco program, function 
across scales and according to certain patterns and tendencies: re-organization (), growth 
(r), conservation (K), and regime change () (Walker & Salt, 2006). This is called the 
adaptive cycle and is pictured in Figure 2.1 below.  
Figure 2.1. The adaptive cycle, double loop 
Source: Resilience Alliance, retrieved from: http://www.resalliance.org/index.php/key_concepts 
 
 
In the adaptive cycle, the growth phase emerges out of the re-organizational phase 
and moves quickly to a longer stage of conservation, where forces from across scales 
pressure the system and the system retains resiliency. At other times, the conservation stage 
is not reached after the growth phase. At this point, the system releases, going from (r) to 
(), and the system again attempts to reorganize itself into a new stable state/conservation 
phase. The small loop from () to (r) to (), can occur multiple times before the system 
reaches a conservation stage (K). Once the system reaches the conservation stage, the system 
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becomes resilient, absorbing pressures and maintaining its basic structure and functions for 
an extended period. If the pressures become too great, the system begins to lose its resiliency, 
and the conservation stage gives way to a release (or regime change) phase. Upon release, the 
system moves into a stage of chaos and change whereby another growth cycle, and a new 
system, can emerge.  
 To apply the adaptive cycle to the tobacco economy, the tobacco program functions 
as a social-ecological system (SES), and thus is most accurately understood within a 
resilience framework. Understanding social systems in terms of resilience thinking is helpful 
in several ways. First, resilience thinking embraces a nonlinear, non-static, and diverse 
explanation of how systems work (Walker & Salt, 2006). Moreover, it views systems across 
scales, providing a more accurate picture of how a certain system operates and is affected.  
This perspective counters the notion, for instance, that economies can become continually 
more efficient and grow indefinitely (Walker & Salt, 2006). This linear trajectory works to 
standardize systems, making them less diverse and adaptable and therefore more susceptible 
to rigidity and a potential release phase. This, too, brings us back to the point made by Scott 
(1998) concerning the differences between traditional and modern development and his call 
for a framework of development that is less linear and more locally appropriate. Secondly, 
since resilience thinking provides a better idea of how complex systems operate, we 
subsequently gain a better understanding of how to manage complex systems (Walker & Salt, 
2006). This is important for understanding why the tobacco program was successful for 
farmers and then deteriorated (see Chapter 3). Lastly, since tobacco farming is nearly gone in 
the mountains, an understanding of complex systems can be useful in regards to working 
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towards and maintaining another desirable system, for instance, a stable infrastructure of 
small and/or organic farms.  
Conclusion 
 To fully grasp the rise and fall of tobacco farming in the mountains, it is necessary to 
examine the larger economic and global contexts within which this system operated. Several 
processes have been briefly discussed in this chapter that help accomplish this goal. First, the 
dichotomy between Scott’s (1998) traditional model of development, which emphasizes 
limits to growth and the cyclical nature of life, and the modern form of development, which 
emphasizes linearity and standardization without reference to local contexts, is discussed. 
Scott’s (1998) notion of development characterizes Bethel’s pre-1930 subsistence-based 
economy, and its future application holds promise with regard to reinvigorating traditional 
agrarian economies and cultures in the mountains (see Chapter 4 and 6). Secondly, a brief 
history of capitalism provides the background for the economic climate surrounding the 
creation of the federal tobacco program during the 1930s. Moreover, the changing role of 
capitalism during the twentieth century, especially concerning agriculture and the farm debt 
crisis of the 1980s, is contrasted by the tobacco program and its egalitarian nature. Thirdly, 
emerging after the farm crisis and the third world debt crisis, neoliberal policies and actions 
combined with capitalist and development agendas and resulted in direct foreign investment 
across the world. This advocacy for “free” markets has come to characterize global industries 
today. Although the U.S. tobacco economy withstood neoliberalism for several years, 
tobacco farming in the U.S. is now entirely deregulated. Lastly, tying all of these things 
together, complex systems theory, which provides a nonlinear, cyclical framework for how 
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systems function over time, is a helpful model for understanding the rise and fall of the 
tobacco economy, the tobacco program, and tobacco farming in the mountains. All of these 
processes show how Bethel’s tobacco economy fits within a larger global framework. As this 
thesis moves forward, this scope continues to narrow, next by examining the federal tobacco 
program (see Chapter 3) and then by discussing the context of tobacco farming at the local 
level in Bethel (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
 33 
CHAPTER 3: THE TOBACCO PROGRAM: 1938-2004 
Introduction 
The origins of the tobacco program begin in a regulatory climate not dissimilar to the 
current neoliberal era that characterizes the tobacco economy. Today’s tobacco farming 
industry is entirely deregulated, just as it was prior to the New Deal of the 1930s. The 
program has come full-circle: from its origins, to its development, to its decades-long run, 
and now after its end. As will be explained in greater detail later in this chapter, the tobacco 
program functioned to control the amount of tobacco on the market and its baseline price on 
the market. In short, this provided long-term stability for tobacco farmers and made tobacco 
grown on just a few acres price competitive on the market. This structure has clear 
implications for small tobacco farmers, and consequently, for tobacco farmers in the 
Appalachian Mountains, where tobacco allotments have historically been small yet 
ubiquitous. This chapter will outline how the tobacco program developed, how it functioned, 
and how key leaders proved influential in the maintenance and fate of the program. This 
history and analysis will provide the groundwork for an examination in Chapters 4 and 5 of 
the culture and economy of a mountain tobacco farming community: Bethel, Watauga 
County, North Carolina.  
To begin, this chapter will sketch the climate surrounding tobacco farming prior to 
the beginning of the program. In the early years of the twentieth century, the development of 
farmer-operated cooperatives and attempts at production controls and standards spawned the 
local and regional infrastructure that enabled federal officials to craft tobacco program 
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legislation. Initially, the 1933 New Deal farm bill, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 
of which the tobacco program was one part, was met with opposition, and it took five more 
years until permanent legislation took effect. After the permanent establishment of the 
second Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1938, the tobacco program operated continuously 
until 2004, but in essentially two major phases. Again, it is important to note that there was 
not one program for all tobacco farming. Specific varieties of tobacco, such as burley, flue-
cured, dark, etc., each had their own programs and their own marketing and price support 
structures and were managed by their own cooperatives. In the section that covers the burley 
tobacco program from 1938-1971, I describe the basic structure of the tobacco program, its 
goals, and how it functioned. During this time, the program controlled tobacco production by 
controlling the amount of tobacco acreage planted. I examine how this system changed over 
time and how the acreage allotments led to the near-collapse of the burley program. In the 
next section, covering the program in the 1970s, I examine how key leaders addressed the 
acreage allotment problems of the 1960s. These years also saw a changing of the guard 
concerning political leadership. By the 1980s, tobacco company influence had altered the 
way political leaders addressed the mounting criticism of the program. Relying on the work 
of anthropologist Peter Benson (2012), who has conducted significant research with regards 
to the tobacco economy in the U.S., I address how tobacco company influence changed the 
nature of the program in the 1980s and 1990s. Out of these years, a neoliberal movement 
toward the deregulation of tobacco production emerged, and in 2004, the program ended, 
with no regulatory guidelines and with little of the initially proposed economic concessions 
for farmers. Currently, with no federal tobacco program, tobacco farmers grow in an 
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unregulated, risky environment that favors larger operations where tobacco can be grown 
cheaper and more efficiently. This new environment is unfavorable for mountain tobacco 
farmers who have traditionally grown small allotments.  
Unregulated tobacco: 1890s-1930s 
By the 1890s, the tobacco economy was controlled by James B. Duke’s American 
Tobacco Company (ATC), a massive conglomeration of tobacco manufacturing companies. 
Commonly referred to as “the trust,” American Tobacco controlled 86 percent of the 
cigarette market by 1910, and, by being well capitalized, ATC aggressively cut market 
prices, undercut competition, and then bought the competition out (van Willigen & 
Eastwood, 1998). For tobacco farmers, American Tobacco’s monopoly provided fluctuating 
market prices and low returns on crops, and farmers often would not make enough to cover 
their costs. Still, during the early years of the twentieth century, demand for tobacco 
continued to rise while prices for the crop continued to fluctuate (van Willigen & Eastwood, 
1998).  
To counter the trust, tobacco farmers in Kentucky and Tennessee began to organize in 
the early twentieth century, forming cooperative groups to collectively sell their tobacco in 
hopes of getting better prices. Not all farmers wanted to sell their tobacco with cooperatives, 
and enough growers held out, selling to the trust and undermining the viability of the 
cooperatives. In response, cooperative farmers began raiding non-cooperative farmers in the 
dark tobacco region of western Kentucky and west Tennessee (van Willigen & Eastwood, 
1998). These “night riders” eventually shifted their efforts from non-cooperative farmers to 
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the power structure itself, attacking company warehouses and laying waste to company 
facilities (“400 night riders,” 1907).  
Similar developments occurred in the burley producing region of central Kentucky in 
the early twentieth century as farmers tried to organize and pool their burley tobacco crops, 
though resistance here was less violent and pooling efforts more successful than in the 
western region (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). Between 1902 and 1910, burley growers 
had some success pooling their crops, but could not negotiate a sale with the trust. This led in 
1908 to the “cut-out,” where burley growers en masse did not grow tobacco and thus 
withheld the crop from the market. This action worked for the cooperative, and the trust 
bought the stored cooperative crops of the previous years. In 1911, antitrust laws broke up 
American Tobacco, but cooperative efforts still did not find permanent success (van Willigen 
& Eastwood, 1998). 
The boom years of World War I brought high prices to tobacco markets and farmers 
but did not lead to the development of any farmer-led marketing organizations. When the war 
years ended, tobacco prices, like other commodity prices, dropped significantly. After the 
war, cooperative movements reemerged. One group, the Burley Tobacco Growers 
Cooperative Association (centered in Kentucky), gained some ground, establishing grading 
systems and high membership rates, but under-capitalization, non-cooperative tobacco, and 
lack of production controls undermined the cooperative’s overall effectiveness. In the end, 
the Great Depression would usher in the circumstances necessary to stabilize American 
agriculture and tobacco farming (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). 
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The birth of the tobacco program: 1933-1938 
 In 1933, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and enacted parity 
legislation to stabilize the American farming economy as part of President Roosevelt’s first 
“Hundred Days” (Badger, 1980). The measures were bold and against corporate interests: 
production of commodity crops was controlled and floor prices were backed by government 
support (Badger, 1980; Berry, 1993a). The AAA affected the biggest industries in 
agriculture, such as corn, wheat, cotton, and tobacco, but only in tobacco did the AAA have 
widespread farmer support (Campbell, 1962). Elsewhere in the country, the measures were 
more contentious (Badger, 1980; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998).  
One of the more progressive aspects of the development of the AAA tobacco plan 
involved what Badger (1980) calls “economic democracy.” In developing the plan for 
removing the surplus tobacco crop from the 1933 flue-cured tobacco market, the leaders of 
the AAA advocated direct farmer suggestions and proposals: if the growers wanted the AAA 
to do something, write it up and send it on and the AAA would examine it. Because of the 
work of the cooperatives over the years, tobacco growers at this time were already organized 
at the local and regional levels. They could, in effect, make proposals within their groups, 
and their group leadership could parley those requests to the AAA. Broadly, this interplay 
between the government and the growers’ groups mirrors the attempts at participatory 
development currently being employed in sustainable agriculture movements in Appalachia 
today and corresponds to several of John Gaventa’s and Rosemary McGee’s (2010) 
propositions concerning how citizen activism can influence national policy. This is a theme I 
will address more thoroughly in the conclusion to this thesis (see Chapter 6). In 1933, grower 
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participation in the program’s development process led to grower support for the production 
control measures they (growers) were eventually presented with by the AAA (Badger, 1980). 
Overall, the measures designed by the AAA built upon the work and goals of the 
cooperatives from the early twentieth century, and the passage of the 1933 bill indicates the 
extent to which government action “transformed the marketing position of the tobacco 
grower. In persuading the growers to sign up to reduce their acreage, the federal government 
did what state governments and the growers had long wanted to do” (Badger, 1980, p. 71). 
Government support provided transformational stability for tobacco farmers and market 
protection from the previously unrestrained forces of the tobacco manufactures. Looking 
back, the cooperatives, on their own, could only do so much to protect tobacco farmers and 
create stable livelihoods. To get to that next level, the growers needed the power and 
guarantee of the government in their corner.  
As another part of the 1933 farm bill, the federal government created the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC), which made loans to tobacco cooperatives and farmers. And as an 
example of the broad ranging effects of the New Deal legislation, Roosevelt’s administration 
established a national grain reserve which allowed the government to protect against high 
consumer prices during times of low supply (Berry, 1993b). Despite these gains, the AAA 
proved controversial, and the 1933 act was not permanently successful. 
The development of the AAA into permanent legislation took several years and many 
contentious discussions on local and national scales but eventually secured a favorable 
economic situation for tobacco growers. Yet, not all people involved in tobacco farming 
subsequently benefitted. Tobacco controls in the 1930s essentially “froze” who could grow 
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tobacco and who could not (Berry, 1993b). Quotas, which detailed how many acres of 
tobacco tobacco farmers could grow, were tied to the land, and the landowners who grew 
tobacco prior to 1933 reaped the benefits of the program. Moreover, small growers feared 
they would be permanently constrained to small acreages (Mann, 1975). In North Carolina, 
small flue-cured growers were unhappy with the flat acreage cut rate proposed by the 1933 
act (Badger, 1980). To decrease the amount of tobacco on the market (and thereby to raise its 
price), federal legislation proposed a flat percentage cut on every tobacco farmer’s acreage. 
Small growers claimed this flat cut on acreage was more detrimental to them than to the large 
growers. In theory, a ten percent reduction in acreage affects the farmer with ten acres more 
acutely than the farmer with 100 acres. Small growers feared that they would shoulder a 
disproportionate amount of the acreage reduction burden and that they might forever be stuck 
with just a few acres of tobacco, limiting their chances to expand operations, raise larger 
crops, and achieve economic prosperity (Badger, 1980).  
Along with the grievances of small growers, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and black 
farmers found themselves on the short end of the stick (Badger, 1980). In eastern North 
Carolina, and likely in other parts of the state and region, the tobacco program cemented the 
racial and social structures in place in the 1930s (Badger, 1980; Kingsolver, 2007). But, the 
New Deal policies had less to do with agrarian reform and more to do with economic 
recovery. Though rightly open to criticism for not working for more social and economic 
change, the New Deal policies of the 1930s, in light of the political obstacles they faced, 
could only do so much: the choice was between a limited program or no program at all 
(Badger, 1980). This is a theme that will continue to emerge throughout this chapter. 
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In 1934 and 1935, national and local level tobacco groups politicked for and against 
government grade standards, inspections, processing taxes, and warehouse and auction 
reforms, among other things (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). As well, corporate interests 
lobbied against any program and production control measures (Berry, 1993a). But, grower 
support for these measures played heavily into the determination of the program’s fate. The 
AAA argued that if the growers and their cooperatives supported the government sponsored 
grading system, then the AAA would work towards achieving those ends. This shows the 
importance of cooperation between local level groups and national level agencies and the 
crucial role of having key leaders (who support the local level) in positions of power and 
influence (Gaventa & McGee, 2010). The tobacco program likely could not have developed 
and been maintained for decades in any other way. 
As gains were being made for farmers, manufacturer efforts worked to sideline the 
program, and the constitutionality of the AAA was challenged on the national level. In 1936, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Butler struck down production controls and processing 
taxes as unconstitutional, thus ending the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act before its effects 
could be felt (Badger, 1980). Tobacco growers and tobacco congressmen were outraged; 
plans were immediately made to revive the tobacco program and efforts focused on 
organizing tobacco farmers in the Farm Bureau, working for permanent production control 
legislation, and permanently replacing the AAA, among other strategies (Badger, 1980). 
Working towards another AAA took two years (1936-1938), because, much to the frustration 
of tobacco states, most of the contentiousness surrounding the New Deal farm legislation 
concerned other commodities, such as wheat, cotton, and corn. Because tobacco growers 
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near-unanimously supported control measures, and because a tobacco program would not 
affect other commodity crop prices, tobacco legislation had a relatively easy time gaining 
acceptance in the proposed national farm bill of 1938 (Campbell, 1962). Because of disunity 
among farm organizations and the lack of an economic emergency, once proposed, passing 
the 1938 AAA took over a year (Badger, 1980).  
The burley tobacco program, 1938-1971 
The tobacco program is not one program for all tobacco, but several programs for 
different varieties of tobacco (i.e., a burley program and a flue-cured program; Mann, 1975). 
For the purposes of this thesis, any reference to the tobacco program, unless otherwise noted, 
refers to the burley tobacco program. So, how does the tobacco program work? The 1938 
farm bill legislation “authorized sources of credit to lend money to farmer co-operatives, 
which would, in turn, make loans to farmers on all tobacco that did not bring the government 
support price” (Berry, 1993b, p. 62). This marked the beginning of the tobacco program and 
the long-term cross-scale cooperation between the national government and local and 
regional farm cooperatives (Gaventa and McGee, 2010). At a basic level, the program did 
three things.  
First, farmer participation in the program controlled tobacco production: quota cards 
were issued to tobacco growers detailing the amount of acreage on which they were allowed 
to grow tobacco (Badger, 1980; Berry, 1993b). This system was voluntary, and voted in by 
the growers every three years, but the structure of the tobacco economy made growing under 
quota (basically) mandatory in order for farmers to make any profit. To keep farmers in the 
program, the government levied heavy taxes on non-program tobacco, to the point that 
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tobacco growers had to participate in the program (Badger, 1980; Berry, 1993b). To control 
production, as mentioned above, flat cuts on tobacco acreage occurred, limiting the amount 
of tobacco in the program and on the market. Acreage allotments were initially assigned 
based on historic tobacco production and the extent of cropland (Mann, 1975). In 1943 and 
1944, Congress raised the minimum allotment size for burley growers because of the high 
demand for cigarettes during World War II (Mann, 1975). After the war, acreage allotments 
were reduced as the marked demand for burley began to decline and as production yields per 
acre continued to increase. Through a series of complex political maneuverings in the late 
1940s and early 1950s that aimed to steady the burley program, the minimum protected 
acreage of tobacco was reduced from one acre to seven-tenths of an acre in 1953. Any 
tobacco acreage at this amount could not be further reduced. Still, the seven-tenths minimum 
was reduced to a half-acre minimum in 1955 as growers overwhelmingly approved the 
reduction by referendum, ostensibly to avoid the end of the program. Mann (1975) writes that 
this policy, in effect, established the principle of protecting the small burley grower over and 
above the large grower, a principle that characterized the program for decades to come. As 
the program evolved, small burley growers developed into a powerful enough voting bloc 
that they could conceivably vote out the tobacco program if they chose to do so. This was the 
fear of some growers and leaders in the burley tobacco economy. Furthermore, growers 
continued to increase tobacco yields per acre, putting more and more burley on the market. 
This added to the mounting instability of the program, but more on this development in a 
moment (Mann, 1975).  
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In addition to acreage allotments, second, the government established negotiated price 
floors for tobacco. These price floors were set during the New Deal and based until 1985 on 
parity prices that took into account production costs and provided farmers with a stable and 
secure price received (Berry, 1993a; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). The government did 
not pay out money to tobacco growers, as in traditional subsidies, but guaranteed a certain 
price for specific grades of tobacco (within specific varieties of tobacco: burley, flue-cured, 
dark, etc.). For the tobacco to sell at auction, it had to bring at least a penny above the 
minimum support price. Since everyone participated in the program, this price support 
system kept tobacco growers from undercutting each other and the companies from 
undercutting the growers, solving one of the problems that had plagued the cooperatives in 
the early twentieth century (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). 
If tobacco at auction did not sell for the baseline support price, then, third, farmer-
operated cooperatives bought the tobacco under loan, with those loans made available 
through the CCC, and the loaned tobacco was then held by the cooperative (Badger, 1980; 
van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). The cooperative re-dried and stored the tobacco, reselling 
it whenever possible. If the cooperative-held tobacco sold for more than the principle of the 
loan plus interest and costs, any excess profit went back to the farmer (Berry, 1993b; van 
Willigen & Eastwood, 1998).  
 Over the course of the tobacco program, government agencies helped farmers with 
credit, assistance, resource conservation, and quota management, among other things. In the 
1960s the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) established the Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS; Mann, 1975). It ran until 1994 and worked 
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with farmers towards farm stability, resource conservation, and helped manage the tobacco 
quota system. In 1995 the USDA reorganized and shifted the ASCS and other programs to 
the newly created Farm Service Agency (FSA; “About FSA,” 2008). The ASCS, reflecting 
national tobacco farm policy, valued local participation during its run from 1961 to 1994. 
Each state had an ASCS committee, and district committees were nested under that. These 
districts were made up of county committees, in turn made up of community committees 
(Mann, 1975). Over time, some consolidation occurred at the county and community levels, 
but the production control program continued to be administered at the county level (van 
Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). This committee had some say in the adjustment of marketing 
allotments, dealt with farmer grievances and problems, and coordinated the allocation of 
marketing quotas. This widespread participation effort provided growers with a voice in 
decision-making and was structured so that local concerns could scale up to the national level 
and become real policy or law (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). Furthermore, cooperative 
groups, such as the Burley Stabilization Corporation (BSC), which was the cooperative for 
North Carolina burley growers, managed tobacco pools, administered the program, and 
worked hand in hand with these government agencies and their agents (personal 
communication, R.G. Shipley, 2012). 
Returning to the discussion of the tobacco program’s structure, from 1941 to 1971 the 
burley tobacco program was controlled by acreage allotments—burley growers’ quota cards 
allowed for farmers to grow a half acre, three acres, ten acres, etc. of tobacco. Over time, 
farmers became increasingly adept at maximizing yield per acre, for instance, by planting 
tobacco plants closer together and by using more fertilizers. This raised their pounds/acre of 
 
 
 
 45 
tobacco and resulted in continual overproduction, which meant more tobacco was being 
taken on loan (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). Since limiting production meant cutting 
allotments of individual acreage, this strategy pushed more and more farmers toward smaller 
allotments (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). By the mid-1960s, overproduction and reduced 
acreage was creating serious problems for the burley tobacco program, and steps were taken 
to create legislation that would switch the burley allotments from acreage to poundage quotas 
(Mann, 1975). This proposed switch (which had already occurred in the flue-cured program 
in the 1940s) meant that burley farmers would be limited as to how many pounds of tobacco 
they grew, as opposed to how many acres (or half-acres). But, since small growers were 
already capped at a half-acre and could grow as many pounds on that allotment as they could, 
they felt they would lose their material advantage to larger operations by switching to 
poundage. So, when this proposal came up for referendum in 1967, burley growers, 
consisting of a large percentage of small growers, voted it down. The major supply problems 
of the program were not resolved (Mann, 1975). 
By 1970, the dire situation of the burley program had grown worse, and in response, a 
group of key tobacco leaders, headed by Granville Stokes, a University of Kentucky College 
of Agriculture associate dean, farm bureau leaders, and others, began meeting regularly to 
brainstorm a solution to the problem (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). The result was 
another proposal that outlined the switch from an acreage control system to a poundage 
system. Yet, this proposal lacked some of the more small-grower friendly measures that were 
included in the initial 1967 proposal (Mann, 1975; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). In May 
1971, a referendum was held and burley growers overwhelmingly approved the switch to 
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poundage (along with a few other changes), and the work of the tobacco leaders became 
federal legislation, saving the burley program (Mann, 1975; van Willigen & Eastwood, 
1998). Why did the small burley growers reject the switch to poundage in 1967 but approve 
it in 1971? According to Mann (1975), by 1971, “the choice was not poundage or the old 
program, it was poundage or no program” (p. 70). Here again we see how close the program 
came to ending, and how the work of key leaders helped maintain the program’s existence. 
The switch to poundage allotments helped the program, namely, by saving it from 
ruin (Mann, 1975; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). Up until the 1970s, the cooperatives had 
been taking on more tobacco than they could resell as farmers continued to produce more 
pounds per acre. And, since acreage allotments could not be reduced any less than a half-
acre, as more farmers approached the half-acre minimum, key leaders saw that the situation 
clearly would not resolve itself (Mann, 1975). The cooperative pools were saturated with too 
much tobacco, and something had to be done or the program looked ready to implode. The 
result was the switch to poundage allotments. In addition to poundage, the 1971 burley 
referendum also included the passage of a “lease and transfer” of allotment proposal, which 
had already been utilized in the flue-cured program since 1961 (Mann, 1975). For the first 
time, the lease and transfer option permitted burley tobacco growers to lease the poundage 
quota of other quota holders—within their county—and plant that leased allotment on their 
(the lessee’s) land. This provided burley growers the opportunity to expand their operations, 
although within limits. For other quota holders, lease and transfer allowed for them to profit 
from the value of their quota without having to grow tobacco (i.e., by leasing it to another 
farmer; Mann, 1975). Examining in closer detail the lease and transfer system also sheds 
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light on the changing dynamics of tobacco farming, and agriculture, in the U.S. by the 1970s. 
Across the country, hundreds of thousands of farmers were leaving farming and fewer 
farmers were raising increasing amounts of commodity crops. These changes made to the 
tobacco program in 1971 had clear impacts on the next thirty-plus years of the tobacco 
program, and it is to this discussion that I now turn. 
Changes to the program: the 1970s 
The 1971 lease and transfer system for burley tobacco came with a few stipulations. 
First, quotas could only be leased to farmers already in possession of their own permanent 
base poundage. This provision was included in order to protect the historic/past tobacco 
farmers’ claims to tobacco production from “new” or “outside” growers (Mann, 1975). 
Second, in spite of some attempts to introduce inter-county leasing into the 1971 program 
amendments, lease and transfer of quotas could only take place within counties. For example, 
a tobacco farmer in Bethel, Watauga County, could only lease a tobacco quota from a quota 
holder within Watauga County. A Watauga County farmer could not lease poundage from a 
quota holder in neighboring Ashe County. Third, farmers could only lease up to 15,000 
pounds of tobacco. This provision capped fears that leasing would consolidate burley farms 
into larger and larger operations (Mann, 1975). 
In addition to the poundage allotments and the lease and transfer system, the 1971 
changes also included a “carry-over” system (van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). This carry-
over provision allowed for farmers to sell up to 110 percent of their quota in a given year 
(lowered to 103 percent in 1985; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). Any tobacco sold over 
the 100 percent of allotment was then deducted from the next year’s quota (van Willigen & 
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Eastwood, 1998). If a farmer in Bethel had a quota for 4,000 pounds of tobacco in 1972, and 
they sold 4,400 pounds, ten percent over their quota, then, their quota for the following year, 
1973, would be ten percent less. The inverse was also true: if a farmer grew less than their 
poundage quota, the following year they could add that unsold amount to their base quota. 
This provision limited farmers from accumulating more than one hundred percent of their 
quota for use in the next year. If a crop failed in 1972, and only twenty-five percent of the 
quota was sold, the next year, 1973, the remaining seventy-five percent of 1972’s quota 
could be sold along with the 1973 pounds. This is one of the areas where the ASCS office 
helped farmers navigate the waters of the tobacco program (van Willigen & Eastwood, 
1998). 
As much as these provisions helped save the program, and in many cases made it 
better going forward for farmers and for non-farming quota holders, it also deemphasized the 
burley program’s historic favoring of the small grower (Mann, 1975). The lease and transfer 
provisions, as feared by some small growers and their defendants, eventually did move 
tobacco production away from smaller operations and toward areas characterized by larger 
allotments and more dense production patterns (Mann, 1975). In one way, especially 
concerning production patterns, this may be why Bethel has remained the last tobacco 
growing community in Watauga County. As more tobacco farmers quit raising the crop, their 
quotas went to areas where tobacco farming was most entrenched. I will return to this theme 
in Chapter 5. Still, these provisions in burley were less acute than in flue-cured tobacco 
farming. Rather quickly in the early 1970s, flue-cured farming became mechanized, more 
farms consolidated, and increasing numbers of tenant farmers and small growers were 
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pushed out or were already leaving farm work. Mann (1975) provided a thorough analysis of 
how these factors contributed to the distribution of benefits within tobacco farming in the 
early 1970s, in both the burley and flue-cured economies. He projected that modifications to 
the program worked to modestly level the distribution of benefits while technological 
advancements worked in the opposite way, concentrating the program’s benefits, as tended to 
be the case in flue-cured regions. As time has gone by, it is clear that Mann’s (1975) 
projections were accurate, especially in light of the buyout and the loss of the program in 
2004. To understand the conditions that led to the program’s downfall, it’s necessary to 
examine the changes that took place in the tobacco program during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The program in the 1980s and 1990s 
Despite all of the changes to the program that took place in the early 1970s, by the 
1980s many of the same problems had yet to be corrected; specifically, cooperatives 
continued to take on more tobacco while loans went unpaid and accrued interest (Benson, 
2012). This instability added to the already complex set of factors swirling around tobacco 
farming and tobacco consumption in the United States at this time. In response to mounting 
criticism from health-related groups and from neoliberals with regards to the government’s 
role in supporting tobacco production, another change was made to the program in 1982, this 
time, through a “no-net-cost” provision. Citing White (1988), Benson (2012) describes no-
net-cost and how it ultimately did not allay the stresses on the program: 
Theoretically, tobacco farmers would finance the guaranteed minimum prices for 
their unsold leaf through a three-cent per-pound assessment on all leaf sold at auction. 
These funds would then go to the co-ops and enable a self-sustaining safety net 
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system. But this compromise only worsened things. There were no incentives for 
tobacco companies to purchase more domestic leaf, much less a critical discussion of 
the international free trade agreements that facilitated tobacco leaf globalization. (p. 
99) 
When the first assessments failed to cover the loan costs for unsold tobacco, the next year’s 
assessment on farmers was raised to seven cents per pound. This added cost forced thousands 
of tobacco farmers on the edge of economic stability out of business (Benson, 2012).  
The changes that came with no-net-cost also provide a good opportunity to transition 
to a broader and more dynamic discussion of the tobacco program. The program had always 
operated within a larger economic and political system, but by the 1980s, wider and more 
contentious factors began to influence the political decisions that ultimately determined the 
downfall of the program. All of these factors had one common thread: ending the federal 
government’s direct role in the production and manufacturing of tobacco. Health-advocacy 
groups fought against tobacco use and the government’s involvement in supporting tobacco 
production. Fiscal conservatives were against a big government program (a major reason for 
the no-net-cost provision). And, emerging neoliberal market forces pursued cheaper tobacco 
production in foreign markets and worked to deregulate U.S. tobacco production (Benson, 
2012).  
One of the most consequential changes that occurred during the 1980s revolves 
around key leadership. For decades, political leaders from tobacco states often worked in the 
best interest of their tobacco farming constituencies, and some of these leaders even worked 
for the best interest of small growers. Mann (1975) writes that during the lease and transfer 
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debates, one senator from Kentucky, John Cooper, who had long sought to protect the 
interests of small burley growers, lamented the inevitable consolidation of farms, and the 
ultimate loss of smaller and poorer farms, that initiatives such as lease and transfer would 
eventually bring. The small growers’ defender retired from Congress in 1972, and in symbol 
as well as practice, Cooper’s retirement signifies a major shift in congressional support for 
tobacco farmers. Increasingly during the 1970s and early 1980s, congressional leadership 
favored the views and strategies of tobacco companies over the equitable aspects of the 
program and the welfare of tobacco farmers (Benson, 2012). Perhaps the first major example 
of this shift in loyalties surfaced with the passage of a 1985 omnibus bill, which included a 
section crafted by Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, that, among other things, changed 
how the USDA formulated quota levels: instead of the baseline price of tobacco being based 
on domestic consumption and leaf exports, new quota levels were based on the purchase 
intentions of tobacco companies. While ostensibly crafted to save the tobacco program, this 
legislation, in reality, worked to the long-term detriment of tobacco farmers and the long-
term benefit of tobacco companies. Concerning this point, Benson (2012) gives a thorough 
examination of tobacco company influence over tobacco leaders (and over the entire framing 
of tobacco farming dialogue), analyzing these dynamics to show how U.S. tobacco 
companies undermined American tobacco farmers. Benson’s (2012) work should be 
consulted for a better understanding of these processes.  
Taking one of Benson’s (2012) conclusions and combining it with one of Mann’s 
(1975) projections from earlier in the chapter provides the necessary framework from which 
to view the changing trajectory of the tobacco program after 1985. This will then set up the 
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later discussion of how the loss of the program negatively impacted tobacco farmers in 
Bethel. Much of Mann’s (1975) work characterizes the tobacco program as a program that 
should and could be used to provide an equitable income for as many tobacco farmers as 
possible. The program was, after all, initially designed to bring stability to American farmers 
and the economy. Yet, inequalities have always existed within the program and tobacco 
farming (who gets to grow the crop, for example), even though the tobacco program was 
often more equitable in practice than other agricultural sectors (Benson, 2012; Griffith, 2009; 
Kingsolver, 2007; Mann, 1975). But, precisely at the time that Mann (1975) calls for an 
overhaul in the program’s structure that could redistribute the program’s benefits more 
evenly, a different change occurred: tobacco-state politicians, under the influence of tobacco 
companies, began drafting policies that favored neoliberal goals over and above the 
economic situation of tobacco farmers and tobacco workers (Benson, 2012). Addressing the 
situation immediately following Senator Helms’ bill of 1985, Benson (2012) writes: 
Tobacco companies were effectively in charge of the government tobacco program. 
Helms had done nothing to address the underlying structural conditions of trade that 
negatively affected the North Carolina tobacco economy or to contain tobacco 
companies in their understandable goal of further integrating international distribution 
and production. Over the course of the 1990s, their intensified sourcing of foreign 
leaf drove the program into the ground while deepening economic competition and 
desperation among North Carolina growers. (p. 107) 
The situation for tobacco farmers in the 1990s was increasingly grim (Brown, 1995; 
Tiller, 2002; Wellons, 2001). Much like the farm crisis that ravaged the Midwest in the 
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1980s, the 1990s proved detrimental to the livelihoods of tobacco farmers (Benson, 2012; 
Dudley, 2000). Large growers were taking on more debt, more risk, and going bust more 
frequently; small growers were being outpaced and leaving tobacco farming in large numbers 
(Benson, 2012; Tiller, 2002). Again, changes to the economy of tobacco farming played a 
key role in these disturbances. For example, from 1990 to 1993, foreign leaf imports grew 
from 400 million pounds to over one billion pounds (Wood, 1998). In response to mounting 
concerns over foreign leaf imports, a law was included in a 1993 omnibus bill that required 
U.S. manufactured cigarettes to contain, at minimum, seventy-five percent of U.S. grown 
tobacco (Skully, 2000). The pressures for the bill came from, among others, growers, because 
of the potential of declining U.S. leaf prices due to cheaper world leaf, and, ironically, from 
anti-smoking groups, who were concerned that increased imports of cheaper foreign leaf, 
used in cheaper cigarettes, would result in an increased number of smokers (Skully, 2000). 
This law, however, conflicted with policies from the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). After the U.S. approved GATT in 1994, a 1995 U.S. law did more than 
simply repeal the seventy-five percent domestic minimum, which would have merely 
returned the tobacco market to the pre-1994 status quo. The 1995 law instead instituted a 
tariff rate quota (TRQ), which allocated the percentage of tobacco foreign countries could 
export to U.S. manufacturers at low or no tariff (Brown, 1995; Skully, 2000).  
Then, from 1997 to 2001, U.S. burley production was cut drastically (Stull, 2009; 
Tiller, 2002; Wellons, 2001). In 1998, basic quota for burley fell 9.8%. That number was cut 
by 28% in 1999, and in 2000, production was cut by another 43% (Tiller, 2002). This decline 
in basic quota accelerated the instability of the program, and in response, active growers did 
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all they could to stay profitable. Leasing quotas continued to be one way for growers to 
attempt to make a profit, but quotas became more expensive as lessors made up the lost 
money from reduced quota values by raising the price to lease their poundage base (Tiller, 
2002). Those that were raising larger tracts of burley tobacco, then, had to deal with more 
and more quota holders just to scrape together enough poundage to make a decent profit. I 
discuss this trend and its implications in Bethel in more detail in Chapter 5. Moreover, 
tobacco companies were beginning to contract directly with tobacco farmers during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, further eroding another pillar of the tobacco program (Tiller, 2002; 
Wellons, 2001). Instead of farmers selling their tobacco to companies at auction, companies 
began setting contracts with individual farmers prior to the growing season to buy their 
allotted tobacco. As long as the farmers stayed within the parameters of their quota, the 
structure of the program allowed them to sell straight to the companies (Wellons, 2001). 
Though this brought moderately better prices for contracting farmers in the short term, 
remembering that at that time contracted prices from the company were still at or above the 
minimum floor price, direct contracting further undermined the program and the auction 
system. Once the floor prices were eliminated in 2004, companies had no reason to offer 
farmers the same high, competitive prices of the program years. By the late 1990s, 
contracting was commonplace in other areas of agriculture that were less regulated than 
tobacco. This system is indicative of the shift in tobacco from a cooperative, equitably based 
tobacco economy to a competitive, individual, free market agricultural era (Wellons, 2001). 
These factors, and certainly many others, contributed significantly to the decline of burley 
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tobacco farming in the mountains and led directly to the end of the federal tobacco program 
in 2004. 
The buyout of the tobacco program 
 “It was a classic case of a government committee making evidenced-based proposals 
and politicians, beholden to powerful corporations and working with constituencies swayed 
by defining ideologies, instead legislating watered-down, almost meaningless, or rather 
dangerous policy.” 
Peter Benson (2012, p.116) 
 
Throughout the 1990s, tobacco companies increasingly influenced the direction and 
status of the tobacco program. Their influence continues to extend in the post-buyout era. 
After 1985, tobacco farming, which Wood (1998) calls the tobacco industry’s least profitable 
sector, continued to be dominated by maneuverings of corporate tobacco. When 
congressional proposals to end the program were brought forth in the 1990s, the political 
power of tobacco companies shot them down, because, in the case of a 1998 bill proposed by 
Senator John McCain, the concessions to farmers were too generous and the restrictions on 
production and international competition were too rigorous for the liking of tobacco 
companies (Benson, 2012). Another attempt at policy change, the Clinton-era report Tobacco 
at a Crossroads, was similarly out-maneuvered politically. Both of these proposals included 
“the elimination of the quota system, cash infusions to growers funded by an excise tax, an 
incentive program to encourage crop diversification… and the ongoing support of domestic 
leaf prices subsidized by financial assessments on growers” (Benson, 2012, p. 116). These 
examples are just a few of the aspects of the proposals (which, again, entailed taxes and 
payments from companies) that sought to end the floundering program while maintaining the 
economic livelihoods of tobacco communities and agrarian areas. Other groups, like the 
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Community Farm Alliance (CFA) in Kentucky and Appalachian Sustainable Development 
(ASD) in southwestern Virginia also worked towards developing policies aimed at 
alternative crops and infrastructure in tobacco-dependent communities, among other 
initiatives (Billings, Fitzgerald, & Markowitz, 2010; Flaccavento, 2010; Hamilton & Ryan, 
1993). However, the proposal that passed in 2004—the bill that’s now known as the 
buyout—included none of the above recommendations or goals (Benson, 2012).  
By the 2000s, talk of a buyout of the tobacco program was ever-present. Bills were 
constantly proposed that sought to end the New Deal program and replace it with varying 
degrees of production controls and compensation (both economic and fiscal) for farmers and 
farming communities (Benson, 2012; Wood, 1998). In the end, the bill that passed in 2004 
was a golden-child of neoliberal ideals: tobacco production in the United States was no 
longer controlled by any government regulations. Except for funding the ten billion dollar 
concession payments to quota holders, which was billions less than amounts put forth in 
previous buyout proposals, tobacco companies achieved all of their desired goals and got a 
company-friendly, completely deregulated tobacco economy (Benson, 2012). Tobacco 
farming had finally caught up to the rest of American agriculture. According to Griffith 
(2009), the changes that occurred in the tobacco economy “in a single year, replicated what 
has occurred in U.S. agriculture generally over the course of the 20
th
 century” (p. 435). 
Recalling the processes of the adaptive cycle from the previous chapter, with the buyout of 
2004, the tobacco economy left its conservation stage (k), characterized by the stable and 
resilient years of the tobacco program, and quickly released, (Ω) entering into a new phase of 
a reorganization of the tobacco farming system (α).  
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The effects of the buyout in the reorganization phase (α) were felt immediately in the 
American tobacco economy. High U.S. tobacco prices fell drastically down to world price 
levels, farms immediately consolidated, and in small producer areas, such as in the 
Appalachian Mountains, the majority of farmers quit raising tobacco. Yet, farmers, farm 
groups, tobacco-state newspapers, and others, roundly applauded the 2004 buyout. Benson 
(2012) attributes this response to the extent in which the marketing strategy of the tobacco 
companies had seeped into every aspect of the tobacco economy. Through the influence of 
key politicians and farm leaders, the talking points of the companies had become the talking 
points of the tobacco-farming infrastructure (Benson, 2012). In Bethel, where I conducted 
my fieldwork, another dynamic of this process is represented. Some farmers there said that 
they were just “tired” of the buyout talks: if the government or the companies or whoever 
wanted to end the program—then just end it. But, for small growers, ending the tobacco 
program meant the loss of tobacco farming. Without price supports and marketing quotas, 
there was nothing to keep their tobacco, grown in small allotments, competitive with tobacco 
from larger operations. Neoliberal attitudes and policies, pushed by the tobacco companies, 
proved decisive by 2004. Historically, the program always had its problems, but those 
problems had always been resolved, to varying extents, with the goal of maintaining the 
program. After 1985 and for the next twenty years, the program seemed perpetually 
threatened. The neoliberal policies set in motion by the 1985 restructuring of the program 
came to total fruition in 2004. The program ended and a new system of tobacco farming 
began.  
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Conclusion 
One of the themes of this chapter, and one of the ways to tell the story of the tobacco 
program, concerns the strong connections between the national and local levels and the 
important roles played by key leaders and local/regional groups in maintaining the tobacco 
program. As sketched in this chapter, the success of the program came in large part from the 
prior organization and work of farmer-operated tobacco cooperatives in the early twentieth 
century. Their prior mobilization and goals (i.e., the implementation of a grading system, 
attempts at production controls) were carried over into national legislation in 1933 (Badger, 
1980; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). Achieving a permanent program came largely from 
the work of key leaders in the AAA who wanted reform. They worked to mobilize the local 
level, which also wanted a government program, and with both groups pushing together, the 
unconstitutionality of the tobacco program was reversed in 1938 (Badger, 1980). This two-
way street of communication helped put farmers in the best possible situation from a 
legislative standpoint by protecting their interests from corporate power and market 
fluctuations. It was in this spirit that the program operated for much of the twentieth century 
(Mann, 1975).  
From 1938 until the early 1970s, the structure of the burley program favored small 
growers (Mann, 1975). In order to control the amount of burley on the market, the program 
controlled the amount of acreage tobacco farmers could plant. However, with improving 
growing techniques and chemical sprays and fertilizers, farmers became more adept at 
raising tobacco, and their yields subsequently increased. In response, the government 
continued to cut acreage allotments, pushing more and more burley growers towards the 
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baseline allotment of a half-acre. Though this made raising burley equitable for lots of small 
farmers, the effects of reduced acreage also undermined the stability of the program (ibid.). 
By 1970, the burley program was on the verge of collapse. 
Again, the role of key actors, led by university and state farm bureau officials and 
others, was important to the survival of the program. In the interest of their states, counties, 
constituencies, and neighbors, these leaders worked together to resolve the problems of the 
acreage allotment system, drafting a workable poundage system for burley tobacco (Mann, 
1975; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). This work was passed as legislation by the 92
nd
 
Congress in April of 1971 and approved by two-thirds of growers (as required for passage) in 
a referendum (Cochrane & Ryan, 1976). The new poundage burley program, along with 
other modifications, saved the tobacco program and the livelihoods and ways of life of many 
growers, but it also ushered in a different era of tobacco farming. 
By the 1980s, corporate influence in tobacco politics was pervasive. Key 
congressional leadership from tobacco states, who in the 1960s and 1970s had often worked 
for the benefit of tobacco farmers, now catered to the goals of tobacco companies (Benson, 
2012; Mann, 1975). Major changes to the structure of the program in the 1980s and 1990s, 
including a new formula for calculating quota levels and increased imports of foreign leaf, 
benefitted tobacco companies more than tobacco farmers (Benson, 2012). Although the 
program was still dealing with its structural problems (i.e., too much tobacco going unsold at 
auction and being bought on loan), these new policies did little to shore up the equitability of 
the program that had characterized it for decades, as mounting criticism of tobacco use and 
the tobacco program grew. Sensing the writing on the wall, regional farm groups, such as the 
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Community Farm Alliance (CFA) in Kentucky, began advocating for rural economic 
development, crop diversification plans, and fair transitions away from tobacco farming, but 
increasingly, congressional politics undermined these goals by evading bills that proposed a 
modified regulatory climate for tobacco production and reasonable concessions to farmers 
(Benson, 2012; Hamilton & Ryan, 1993). By the late 1990s, the end of the program was 
imminent (Tiller, 2002). Burley production in the U.S. fell drastically from 1997 to 2000, 
approximately 65% according to Wellons (2001), and as fewer farmers were raising tobacco, 
those still growing leased more and more quota, and those quota-lease prices continued to 
rise. Furthermore, the cost of inputs, gasoline, fertilizers, sprays, etc., continued to escalate, 
exacerbating the economic situation of tobacco farmers. After years of failed proposals, the 
tobacco program finally ended in 2004. According to Benson (2012), the buyout of the 
program was a neoliberal coup for tobacco companies.  
As I discuss in more detail in the next chapter, this transition to a free market tobacco 
economy significantly altered the tobacco farming landscape. High U.S. tobacco prices fell 
markedly down to world price levels. In eastern North Carolina, where flue-cured production 
is heavily concentrated, farms immediately consolidated and production increased (Benson, 
2012). In the mountains, however, where small growers with a few tobacco acres 
predominated, tobacco farmers simply could not compete with the prices of free market 
tobacco. Without the program, there was no mandate for companies to buy tobacco from 
small growers. In a deregulated market, tobacco companies could source burley wherever 
they could get it the cheapest—from larger and more capitalized operations. Small growers 
quit raising the crop in large numbers after 2004, and the next chapter examines why this was 
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so. Unfortunately, this brought Senator Cooper’s (Kentucky) 1972 concerns regarding the 
state of small-scale tobacco farming, as quoted by Mann (1975), to fruition: 
And I can just see that in time, gradually, as always happens in almost any economic 
field, those with greater means would grow and gradually take the acreages by sale or 
by lease from these small people. (p. 71) 
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CHAPTER 4: BETHEL: THE CONTEXT OF MOUNTAIN TOBACCO FARMING 
“A culture becomes available in a special way once it’s waning. We can see it more 
clearly then. It’s hard to know what’s happening at the time it’s going on. We don’t have the 
perspective that we do when we view it across time.” 
- Robert Morgan, 2002, p.496 
 
Introduction  
The community of Bethel in western Watauga County, North Carolina, is the last 
tobacco growing community in the county. Commercial tobacco first arrived in Watauga 
County in the late 1920s, and with the advent of the tobacco program in 1938, burley tobacco 
became a reliable cash crop for farmers transitioning from subsistence-based economies to 
cash-based economies in the 1940s. For the latter half of the twentieth century, burley 
tobacco provided farmers and families with a partial, but stable, source of yearly income. 
Tobacco in the mountains never equaled the size and scope of tobacco farms off the 
mountain (Griffith, 2009). Yet, burley tobacco played an important role in the livelihoods of 
Watauga County farmers over the course of the twentieth century. As part of a diversified 
farm or work strategy, tobacco farming helped maintain family income, farming traditions, 
and ways of life even as modernization transformed agriculture and the structure of the 
American economy in the twentieth century. Bethel and other agrarian mountain 
communities were able to profit from raising tobacco because of the federal tobacco 
program. The previous chapter outlines the burley tobacco program and how it developed, 
worked, and ended.  
The goal of this chapter is to give the previous chapter a face, namely, by examining 
Bethel. So, too, I hope to show Bethel’s current place in the global economy, and therefore, it 
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is important to trace its historic cultural and economic roots. The chapter begins with an 
examination of Rhoda Halperin’s (1990) theoretical constructs of “multiple livelihood 
strategies” and the “deep rural” and how these models apply to Bethel. In the early twentieth 
century, Bethel was a subsistence-based agrarian community. Though some cash economy 
did exist, providing for the household economy remained the main goal of these subsistence-
based families. This chapter next addresses James Scott’s (1976) theory of the moral 
economy of subsistence cultures. I detail components of the moral economy that apply to 
Bethel, which include avoiding risk and reliance on community cooperation. These factors 
characterized the history of farming and the tobacco farming culture and economy of Bethel 
throughout the twentieth century. Examining Bethel’s pre-modern economy through the lens 
of the moral economy also helps account for Bethel’s transition to a modern economy in the 
1930s and 1940s.  
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the tobacco program provided stability 
for tobacco farmers in Bethel as modernity continued to emerge, enabling farm families in 
Bethel to combine elements of both tradition and progress in their daily lives (Hatch, 2008). 
When the program ended, however, so did the viability of tobacco farming in the mountains. 
Off the mountain, larger farms increased mechanization, hired more labor, took on more 
debt, and increased their production of tobacco. But in the mountains, with limited flat land 
and smaller operations, farmers could not scale up and compete with the price of deregulated 
tobacco. After 2004, most mountain tobacco farmers quit raising the crop, highlighting the 
crucial role the program played in mountain tobacco farming. Today, a few farmers in Bethel 
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still raise tobacco on contract with tobacco companies, continuing their cultural traditions. 
Tobacco brings less money now than it did years ago, but these farmers still carry on. 
Multiple livelihood strategies 
According to Rhoda Halperin (1990), “multiple livelihood strategies refer to people 
performing many kinds of work tasks in a given day, week, season, and lifetime…they also 
perform many tasks for which they may or may not be paid” (p. 19). More complex than just 
occupational pluralism (i.e., working two jobs) multiple livelihood strategies indicate 
participation in various economic institutions and “consist broadly of subsistence strategies 
and cash-generating strategies” in agrarian, marketplace, and wage labor economies that span 
the urban to rural (Halperin, 1990, p. 20).   
The concept of multiple livelihoods allows us to see from the ground level how 
families and neighbors in Bethel have worked to maintain their cultural identity throughout 
the modernization trends of the twentieth century. Multiple livelihood work has evolved 
generationally in Bethel: from subsistence-based economies with little cash, to cash-based 
farming and marketplace/wage labor economies with some subsistence, to marketplace jobs 
with little subsistence. Despite these changes during the twentieth century, Bethel has 
retained its rural identity. 
Constructing the “deep rural” 
To understand the livelihood patterns in Bethel, it is beneficial to use the 
conceptualizations Halperin (1990) applies to an Appalachian, rural-working class region of 
Kentucky: the “deep rural,” the “shallow rural,” and the “urban.” These zones demarcate 
geography, livelihood opportunities, and livelihood patterns. Typically, ethnographic 
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research has focused on the mostly rural or the mostly urban, leaving the middle ground 
between them, the “shallow rural,” undervalued (Halperin, 1990). The shallow rural is “an 
unstudied, unnamed, and uncategorized gray area between country and city that contains the 
most intricate mix of possible livelihood strategies” (Halperin, 1990, p. 17). The shallow 
rural is geographically situated in the “country” but is infused with modern conveniences, 
such as shopping centers and factory jobs, that, on the one hand, provide its inhabitants easy 
entry into the marketplace economy, but on the other hand, endanger its rural characteristics 
and economy. Its inhabitants work in the marketplace but also have gardens and small farms; 
they frequently fluctuate between zones and tend to identify with the “country.”  Unlike the 
“urban” economy, with its own opportunities for livelihoods, the shallow rural is not far 
removed from its roots in the deep rural (Halperin, 1990). 
Halperin (1990) uses the term deep rural to conceptualize the region we think of as 
“the country.” In the country, different livelihood opportunities exist than for those living in 
an urban or a shallow rural area, because the deep rural is geographically, ecologically, and 
culturally distinct. The deep rural is often devoid of major industry and interstates, but as 
modernization reaches out across the country, once-deep rural places can quickly become 
shallow rural areas. Major highway expansions, for example, lead to an infrastructure that 
supports large transportation, industrial parks, and chain stores, transforming the deep rural 
to the shallow rural. Still, these distinctions are fluid as people fluctuate between these 
constructed zones. 
Geographically, the deep rural is distant from cities and largely thought of as “home” 
for both urban and shallow rural Appalachians (Halperin, 1990). Its population is sparse 
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(compared to the urban and shallow rural), big infrastructure is minimal, and fast food, 
banks, and grocery stores are infrequent. Ecologically, the deep rural offers its inhabitants 
natural resources with which to make livelihoods. In Bethel this includes timber for logging, 
hillsides for grazing or raising Christmas trees, bottomland for growing tobacco, corn, or hay, 
and land for leasing, among other things. Taking both of these designations together, Beaver 
(1986) states that, historically, “mountain communities were defined by the terrain; property 
lines generally followed the ridge lines. These ownership and settlement patterns reinforced 
community identity within hollows and coves and led to a sense of distinctiveness of the 
various hollow communities” (p. 18).  
Culturally, the deep rural is built on the traditional settlement pattern of family land 
inheritance, and family ownership of the land “confers independence as well as a sense of 
place” (Beaver, 1986, p. 18). So, on the one hand, land ownership is crucial to the deep rural 
economy, because it provides people with control over resources, thus allowing for multiple 
ways to make a living off the land. But, on the other hand, “a farming community has organic 
coherence because its residents have strong ties to the land that defines the place” (Salamon, 
2003, p. 182). Land allows multiple generations of family to live nearby and helps support 
strong social networks and connections (Keefe, 2009; Salamon, 2003). Moreover, inherited 
land often is sold between siblings, allowing for family land to stay in the family and remain 
productive, giving family members the option to leave the deep rural in pursuit of other 
interests while keeping the connection to “home” alive (Beaver, 1986). Those staying in the 
community maintain a cultural continuity, keeping up long standing social connections and 
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livelihood strategies that have developed over time in deep rural economies. In Bethel, one of 
those long-standing cultural traditions is farming tobacco. 
Bethel: a deep rural economy 
Bethel is located in the western part of Watauga County near the Tennessee/North 
Carolina line, about a thirty-minute drive from the two closest towns, Boone, North Carolina, 
and Mountain City, Tennessee. It is a small, cove-like area surrounded by mountains on all 
sides. Beaver Dam Creek runs through the community to the Watauga River, which flows 
into Tennessee. Historically, no railroad ran through the community, and no major highway 
was easily accessible. Prior to the 1960s, the best road in to and out of Bethel was George’s 
Gap Road, a winding two-lane road that eventually leads to what is now U.S. 321. In 1936, 
George’s Gap Road was a gravel road and the only improved road in the community (North 
Carolina County Road, 1936). In Map 4.1 the serpentine-like dashed line (connoting a 
graveled road) represents George’s Gap Road (Bethel is located at the center of these maps). 
A more accurate and detailed George’s Gap Road is depicted in Map 4.2: the bold outlined 
roads in this map are the rural delivery routes run by the Post Office, circa the 1920s (Rural 
delivery routes, 1920). By 1953, George’s Gap Road was paved and several other tertiary 
roads were stoned surfaced (Watauga County, 1953). By the early 1960s, U.S. 321 had been 
rerouted on what was formerly state highway 603 and extended into Tennessee (North 
Carolina County Road, 1936; Highway maintenance map, 1962). In the mid-1960s, as part of 
a federal secondary highway systems aid program, a new road was constructed from U.S. 
321 to Bethel (Watauga County, North Carolina, 1968). This road is now known as Bethel 
Road, and it replaced George’s Gap Road as the easiest way to drive in and out of Bethel. In 
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symbol and in practice, the new Bethel Road better connected Bethel to the infrastructure of 
the rest of Watauga County, and it precipitated the consolidation of the county’s high 
schools. Bethel High School, along with the four other Watauga County high schools, closed 
in the spring of 1965, and in the fall of 1965, a newly consolidated Watauga County High 
School opened (Corbitt, 1976). 
As modernization has taken hold in America throughout the twentieth century, many 
places that would have been identifiable as deep rural prior to World War II have merged 
with urban areas. Farming communities that once existed around nearby towns and cities are 
no longer even shallow rural areas but just larger parts of the metropolitan infrastructure 
(Lee, 2005). But despite increasing modernization and integration into the market economy 
across the nation, Bethel has remained a deep rural area. Better roads have made it easier to 
get to nearby towns and jobs, but even in the modern economy, these places are still some 
distance away.  
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Map 4. 1. North Carolina county road survey of Watauga County, 1936 (North Carolina Maps, State Library of 
North Carolina). Retrieved from: http://www.lib.unc.edu/dc/ncmaps/?CISOROOT=/ncmaps 
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Map 4. 1. Rural delivery routes, United States Post Office, circa 1920s) 
 
Map 4. 2. Watauga County (state highway and public works commission), 1953 
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Map 4. 3: [highway maintenance map of] Watauga County, NC, 1962 
 
Map 4. 4: Watauga County, North Carolina (highway maintenance map), 1968 
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In Bethel, the social, land, and community ties that existed prior to modernization are 
still active, and so are its farming traditions. Of all the communities in Watauga County, a 
county that at times had hundreds of tobacco quota holders, Bethel is the only place where 
tobacco is still being grown, albeit by just a handful of farmers. Even in the midst of a free 
market tobacco industry, these farmers are continuing a community tradition that has been 
lost elsewhere in the county and region. To understand why this is so, it is helpful to utilize 
Scott’s (1976) theory of the moral economy and analyze how it reinforces the tobacco culture 
in Bethel. 
The moral economy in Bethel 
Burley tobacco farming communities throughout the twentieth century have relied 
upon cooperation and mutual assistance for the success of their crops (van Willigen & 
Eastwood, 1998). Neighbors have helped neighbors in times of need and when cutting or 
hanging tobacco needed to be done; extended family, too, helped in these times. As working 
tobacco began to compete with off farm work in the mid to late twentieth century, exchanged 
labor began evolving to cash exchanges between family, neighbors, and friends (Kingsolver, 
2011). This development illustrates a measured decline in the “moral economy” of burley 
communities over the course of the twentieth century. But, what is the moral economy? 
Concerning subsistence-based communities, Scott (1976) writes that the moral economy “is 
the central economic dilemma of most peasant households…the peasant household has little 
scope for the profit maximization calculus of traditional neoclassical economics” (p. 4). As I 
outline below, the twentieth century farming traditions of Bethel developed out of a 
subsistence-based culture characteristic of the peasant societies in Scott’s (1976) study. 
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Bethel’s historical “subsistence ethic, then, is rooted in the economic practices and social 
exchanges of peasant society” (Scott, 1976, p. 6). These practices and exchanges, which 
constitute the moral economy, “provide a minimal subsistence insurance for villagers” (Scott, 
1976, p. 5). As Keefe (2009) writes: “In these kinds of economies, people are bound together 
by social obligation and reciprocal exchange” (p. 17). 
 In the pre-modern subsistence economies of these communities, community 
cooperation provided a sort of insurance for subsistence families, creating a type of economy 
that might cause some to lose status while allowing for everyone to make a living out of the 
community resources (Scott, 1976). Arthur (1915) highlights this ethic in Bethel (known 
then, generally, as the Beaverdams, or Beaverdam, community) through his brief biography 
of Dudley Farthing (1804-1895), a prominent county citizen of his era and one of the largest 
landholders in the community: 
It is said that when corn was scarce he [Dudley Farthing] would not sell it for money, 
saying a man with money could get it [corn] anywhere, but a man who had no money 
could get it only where he was known and his needs obvious. He [Mr. Farthing] lost 
little if anything by thus crediting his neighbors in distress. (p. 309) 
This example of placing the community before personal profit reinforces Scott’s (1976) 
theory of subsistence-based moral economies and shows how the farming culture of Bethel 
was founded on this system. The moral economy contrasts with the goals of capitalist/market 
economies based on individual profits; in fact, it has “little scope” for such enterprises (Scott, 
1976). It is within this framework of the moral economy, then, that we can examine the 
tobacco farming culture of Bethel throughout the twentieth century. 
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Studying the moral economy means emphasizing local values and experiences within 
research (Keefe, 2009; Scott, 1976). This economy is kin-based and founded upon reciprocal 
exchange and intimate social bonds, and these factors create the community’s social capital, 
which are the resources and connections within a community by which a community can 
pursue common goals (Keefe, 2009). In a rural setting like Bethel, aspects of the moral 
economy still drive interactions and organization. For example, one farmer in Bethel helps 
put out the hay for another older farmer’s cattle, providing the older farmer the ability to still 
keep cattle well into his eighties. As another example, when one farmer’s son was in the 
hospital, neighbors and friends put his tobacco crop in the barn to ensure the success of his 
crop. 
In a moral economy, this reciprocal type of social obligation is crucial to maintaining 
cultural and community identity, and not just in times of crisis (Halperin, 1990; Keefe, 2009). 
Halperin (1990) notes that among community members sharing a common identity and 
multiple livelihoods, egalitarianism can confer reciprocity. In this situation, tobacco work is a 
more cohesive part of daily household and community life, and is less demarcated than full 
time work off the farm. With numerous community members all working in the same 
industry, tobacco farming, and all expecting to receive comparable incomes from tobacco, 
exchanges of work and shared labor occurs. Working tobacco crops, talking about tobacco, 
and helping neighbors and family becomes a habitual community practice. This is how an 
egalitarian common identity can confer reciprocity and help to build and maintain social 
capital (Halperin, 1990; Keefe, 2009; Salamon, 2003). Scott (1976), then, makes the point 
that “village egalitarianism in this sense is conservative not radical; it claims that all should 
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have a place, a living, not that all should be equal” (p. 40). Thus, we find that the practitioner 
of multiple livelihoods, the “jack of all trades,” tends “to give freely and generously of their 
time and resources to help kin and neighbors on a regular basis” (Halperin, 1990, p. 15). 
Historically in Bethel, this claim is synonymous with the example of Dudley Farthing 
(mentioned above). Farthing would rather provide for his community’s well-being out of his 
surplus crops than make extra money at their expense. As Bethel has transitioned to the 
modern economy, this ethic has changed over time. Today, some farmers and friends still 
help each other out, such as Bill Sherwood, who puts out hay for C.B. Reese’s cattle. On a 
larger, community wide scale, however, this ethic of cooperation has changed in Bethel since 
the mid- to late-twentieth century. According to one former tobacco farmer, people in Bethel 
do not help each other out and work/labor together today as much as they once did. This 
claim points to the loss of the shared common identity and multiple livelihoods that at one 
time characterized Bethel’s tobacco culture and economy. With less common work in 
tobacco farming, there is less opportunity for acting out the egalitarianism that confers 
reciprocity, and this highlights Bethel’s transition from a moral economy to a modern 
economy. 
At the same time, the loss of the moral economy is also changing the community 
power structure and social standards (Scott, 1976). Dudley Farthing, in the late nineteenth 
century, provided for others in the community when they were in need. In terms of the moral 
economy, the elevation of Farthing’s status (as a community patriarch) is less relevant to my 
argument than seeing the integration of his actions in the larger scope of general community 
health. In the end, the community possessed a moral solidarity based on its ability to 
 
 
 
 76 
safeguard and feed its members (Scott, 1976). This concern for the community played out 
through the twentieth century in Bethel and continues to change with the loss of tobacco 
farming and the onset of free market economic forces. When tobacco farming was viable in 
Bethel, farmers bought fertilizer and supplies at local-area businesses (personal 
communication, Tommy Lawrence, 2011). Buying supplies locally conferred a degree of 
loyalty to the community (personal communication, Shelby Eggers, 2011). In the moral 
economy of Bethel in the late twentieth century, buying supplies locally dovetailed with 
shared work in tobacco farming. They both mutually supported each other. When tobacco 
farming declined, however, what was left of the pre-modern moral economy declined as well, 
as more characteristics of neoliberal economics took hold. For example, a farmer that used to 
buy inputs locally now drives farther to get a cheaper price for fertilizer. His concern is that 
the local stores are not concerned about him (meaning not concerned about the financial 
hardships of the local farmers). His solution is to buy his inputs where he can get the 
cheapest price. In effect, the ideals of competition and individual profit that characterize 
neoliberal economics have replaced the moral economy’s ethics of cooperation and 
community well-being that once characterized Bethel. Rather quickly, an economy that was 
founded for decades upon cooperation, help, neighborliness, etc., and made viable by the 
stability of the tobacco program, transitioned to a full free market economy. 
For much of the twentieth century, the culture of tobacco farming provided Bethel 
and other Watauga County communities the opportunity to act out the moral economy in an 
increasingly modern economic landscape. Kinship and neighbor connections were highly 
valued and needed to raise tobacco. Children were taught work ethic, responsibility, and 
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farming traditions by helping raise tobacco and by raising their own crops. One of my 
classmates, who is from the Valle Crucis community in western Watauga County, grew up 
raising tobacco. During his middle and high school years, he and his sister worked their own 
tobacco patch. Their grandfather provided the inputs (sprays, fertilizer, etc.), and they did all 
the work and cultivating. They all three split the profits in thirds, and my classmate used that 
tobacco money to buy his first truck. After the buyout, they quit raising the crop. This 
example shows that, in spite of increasing modernization and off-farm work in the 1990s and 
2000s, the tobacco program allowed small and part-time farmers to continue their cultural 
tradition of raising tobacco, keeping aspects of the moral economy alive in Watauga County 
and Bethel. Further examining Bethel’s roots in subsistence-based farming is necessary to 
better frame the importance of the tobacco program’s role in maintaining an agrarian culture 
in Bethel throughout the twentieth century.  
Subsistence-based economies 
The pre-1930s subsistence-based economy of Bethel functioned like that of some 
other traditional mountain communities, typically consisting of small, non-commercial 
family farms that consumed most of their own agricultural products (Arthur, 1915; Beaver, 
1986; Halperin, 1990; Hatch, 2008; U.S. Census, 1930). During this era, cattle production 
thrived in Watauga County, and farmers cleared hillsides for pasture and planted corn for 
feed and household use. During this time, forested hillsides were often clear-cut for pastures. 
With more livestock to feed, more corn was planted in both bottomlands and hillsides, 
contributing to the depletion of the county’s topsoil by the mid twentieth century (van 
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Noppen & van Noppen, 1973). Despite these issues, cattle production provided families with 
meat, dairy, and some income, crucial elements to their subsistence-based livelihoods. 
In the nineteenth century, cattle, as well as other livestock, were sometimes sold to 
drovers moving through the area. Prior to the Civil War, hogs were frequently driven through 
the Watauga County communities (Arthur, 1915). In the twentieth century, cattle continued 
to provide some income for farmers in Bethel, and they were sold to drovers or taken to 
Tennessee for sell at a nearby railroad (personal communication, Shelby Eggers, 2012). The 
livestock that was not sold was kept for home consumption. Cattle were grazed in newly 
timbered pastures and hogs were kept through the winter, feeding on mast in the forests. 
Meat was butchered and cured on the farm and hung to dry in smokehouses (Arthur, 1915).  
The data in Figure 4.1, from the 1930 U.S. Census, highlights a few of the important 
cash generating strategies for farm families in Watauga County, and Watauga’s neighboring 
counties, in 1930. The most unique example concerns sheep production. Sheep served a dual 
purpose for farm families. They provided wool for clothing and meat for food, and in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, Watauga County had a strong market for selling sheep 
(Jarrell, 2011; U.S. Census, 1930; van Noppen & van Noppen, 1973). Figure 4.1 shows that 
in 1930 Watauga County reported having 16,670 sheep on 642 farms (U.S. Census, 1930). 
Including Watauga’s neighboring counties, Ashe, Avery, and Allegheny, the area that would 
come to be known later in the twentieth century as the “high country” accounted for, in 1930, 
approximately forty percent of North Carolina’s sheep production (U.S. Census, 1930). In 
comparison, Figure 4.1 shows that neighboring Wilkes County (off the mountain and to the 
east of Watauga County) produced only 994 sheep on 52 farms, and Yancey County, a 
 
 
 
 79 
mountain county to the southwest of Watauga County, produced just over 4,000 sheep, four 
times less than Watauga. This market for sheep was one of the few viable cash generating 
farming strategies in Watauga County during the years around 1930 (U.S. Census, 1930) 
Figure 4.1. Watauga County cattle, dairy, and sheep production statistics, 1930 (U.S. Census, 1930) 
 Alleghany Ashe Avery Watauga Wilkes Yancey 
Sheep 
production 
      
1 
Sheep on 
farms 
15,055 28,712 8,099 16,670 994 4,032 
 
Farms 
reporting 
573 1,031 210 642 52 207 
Cattle 
production 
      
2 
Cattle on 
farms 
9,827 20,021 5,497 10,765 12,752 6,027 
 
Farms 
reporting 
1,805 3,281 1,242 2,095 4,318 1,818 
Dairy 
production 
      
3 
Cows and 
heifers 
milked 
3,395 7,059 2,021 4,099 7,309 2,850 
 
Farms 
reporting 
1,291 3,209 1,191 2,056 4,258 1,824 
4 
Milk 
produced, 
gallons 
1,097,010 3,035,083 1,018,530 1,812,823 3,082,202 1,350,461 
5 
Whole milk 
sold, gallons 
27,089 1,001,211 31,319 128,594 107,723 9,244 
 
Farms 
reporting 
61 564 131 157 199 24 
6 
Butter sold, 
farms 
reporting 
659 1,828 357 937 1,929 383 
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The select statistics in Figure 4.1 with regards to dairy production indicate a few 
major points about the nature of farming in the Watauga County at this time. Dairy was an 
important element of Watauga County farming but not as unique as sheep production in 
comparison to neighboring counties. Producing close to two million gallons of milk, 
Watauga County falls into the average range of mountain and Piedmont county milk 
production in 1930. Of the approximately 1.8 million gallons of milk produced in Watauga 
County by just over 2,000 farms, only 128,594 gallons was sold as whole milk, and that by 
only 157 farms (U.S. Census, 1930). 
Watauga’s experience contrasts with Ashe County, Watauga’s immediate neighbor to 
the northeast, which produced approximately 3 million gallons of milk and sold one million 
gallons, from 564 farms, as whole milk. Concomitantly, twice as many farms sold butter in 
Ashe County than did in Watauga County, indicating a substantially stronger market for 
dairy in Ashe. The number of farms producing milk in Watauga County in 1930, some 2,056, 
but not selling it as either whole milk (approximately 1,900 farms) or butter (approximately 
1,100 farms), suggests a few possibilities regarding livelihoods. Home consumption of dairy 
products was widespread. According to Figure 4.1, around 4,000 cows and heifers were 
milked on 2,000 farms, equaling about two dairy cows per farm with a rough average. With 
most farms probably having one or two dairy cows, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
amount of milk produced met the needs of the Watauga County farm family with some 
surplus (U.S. Census, 1930). That surplus, for example, could be made into butter and sold, 
which about half of the reporting dairy farmers did in 1930, or, if not sold, then bartered at 
local general stores. This combination of selling or bartering surplus dairy products points 
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toward the commercial side of subsistence and applies to Bethel’s economy in the 1930s 
(Hatch, 2003; personal communication, Braxton Johnson, 2012).  
The small industries that existed in Bethel and in nearby communities provided 
subsistence-based farmers some opportunities to sell excess products. The mountain villages 
that spanned the roads near Bethel typically had general stores and several had gristmills 
(Arthur, 1915). Arthur (1915) claims Sugar Grove had the first cheese factory in the South, 
established on June 5, 1915, and the Vilas community also had a cheese factory. According 
to one Bethel farmer, Braxton Johnson, whose grandfather recounted stories of this era to 
him, the cheese factories did provide some opportunity to sell excess dairy for farmers in 
Bethel (personal communication, 2012). But, by the same token, Mr. Johnson noted how 
bartering was critically more important and more common to Bethel’s economy than selling 
surplus. In Bethel, bartering took place at the local general stores, and dairy, eggs, and 
additional surpluses could be traded for other necessities, such as flour, sugar, and coffee 
(ibid.). As another aspect of the barter economy, corn could be ground at local mills in 
exchange for a portion of the meal. Families in Bethel at this time combined traditional 
farming and gardening, the use of the forests (for food, lumber, and feeding livestock), 
bartering, and some cash exchanges to build a life based predominately on subsistence 
agriculture (personal communication, Braxton Johnson, 2012; Beaver, 1986; Halperin, 1990; 
Hatch, 2003). 
Bethel’s subsistence-based economy, when considering the overall farming economy 
of Watauga County, presumably consisted of farms that were less-commercial in nature (U.S. 
Census, 1930). Until the advent of better roads and railroads in the region, the goods of 
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mountain farms (produce, livestock, fruits, etc.) were difficult to transport to markets 
(Beaver, 1986). As a result, commercial agricultural production remained small in Watauga 
County prior to the 1930s. There were, however, a few exceptions. As mentioned above, 
livestock was sometimes sold to drovers or locals themselves would drive livestock or sell it 
locally. Sheep production was strong in Watauga County and dairy products provided some 
income for farmers, as well (Jarrell, 2011; Beaver, 1986). Also, according to the 1930 U.S. 
Census of Agriculture, cabbage and green beans (snap or string) were the only significant 
cash crops in Watauga County in 1929. Cross-examining this data (Figure 4.2) with cattle 
statistics (Figure 4.1) confirms that commercialized farming in the county was not 
ubiquitous.  
Figure 4.2. Cabbage and beans statistics for Watauga County, 1930 (U.S. Census, 1930) 
   
Cabbage: State Statistics 
 
Cabbage: Watauga County 
1 Acres 3,467 595 
2 Value of crop (dollars) 400,933 91,816 
3 Farms reporting 7,014 751 
4 1919 acres 1,181 103 
   
Beans: State Statistics  
 
Beans: Watauga County 
5 Acres 9,796 100 
6 Value of crop (dollars) 787,917 9,139 
7 Farms reporting 10,795 172 
8 1919 acres 1,500 4 
 
In 1929, Watauga County had a thriving market for cabbage, having 751 farms that 
produced $91,816 worth of cabbage on 595 acres (U.S. Census, 1930). The cash value of the 
county’s cabbage crop, $91,816, equaled nearly ¼ of the entire state’s crop! Taking the 
number of cabbage farms (751) and the number of acres (595) together, it seems safe to 
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assume that most farmers produced around an acre or less of cabbage. A farm family could 
manage a crop of this size. Additionally, 172 farms reported having 100 acres of beans in 
1929, producing a crop worth $9,139. Commercial beans were likely grown on less than an 
acre per farm. Besides cabbage and beans, Watauga County did not produce significant 
amounts of any other field crop in 1930 (U.S. Census, 1930). 
Figure 4.1 shows that 2,095 Watauga County farms reported having 10,765 cattle in 
1929 for sale or consumption. Since examining the distribution of cattle to farms is beyond 
the scope of this research (but would be an important aspect of the agrarian economy to 
analyze), a simple average shows that five cattle per Watauga County farm was the possible 
norm in 1930. If 2,095 farms had cattle, presumably representing all the farms in the county, 
and only 751 of them raised cabbage, the only significant cash crop at the time, it seems safe 
to hypothesize that subsistence-based farming played a major role in the economy of 
Watauga County during this period. Cattle and sheep could be sold, and cabbage was sold by 
some as well, providing some income for farmers. But, this income was still a part of the 
overall diversified subsistence-based farming economy of the county (Hatch, 2003).  
Burley tobacco did not become an important cash crop in Watauga County until the 
early 1930s, arriving comparatively later than in other sections of Appalachia (personal 
communication, C.B. Reese, 2011; Beaver, 1986; U.S. Census, 1930). In 1929, one mountain 
county near Asheville, North Carolina (Madison) produced over 2.2 million pounds of 
tobacco on 2,186 farms (U.S. Census, 1930). Madison County’s tobacco infrastructure 
clearly was well established in the early twentieth century. It had been a major flue-cured, 
bright leaf tobacco producer in the state in the late nineteenth century (Algeo, 1997). After 
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that market waned, Madison County quickly reemerged in the 1920s as the burley production 
leader in the North Carolina mountains (Algeo, 1997; van Noppen & van Noppen, 1973). In 
Watauga County, however, burley tobacco was just beginning to emerge in the late 1920s. In 
1929, fifty-four farms reported growing tobacco; they produced 15,382 pounds on twenty 
acres. In contrast, only eight acres were reported in 1924 and just four acres in 1919 (U.S. 
Census, 1930). Prior to the late 1920s, Watauga County had no tobacco economy 
whatsoever, and farms made little if any money from tobacco. Contrasted with Madison 
County, the lack of a tobacco economy further indicates the lack of cash-based farming in 
Watauga County until the 1930s. Even then, tobacco income did not become reliable until the 
1940s with the permanent establishment of the federal tobacco program. 
“Risk” and the subsistence-based farming economy of Bethel  
Though burley tobacco stores well once it is cured, a lack of tobacco farming history, 
poor access to markets, and no government price supports/growing quotas made keeping and 
transporting tobacco from Watauga County to market a risky venture for farmers prior to the 
1930s and 1940s. Scott (1976) theorizes that subsistence economies are risk averse, and that 
risk is “the central economic dilemma for most peasant households…typically, the peasant 
cultivator seeks to avoid the failure that will ruin him rather than attempting a big, but risky, 
killing” (p. 4). Leaving the farm to drive cattle, investing heavily in one crop, or selling 
tobacco at market would constitute significant risk for subsistence-based families in distant 
farming communities, such as Bethel, during the early twentieth century. Therefore, a 
consistent subsistence becomes more profitable for the household economy than any single 
profit-generating venture, since subsistence is steady and reliable (Scott, 1976). 
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In the subsistence era of Bethel, avoiding risk meant valuing the diversification of 
work, and on a subscale, the diversification of farming. For work, Bethel subsistence farmers 
have logged timber, farmed, grazed livestock, and had some wage labor (U.S. Census, 1930). 
At times, these various jobs have crossed paths. As an example, in the early 1930s, a new 
school was built in Bethel by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), and the WPA 
bought and built with timber cut by locals and hired locals to work on the project, as well 
(personal communication, Shelby Eggers, 2011). With regard to farming, minimizing risk 
included planting multiple seed varieties, raising gardens, tending orchards, planting on 
scattered pieces of land, and utilizing the commons (Beaver, 1986; Boyer, 2006; Scott, 
1976). Diversifying helped to ensure multiple sources of food, and later income, which 
provided for the family’s well-being. As these subsistence-based farmers transitioned into the 
modern economy in the 1940s and 1950s, growing burley tobacco, supported by the federal 
tobacco program, became a stable and safe way to make some money from farming in 
Watauga County. This security characterized tobacco farming in Bethel for much of the latter 
half of the twentieth century. 
Burley production in Watauga County: 1929—2007 
 Beginning in the 1940s and continuing until the last years of the tobacco program, 
tobacco production in Watauga County remained relatively consistent as the number of farms 
grew and then declined (see Figure 4.3). In 1944, with tobacco in high demand due to World 
War II tobacco consumption and with a newly secured tobacco program voted-in by farmers, 
987 farms reported raising tobacco on 788 acres in Watauga County. These 987 farms 
produced roughly 1.2 million pounds of tobacco (U.S. Census, 1950). Throughout the rest of 
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the program years, tobacco production in Watauga County remained relatively constant, 
hovering around 1.2 million pounds for the duration of the program (see Figure 4.3). Initially, 
from the 1940s until the late 1960s, the number of tobacco farms increased as acreage quotas 
for burley were cut back (see Chapter 3). In 1959, 1,351 tobacco farms produced 
approximately 1.5 million pounds of tobacco in Watauga County (U.S. Census of 
Agriculture, 1959). Of these 1,351 tobacco farms, 1,261 had one acre or less. Just 88 tobacco 
farms were between one acre and 2.4 acres and only two farms raised more than 2.5 acres of 
tobacco (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1959). Clearly, Watauga County was dominated by 
very small tobacco operations during the first decades of the program. 
After the lease-and-transfer of quota provision of 1971 and the switch to poundage 
quotas, fewer farms produced Watauga County’s tobacco production totals (Mann, 1975). 
Since nearly all tobacco farms in the county were an acre to a half-acre by 1971, leasing 
quota enabled farmers in areas where the means of tobacco production were the greatest, 
such as Bethel, to raise more tobacco. So, by 1978 Watauga County produced over 1.6 
million pounds of tobacco on 598 farms (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1978). And five years 
after that, the county produced 2.2 million pounds on 613 farms. These were the peak years 
of tobacco production in Watauga County. After changes to the program in the mid-1980s 
(see Chapter 3), the blue-mold outbreak in the early 1980s (Chapter 5), and because of many 
other complex factors, tobacco production began to decline in Watauga County. In 1987, 
only 1.16 million pounds of tobacco was produced on 439 farms—a sharp fall from 1982’s 
totals (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1987).  
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Although production rose and maintained through the 1990s, at approximately 1.4 
million pounds in 1992 and 1997, between 1997 and 2002 tobacco production and the 
number of farms declined again (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1992; U.S. Census of 
Agriculture, 2002). Through all of these changes to the tobacco economy, tobacco production 
remained relatively constant in Watauga County because the tobacco program provided small 
farmers a fair and competitive price for their crops. When the program ended in 2004, 
tobacco production in Watauga County almost immediately bottomed-out. 
Figure 4.3 Historic Watauga County tobacco production totals (U.S. Census of Agriculture) 
 
Year 
 
Watauga County Tobacco Production (U.S. Census of Agriculture) 
 
Farms Acres Quantity (pounds) 
1929 54 20 15,382 
1934 307 153 157,469 
1939 731 383 475,574 
1944 987 788 1.278,942 
1949 1,071 703 1,050,413 
1954 1,265 860 1,583,795 
1959 1,351 726 1,545,335 
1964 974 657 1,347,350 
1969 777 529 1,238,455 
1974 575 615 1,248,081 
1978 598 809 1,671,467 
1982 613 1,049 2,240,169 
1987 439 648 1,161,028 
1992 416 779 1,459,009 
1997 285 762 1,422,908 
2002 187 495 959,769 
2007 11 24 44,000 
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Tobacco farming in Bethel, post-buyout 
Currently in Bethel, tobacco farming is a risky venture. Direct farmer-to-company 
contracts provide no long-term stability for farmers and no price assurances, among other 
uncertainties. These contracts, which have replaced the bidding process of the auction 
warehouse during the tobacco program era, keep tobacco farmers, in the words of several 
farmers from Bethel, “at the mercy of the buyer.” Even in places with more arable land 
where tobacco production has increased since the buyout, tobacco farmers en masse operate 
with great uncertainty year to year (Benson, 2012; Donaldson, 2011; Griffith, 2009; Stull, 
2009). In this new system, the company contractually controls the variety of tobacco planted, 
the chemicals used on it, and its selling price (if the crop is deemed buyable by the 
company). The free market structure of growing tobacco post-buyout favors competition 
between farmers, and it requires more capital, more land, more labor, and greater efficiency. 
Bigger is better and the only way to survive. For small tobacco farmers, like those in 
Watauga County, these changes were too burdensome to overcome, and growing tobacco 
became economically impractical (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 2007).  
The data in Figure 4.4 (pictured below), with North Carolina county tobacco statistics 
from before and after the tobacco program buyout, supports this point. These statistics are 
from the 2007 U.S. Census of Agriculture, which provides 2007 and 2002 production totals. 
Since the buyout of the tobacco program occurred in 2004, these statistics show the 
quantitative effect of the buyout on tobacco production in North Carolina. Figure 4.4 is 
divided into four sections of tobacco production data: state totals, mountain county totals, 
Piedmont county totals, and eastern North Carolina county totals. The counties are listed by 
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their geographical arrangement (northeast to southwest or north to south). The mountain and 
Piedmont counties were selected because of their proximity to Watauga County, and the 
eastern counties were selected because of their historic and current tobacco culture and 
production rates (Benson, 2012). 
Figure 4.4 Tobacco production totals, North Carolina selected counties, 2002 and 2007 (U.S. Census of 
Agriculture, 2007) 
 
Geographic 
Area  
Tobacco (Pounds) 
2007 2002 
Farms Acres Quantity Farms Acres Quantity 
State totals 2,622 170,083 365,958,031 7,850 167,677 353,125,841 
Mountain 
county totals 
      
Ashe 34 114 204,886 230 693 1,177,596 
Watauga 11 24 44,000 187 495 959,769 
Avery 4 15 26,400 37 91 176,804 
Mitchell 19 63 100,653 108 410 530,604 
Yancey 28 134 175,743 256 976 1,293,012 
Madison 57 350 635,205 467 1,882 2,650,963 
Piedmont/near
-mountain 
county totals 
      
Alleghany 32 389 673,378 108 251 361,689 
Wilkes 7 385 1,024,750 17 431 918,915 
Surry 90 3,325 6,600,072 217 3,591 8,181,564 
Yadkin 56 2,694 5,659,437 130 2,584 5,800,101 
Eastern North 
Carolina 
county totals 
      
Wilson 56 7,788 19,176,170 133 6,281 14,571,390 
Wayne 108 8,944 21,705,115 208 5,035 11,054,539 
Sampson 117 10,863 21,492,518 243 5,421 11,609,922 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the 2007 and 2002 total number of tobacco farms, total amount of 
tobacco acreage, and total quantity of tobacco produced (in pounds). To summarize the data, 
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after the 2004 buyout, North Carolina saw tobacco production increase, production acreage 
slightly increase, and the number of tobacco farms decrease. Each county section highlights 
three different responses to these production changes following the deregulation of the 
tobacco market in 2004. 
In 2002, two years before the end of the program, 187 farms reported raising tobacco 
in Watauga County (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 2007). In 2007, just five years later and 
three years after the end of the program, only 11 farms reported raising tobacco. Of the 187 
farmers that reported raising tobacco in 2002, 176 had quit by 2007 (U.S. Census of 
Agriculture, 2007). Production in Watauga County also fell drastically. In 2002, the county 
produced nearly one million pounds of tobacco. Although these totals are slightly less than 
the county’s historic production rates, which often hovered between 1.2 and 1.5 million 
pounds, the 2002 totals do indicate that tobacco production remained relatively constant in 
Watauga County throughout the years of the tobacco program. But after the program ended, 
Watauga County’s production dropped precipitously—in 2007, the county produced only 
44,000 pounds (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 2007).  
The buyout effectively ended tobacco farming in Watauga County and, as Figure 4.4 
shows, in the other mountain counties as well. Each mountain county from Ashe to regional 
tobacco leader Madison, lost scores of tobacco farmers and hundreds of thousands of pounds 
of tobacco production. The tobacco program, with its price supports and marketing quotas, 
allowed for small growers, such as those in the mountains, to get competitive prices on their 
crops and maintain stability long-term. Under the program, their risk was minimal—187 
Watauga County tobacco operations could still grow tobacco in 2002 and get decent enough 
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prices to justify raising the crop. Without the regulation of the program, the price of U.S. 
grown tobacco dropped significantly, reaching levels that were more comparable to prices on 
the world market (Ray, 2004). Tennessee burley prices dropped $.38 per pound from 2004’s 
average of $1.98/lb. to 2005’s $1.60/lb. (“Tennessee Tobacco,” 2010). In comparison, 
$1.60/lb. was the price of burley in the late 1980s, twenty years earlier (Ray, 2004). As 
tobacco prices dropped after the buyout, the costs of inputs, machinery, and labor continued 
to rise, and many mountain tobacco farmers simply quit raising the crop (U.S. Census of 
Agriculture, 2007).  
During this period that tobacco farming declined so quickly in the mountains, the 
opposite effect occurred in the flue-cured producing region of eastern North Carolina (see 
Figure 4.4). Wilson County went from 133 tobacco farms in 2002 to only 56 farms in 2007, 
after the deregulation of the tobacco market. But, those 56 farms produced approximately 4.5 
million more pounds of tobacco in 2007 than the 133 farms produced in 2002 (U.S. Census 
of Agriculture, 2007). 
Following this trend, Wayne and Sampson counties nearly doubled their tobacco 
production after the buyout. In the Piedmont region, although production rates remained 
relatively the same, fewer farms produced these comparable totals. Yadkin County, for 
instance, produced approximately the same amount of tobacco in 2007 as in 2002, but it did 
so with 74 fewer farms. The deregulation of United States tobacco farming has clearly 
increased overall production in North Carolina while shifting it to fewer and larger 
operations (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 2007).  
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In Bethel, with the diversification of work strategies, part-time tobacco farming kept 
people on the farm and helped maintain the cultural fabric of farming communities 
throughout the twentieth century. The next chapter examines this theme in more detail. The 
key here is the tobacco program. The program made burley tobacco grown in small 
allotments in the mountains price competitive with burley from larger operations. With the 
end of the program and the onset of the contracting system in 2004, nearly every tobacco 
farmer in Watauga County quit raising the crop. Currently only a handful of farmers still 
raise tobacco. While production has increased and become more concentrated elsewhere in 
the state, in the mountains the deregulation of the tobacco market has effectively ended 
tobacco farming. What made the program so important for growing tobacco in the 
mountains? 
The emergence of a market economy: the tobacco program 
 In Bethel, the emergence of tobacco as a cash crop via the program in 1938 enabled 
subsistence-based farming families to transition into the modern economy gradually, with a 
reliable source of yearly income. The partial income provided by growing tobacco also 
necessitated the emergence of multiple livelihood strategies within the emerging market 
economy (Halperin, 1990). Since tobacco could only provide a portion of the household 
income, raising cattle and/or logging helped provide a year-round income for deep rural 
families in the mountains, and this enabled them to continue to navigate the transition to a 
market economy. Again, the tobacco program helped keep farmers on their farms and 
allowed them to continue to own their land and keep it in production. In just twenty years, 
from 1929 to 1949, Watauga County added over 1,000 tobacco farms (U.S. Census, 1930; 
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U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1950). It stands to reason that many of the farms that reported 
owning cattle in 1929, but that did not sell cabbage (some 1,300 farms), transitioned away 
from subsistence-based farming during the development and early years of the tobacco 
program. The program offered stability and guaranteed income for farmers; with a stable 
tobacco crop, they could continue to farm by having diversified operations or by having part-
time/off-farm work. The program enabled farmers in Bethel to keep their land and continue 
farming as modernization began to change the American landscape. These assurances 
changed the moral economy of Bethel by replacing its safeguards of traditional subsistence-
based farming with the safeguards of partial guaranteed income from tobacco money. 
Anthropologist Elvin Hatch (2008), who has conducted research in a neighboring 
western North Carolina county, highlights other reasons why a cash economy began to 
replace subsistence culture. For one thing, modernization did seem to offer people material 
advantages, like easier and more efficient work and more comfortable living (with electricity, 
for example). Secondly, and more importantly, Hatch (2008) identifies the wider social 
movement of modernization underway in the United States after World War II. By 
distinguishing progress from backwardness, the powers of politics, media, and technology 
began to frame a pattern of an American economy based on the accumulation of wealth, 
consumerism, and technological advances (Escobar, 1995). This is exemplified in 
Appalachia by the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933, a state 
modernist initiative aimed at the development of progress in the southern United States 
(Davidson, 1948; Whisnant, 1980). In agriculture, the 1954 farm bill and subsequent U.S. 
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farm policy, which emphasized mechanization, increased farm debt, and moving farmers off 
the land, etc., illustrate this movement towards modernization (Berry, Jr., 1993a). 
Hatch (2008) frames the local level decisions to modernize in terms of the goals and 
viewpoints regarding change held by local conservatives and progressives. Based largely on 
moral terms, local conservatives (or traditionalists) believed that the market economy 
devalued social and kinship relationships and disregarded the prestige of the moral economy 
by focusing on the accumulation of money and wealth. By accumulating money, 
conservatives foresaw the rise of greed and consumerism and the loss of social and 
community cooperation. The market economy meant the loss of the way of life they had been 
born into, the loss of what Scott (1976) calls the moral economy (Hatch, 2008).  
The goals for progressives, however, highlighted progress and leaving behind the old 
way of doing things, and of course, this was highly influenced by media and political power 
structures. The progressive agenda carried a moral dimension as well: its main arguments 
centered on making people’s lives better, easier, more beautiful, and more meaningful 
(Hatch, 2008). Technology could erase chores; new chemical sprays could eliminate hoeing 
tobacco and suckering, and electricity enabled improvements at home and in work. These 
innovations provided tangible results and many benefits for farming families. As an example, 
electricity enabled small dairy operations the ability to upgrade their operations, making 
them more efficient and safer. Many dairies were then able to sell Grade A dairy products, 
which brought more income than lower graded (Grade C) products, which didn’t require 
refrigeration (Hatch, 2008). Conversely, this moral ideal led to the old way being 
characterized as backward. Such things as undecorated homes or homemade items, when 
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compared to store bought products, began to be devalued as the modern economy emerged 
across the country. Similarly, mechanization in farming began to replace handwork, draft 
animals, and the old way of doing things. But, with the stability of the tobacco program, 
tobacco farmers were able to transition to a modern economy, absorb these changes, and 
keep their farming culture relatively intact. 
Hatch (2008) identifies a simpler sense of modernity that developed, one that 
embraced characteristics of both tradition and progress. This type of modernity generally 
valued technological advances, new homes, new cars, factory jobs, and so on, but did so with 
a modest tone. Flashiness and excess consumerism were not in favor, and this is true in 
Bethel as well. One of my informants worked several years off the farm and had the 
opportunity to advance in his company, but he decided instead to return to work in Bethel, 
run the general store, and raise tobacco and farm part-time. He chose a lifestyle that provided 
more meaning than a job with career advancements and golf trips. His story is told in more 
detail in the next chapter. The homes of my informants are modest, and generally so are most 
of the homes in the community. Most of my informants live on or near their family land. 
Much of the second-home development in Watauga County has concentrated in other areas 
of the county, and these two lifestyles do not seem to compete in Bethel as they do 
elsewhere. But, it should be noted that part-time farmers in Bethel certainly found wage labor 
work during the second-home boom in Watauga and Avery Counties during the late-
twentieth century. Working construction, grading, operating machinery, hauling, and logging 
were aspects of many part-time farmers’ overall income (personal communication, Shelby 
Eggers, 2012). Over time, then, mountain progressivism in Bethel developed steady traction, 
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providing yet another dimension to its twentieth century moral economy. Even though 
modernity has taken full hold and the moral economy is now waning, traditional elements 
remain strong. 
Transitioning to a market economy: coal 
Coal mining communities are often put forth as the standard of modernization in 
Appalachia. Yet, the gradual transition to the global market economy in Bethel contrasts with 
the rapid transition that occurred in the coal mining communities of southern Appalachia at 
the beginning of the twentieth century (Eller, 1982). Prior to the extraction of coal, 
communities in these areas operated similarly to subsistence-based Appalachian 
communities, such as Bethel, further south. When the coal companies moved in, the 
economies of these communities changed quickly. With good quality coal in the ground, a 
non-union workforce, and cheap start-up costs, coal barons in the mountains wrested industry 
dominance and accumulated huge profits (Eller, 1982).  
Although tobacco and coal developed differently, many of the new miners in the 
burgeoning southern Appalachian coal industry carried the same agrarian background as the 
people who would become tobacco farmers in Bethel, one of “a system of small, independent 
family farms, clustered together in diffuse open-country neighborhoods” (Eller, 1982, p. 
194). In mining, company power, manifested in the formation of the company town and the 
company store, drastically altered former subsistence-based farming community structures to 
the point that the livelihoods of miners were near totally controlled by the coal companies 
(Eller, 1982).  
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What, then, made the emergence of the market economy in burley tobacco farming 
different from that of the coal mining industry? The difference rests with the price support 
and quota system of the tobacco program, which led to a stable tobacco economy in 
Appalachia that checked the power of the tobacco companies. This key difference altered 
corporate power and its effects on life at the ground level for tobacco farmers (Benson & 
Kirsch, 2010). Essentially, the tobacco program enabled regional cooperatives to provide an 
equitable income for their members, those holding growing quotas, while protecting them 
from the power of tobacco corporations. In this way, local concerns and agendas were able to 
scale up through cooperative channels to the regional and national levels, and this provided 
tobacco farmers with an equitable livelihood (Gaventa & McGee, 2010). Today, however, 
the tables have turned. Power is manifested in farming under company contract, whereby 
corporations obtain “high-value commodities at low ‘wage’ prices while controlling the 
essential aspects of the production process” (Fisher & Harnish, 1980, p.7). The farmers under 
contract fall into a cycle of overproduction and low returns and are in competition with one 
another. Under the federal tobacco program, farmers were able to collectively sell their crops 
at a pre-negotiated price, and the system operated, at least in theory, equitably. Conversely, 
how different would the coal mining industry look if it had operated under a similar system, 
where a miners’ cooperative negotiated the price of mined coal?  
Stability in tobacco farming 
Unlike coal economies, the tobacco program allowed agrarian communities to 
navigate the waters of modernization largely on their own terms. For example, many farmers 
owned their own farms at the outset of the tobacco economy in Watauga County, and this 
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provided a measure of independence concerning their work and kept family lands in 
production (U.S. Census, 1930; Salamon, 2003). By owning land, the landowner used it to 
their benefit or profit. They raised gardens for household consumption, grew corn and cut 
hay for livestock feed, and grew tobacco beginning in the 1930s. Later in the twentieth 
century, landowners continued to profit from land by leasing their tobacco quotas (which 
were tied to the land) to farmers still raising tobacco (Algeo, 1997). In this way, active 
growers could raise more pounds of tobacco and quota owners could still profit. This leasing 
system encountered problems later in the twentieth century, and added to the pressures on the 
program, but the program continued to function beneficially to farmers (Algeo, 1997; Benson 
2012). With a stable and secure market for growing burley tobacco, landowners in the 
mountains could raise tobacco or lease their quotas and make at least a portion of the income 
they needed to live in the modern economy.  
Although burley tobacco has provided substantial portions of income for a few 
mountain farmers, the majority of mountain growers raised tobacco as part of a diversified 
farm operation or in combination with public (wage labor) work (Benson 2012; personal 
communication, Tommy Lawrence, 2011). This was the trend in Watauga County and in 
Bethel and is contrasted with off the mountain tobacco operations, which tended to supply 
larger percentages of family income (Benson, 2012; Griffith, 2009; Kingsolver, 2011; Stull, 
2009). In 1969, Watauga County had 777 tobacco farms on 529 acres (U.S. Census of 
Agriculture, 1969). These farms produced 1,238,455 pounds of tobacco. Of those 777 farms, 
184 farms were classified as Class 1-5 farms (farms that sold over $2,500). These 184 farms 
produced nearly half the county’s tobacco pounds (538,253) on slightly less than half its 
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acres in production (237). By 1969, burley tobacco acreage allotments had been cut back for 
several years due to overproduction stemming from higher per acre yields and growing 
numbers of allotments were reaching the half-acre minimum (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 
1969). Consequently, in 1971, burley quotas switched from acreage allotments to poundage 
allotments (Mann, 1975; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998).  
By the 1960s and 70s, tobacco, livestock, and logging, or, tobacco, livestock, and off-
farm wage labor, were prominent combinations of livelihoods in Bethel, and tobacco money 
often played an important role for the family within these multiple livelihood strategies. 
While providing the total number of tobacco farms and number of tobacco acres, the 1969 
Census of Agriculture does not provide the per farm average income for tobacco. So, for a 
rough estimate, if Watauga County’s 1969 total pounds (1,238,455) is divided by its total 
tobacco farms (777), each farm produced approximately 1,594 pounds/acre 
(1,238,455lbs./777 farms = 1,594 lbs./acre) (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1969). Using 
pricing statistics from Tennessee (which shares more commonalities with western North 
Carolina burley farms), in 1970, burley tobacco brought on average, .728 dollars per pound 
(“Tennessee Tobacco,” 2010). Multiplying this rate by the average pounds per acre equals 
$1,160 ($.728 x 1,594= 1,160). As a ballpark figure, the average Watauga County tobacco 
farmer received around $1,160 dollars for their tobacco (not deducting expenses) in 1969/70. 
This figure holds steady with Watauga County farm income data from 1969, which gives the 
per farm average value of all agricultural products sold as $3,154 (see Figure 4.5). Of this 
average farm income, roughly two-thirds came from livestock and one-third from crops (U.S. 
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Census of Agriculture, 1969). It seems reasonable to assume that the average farm in 
Watauga County in 1969 received around a third of its farming income from tobacco. 
 Figure 4.5. Watauga County farm income and sales, 1969 (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1969) 
Market value of all 
agricultural products sold 
 
Dollars 
 
3,895,298 
     Average per farm Dollars 3, 154 
Crops including nursery 
products and hay 
 
Farms 
 
909 
 Dollars 1,234,376 
Forest Products Farms 43 
 Dollars 26,287 
Livestock, poultry, and their 
products 
 
Farms 
 
687 
 Dollars 2,634,635 
 
Although only a portion of the farming income in Bethel, tobacco money was 
significant and reliable as it continued to provide for the family household. Coming every 
winter, tobacco money often went towards Christmas gifts, paying yearly expenses, and 
paying property taxes (personal communication, Tommy Lawrence, 2011). So, while only a 
partial portion of farming income, tobacco money provided for important cultural 
components, such as Christmas gifts, college tuitions, and weddings. Moreover, tobacco 
farming and tobacco income kept family farmland in use, and allowed farm families to 
continue to own their own land and maintain their ways of life. 
Within the Appalachian region as a whole, however, the burley tobacco economy 
varied in size and scale depending upon the availability of tillable land. In the foothills of 
Tennessee or in Kentucky for example, larger tracts of tobacco could be grown simply due to 
the availability of more cropland (Donaldson, 2011; Kingsolver, 2011; Stull, 2009). Growing 
larger tobacco crops inherently requires more laborers than a single farming family can 
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provide. Kingsolver (2007) points to Kentucky tobacco production’s historic reliance on low-
wage and no-wage farmworkers (i.e., slaves, tenant farmers, migrant workers, and unpaid 
family members), arguing that these “others” have been strategically used by farmers to a) 
perpetuate the Jeffersonian ideal while b) maintaining a hierarchical class structure that 
favors the farmer and ensures his accumulation of wealth.  
Kingsolver’s (2007) study builds on the fact that tobacco production has always been 
fully integrated in the global economy while relying on farmworkers. For example, she 
provides insight into the invisible role played by African slaves in pre-industrial Kentucky 
agriculture, an obvious exploitation of labor and illustration of global economic forces, but 
one that is often glossed over in historical remembrance. After slavery, tenant farmers took 
their place in the tobacco economy, and now, migrant workers are filling the labor void. 
These trends have characterized larger tobacco operations in America and have resulted in 
distinct class hierarchies in these places (Benson 2012; Kingsolver 2011). 
In Bethel, due to Watauga County’s lack of a tobacco economy prior to the 1930s, 
and because of the security stemming from the program, farm families were able to work 
their own tobacco crops. As noted earlier in this chapter, in 1959, 1,261 of 1,351 total 
Watauga County tobacco farms raised less than an acre of tobacco. Parents and children were 
able to work these patches with their own labor (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1959). Despite 
the fact that tenant farming was quite prevalent in Watauga County in the 1930s, 
approximately 450 of the 2,100 farms in 1930 were tenant farms, tenant farming was not as 
critical to the emergence and stability of Watauga County’s tobacco economy as it was 
elsewhere in the South (U.S. Census, 1930). Since tenant farming was well established prior 
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to tobacco’s emergence, and since tobacco crops in Watauga County were small and could 
therefore be worked by families, it stands to reason that the stability provided by the tobacco 
program was primarily responsible for Watauga County’s historic tobacco economy.  
Still, a yearly tobacco crop on small farms necessitated the need for help on certain 
occasions, and so, especially as fewer farms produced Watauga County’s tobacco throughout 
the twentieth century, extended family, neighbors, and hired workers helped work tobacco 
crops. Generally, certainly into the 1980s and 1990s, and until the buyout, in Watauga 
County, sons and sons-in-law and daughters and daughters-in-law, living locally, would help 
parents and relatives put up tobacco on evenings and weekends after they finished working 
their day jobs. This kept social and cultural connections to land and place active and shows 
how a mountain ethic of hard work, industriousness (i.e., do it yourself), and cultural 
humbleness, all elements of the traditional moral economy, developed in the midst of 
modernity (Hatch, 2008). 
But, by the 1970s, even though this next generation could often help with tobacco 
crops, they were not coming back to the farm to live and work. They had jobs in Boone or 
Lenoir or in other cities or states. Farming on a small scale was becoming too risky and too 
hard; if they wanted to farm, the opportunities often were not feasible. Around the country, 
federal farm policies drove families out of farming—the U.S. lost nearly one million farms 
between 1959 and 1969 (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1969, Vol. 2[2]). To help get tobacco 
put up, farmers often swapped work with friends and neighbors, and increasingly, as the cash 
economy became more prevalent, they hired additional help. In 1969, 504 Watauga County 
farms reported hiring farm labor, up from 421 in 1964 (though the data is unclear as to what 
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specific farm work this hired labor did; U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1969 Vol. 1[26]). In the 
1980s and 90s, wider economic and social forces continued to put pressure on American 
agriculture and tobacco farming. By the 1990s, those still raising tobacco in Bethel and 
elsewhere in the mountains were turning to migrant labor as the family and neighbor 
connections that once helped with tobacco were no longer available to work. These former 
helpers and workers had other jobs, more comfortable lives, or could not spare the time to put 
up tobacco. As fewer locals worked tobacco, their skills declined as well, and once the local 
tobacco labor force was depleted, the people remaining often were not the best or most 
reliable workers. It was at these “pressing times in the production cycle” that Bethel farmers 
began turning to migrant, mostly Hispanic, farm workers to help work tobacco (Kingsolver, 
2011, p. 37).  
The end of mountain tobacco farming 
In 2004, the tobacco program ended and U.S. tobacco production transitioned entirely 
to the free market. Today, post-buyout, tobacco farmers (both large and small) are at the 
mercy of corporate power (Benson & Kirsch, 2010). As tobacco prices have dropped and 
input and labor costs have continued to rise, farmers in Bethel can hardly afford to pay 
migrant workers and make any profit. One heavily invested tobacco farmer in Bethel had to 
lay off his Hispanic workers after 2004, because he could not afford to pay them. He figures 
that he and his wife might make minimum wage doing all their tobacco work themselves. 
Without a regulated price and growing quota, small tobacco farmers cannot compete in the 
newly deregulated tobacco economy. Because of limited cropland in the mountains, larger 
tobacco operations never materialized, and now, post-buyout, the tobacco culture and 
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economy of Bethel is waning. Most mountain farmers quit after the buyout, and the statistics 
are worth repeating: Watauga County went from 187 tobacco farms producing nearly one 
million pounds of tobacco in 2002 to 11 farms producing just 44,000 pounds in 2007 (U.S. 
Census of Agriculture, 2007).  
Why are these few men in Bethel still growing tobacco? Tobacco money has typically 
not provided large portions of family income in the mountains, and there are other ways to 
make the small income that tobacco money brings. For one farmer, 2011 will be his last 
burley crop. He’s seventy-two years old and has been raising tobacco for much of his life. 
Maybe he still raises it because it’s what he has always done. He has the skills, the 
equipment, and the knowledge to raise tobacco. Maybe tobacco connects him to his family 
and to his past. Tobacco farming in Bethel has historically been a family operation, from its 
developing years in the 1930s to today. One family in Bethel still raises tobacco together. A 
father and son each have a contract and share a field where they grow their tobacco. These 
men were taught about life, responsibility, and hard work in tobacco fields as children. Part 
of the reason they still raise tobacco is to teach their grandchildren and children the same life 
lessons. Maybe, then, raising tobacco is symbolic of a farming culture in Bethel. These few 
farmers who still raise tobacco in Bethel are the last ones standing. They are carrying on their 
community’s farming tradition in spite of the economic forces that work against them.  
Conclusion 
It’s been my goal in this chapter to show how the tobacco program extended, not just 
tobacco farming, but also a culture of farming in Bethel and in other agrarian mountain 
communities during the twentieth century. Especially in Bethel and Watauga County, where 
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no significant cash-based tobacco economy existed prior to the 1930s, the program enabled 
farmers to grow tobacco with the assurance of getting a competitive market price. They could 
raise one acre of tobacco and know there would be some money at the end of the year. This 
made growing tobacco worth the risk of time and effort in Bethel. Prior to the 1930s, 
commercial agriculture in Bethel and Watauga County was minimal. Besides the selling of 
livestock, timber products, dairy, and, for a few years in the 1930s and 1940s, cabbage, 
which provided some income for farming families, most agricultural products were 
consumed on the farm or bartered at general stores (Jarrell, 2011; U.S. Census, 1930). 
Tobacco provided a secure source of farming income on a yearly basis and helped transition 
these subsistence-based farms to the emerging modern economy in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Since its inception, tobacco farming in Bethel, and in the mountains, has generally 
provided only a portion of the farming household’s income, but over the years, it has been 
crucial for the maintenance of agrarian cultures and economies. Because of the limited 
availability of arable land in the mountains, tobacco operations have remained small, mostly 
encompassing a few acres. Compared to larger tobacco operations in the Piedmont and in 
eastern North Carolina, mountain counties produced relatively small production totals. But 
even though the mountain counties had small tobacco farms, these small farms were an 
integral component of a greater farming infrastructure in the region, characterized by 
diversified and part-time operations. In turn, tobacco farming played a supplementary, but 
vital, role in the perpetuation of farming cultures in the mountains throughout the twentieth 
century. One question to ask is what makes a county tobacco dependent (Billings et al, 
2010)? Is it the amount of pounds produced, which obviously favors counties with larger 
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operations and more flat land? Or, as was argued at the state level in Kentucky in the late 
1990s, is county tobacco dependence more accurately surmised as a combination of “the 
number of farms, the percentage of per capita income represented by tobacco, and the 
amount of tobacco grown” (Billings et al, p. 16)? This latter definition, in the spirit of the 
tobacco program, leveled the playing field, and promoted a more inclusive definition of 
tobacco dependence, one that could have included Bethel and other mountain communities. 
Again, part-time tobacco farming enabled the continuation of farming as a way of life, and 
sometimes as a primary livelihood, in the mountains. But, all of this, this farming culture that 
existed in the mountains throughout the twentieth century, is predicated upon the tobacco 
program. The price supports and marketing quotas of the program allowed for mountain 
tobacco farmers to get competitive prices on their small crops. Without the program, as 
evidenced by the drastic decline in the number of tobacco farms from 2002 to 2007 in the 
mountains, tobacco farming in Bethel is seriously imperiled (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 
2007). And thus, so is the culture and economy of farming in the mountains.  
During the twentieth century, a stable market for tobacco ensured the continuation of 
farming in the mountains, even if it was only part-time. Tobacco farming made up small 
portions of incomes but large portions of ways of life. Moreover, the nature of raising a 
tobacco crop necessitated the need for help, which was often found in families and neighbors. 
As farmers transitioned to the cash economy in the 1930s and 40s, they were able to adapt 
aspects of their pre-modern subsistence-based farming culture to the emerging era of 
modernization. The tobacco program, then, helped former subsistence-based farms balance 
the changes brought by the emerging modern economy: they could still employ the social 
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connections and diversified farming techniques characteristic of the decades prior to the 
1930s while entering into the modern, progressive world that surfaced during the 1950s. As 
modernity rapidly changed the American economic landscape post-1950, tobacco farming 
provided rural mountain families the ability to navigate those waters at their own pace. 
Families—mothers, fathers, and children—often worked their own tobacco. Neighbors and 
other family members helped each other at the most labor-intensive times of the year. 
Eventually, this work pattern, held over from the subsistence-based farming years, gave way 
to paying friends, family, neighbors, and workers in the 1970s and 1980s. Then, in the 1990s, 
migrant labor began to replace help from the local community (Algeo, 1997).  
In comparison to the general trend of American farming, Bethel, and other tobacco-
farming communities in the mountains, withstood the full emergence of the modern economy 
until the last decades of the twentieth century. The reason this is notable, and the reason I’ve 
framed this change with a somewhat negative connotation, concerns Bethel’s social and 
cultural connections, its social capital, that has been disrupted with the modern economy’s 
full emergence. One former tobacco farmer in Bethel lamented that people don’t help each 
other out like they once did. In part, I find this sentiment results from the lack of a common 
identity and shared livelihood that once characterized Bethel (Halperin, 1990; Salamon, 
2003). Without a tobacco economy and culture, fewer people are employed in the same line 
of work (tobacco farming, and diversified farming in general), fewer people work locally in 
the community, and the ethic of reciprocity that formerly characterized tobacco farming in 
Bethel, and was necessary for its success and the community’s well-being, is waning. 
Without tobacco, Bethel has in some ways lost its tie that binds. Its social capital is not gone, 
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but it has changed significantly. It is now time to hear this story, the story of tobacco farming 
in Bethel, from the farmers who grew the crop. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE STORY OF TOBACCO FARMING IN BETHEL: CULTURAL 
MEANINGS AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
Introduction 
During my research in Bethel, interviews with tobacco farmers usually began with a 
description of the tobacco growing process and the work involved in tobacco production. 
These farmers would talk me through each stage of the tobacco growing season and this 
would lead to my questions and their answers and stories about how tobacco was raised in 
the old days and how tobacco is grown and sold now. This chapter, then, tells the story of 
Bethel’s tobacco culture and economy as it was told to me. Following the growing process 
over the course of a year, the chapter moves from season to season and era to era, 
culminating in the story of how tobacco is raised and sold in the current deregulated era of 
tobacco farming.  
The chapter opens with a glimpse into the nascent years of tobacco farming in Bethel 
with descriptions of how farmers grew tobacco in the 1930s and 1940s, prior to chemical 
sprays, modern machinery, and other labor saving techniques. The next section concerns how 
tobacco was grown in the mid- to late-twentieth century and illustrates how some aspects of 
the “old days” work remained alive in Bethel even as tobacco farmers increasingly 
transitioned to more modern practices. By the 1990s, a set of complex factors began to 
change the tobacco economy. The cost of inputs increased, burley prices dropped, and the 
program turned less and less resilient. After the buyout of the program in 2004, small farmers 
were hit hard by the resulting changes to the tobacco economy. In these latter sections 
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regarding this new state of tobacco production post-2004, farmers from Bethel describe the 
differences between growing and selling tobacco during the program years and then after the 
buyout. Out of these discussions, the story of Bethel’s tobacco culture and economy emerges. 
Now, with direct company-to-farmer growing contracts and no tobacco program, 
tobacco farming in Bethel and in the mountains is nearly gone, and only a handful of people 
still raise any tobacco at all. The reasons most farmers have quit, namely, that they cannot 
make money growing the crop and that contracts are unavailable, speaks to the current state 
of tobacco farming in Bethel and in the mountains, indicating, too, that farming in general 
may not be a viable source of income going forward. Viewing Bethel’s tobacco economy 
over time also sheds light on the changing tobacco culture and agrarian culture. The stories of 
raising tobacco in this chapter often point toward culture’s influence on the manner in which 
the crop was grown. This influence ranges from the early days, when the goal was often to 
grow the highest quality crop possible, to now, where family work and life lessons still 
largely characterize one farmer’s tobacco operation. Discussing this culture of tobacco helps 
explain why tobacco farming has persisted in Bethel for so long, in spite of various economic 
disadvantages. Going forward, the state of tobacco farming is entering a new era/system of 
production, likely indicating the complete end of mountain tobacco farming. This makes the 
continuation of the agrarian culture and economy of Bethel doubtful, and heightens the 
realization that Bethel’s long standing social and community structure, which revolved in 
large part around tobacco, is close to permanently changing.  
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Raising burley—the early years 
Tobacco farming has deep roots in Bethel. At eighty-eight years old, C.B. Reese 
remembers raising tobacco with his family as a small child. Regarding the time-intensiveness 
of working the crop, Mr. Reese recounts: “it was a pretty slow deal, back when we started.” 
Those were the nascent years of tobacco farming in Bethel and in Watauga County. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, tobacco as a cash crop arrived comparatively later in 
Watauga County than it did in other Appalachian and North Carolina mountain counties. 
Whereas Madison County, North Carolina, had a successful bright leaf tobacco economy in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and was quick to adopt burley in the 1920s 
and 1930s, in 1929, only 54 farms reported raising tobacco in Watauga County, marking the 
county’s first significant tobacco production (U.S. Census, 1930). Fifteen years later, in 
1945, 1,437 farms reported raising tobacco in Watauga County (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 
1950). In between the late 1920s and 1945, a tobacco culture and economy developed in 
Watauga County, and the story in this section details how tobacco was grown and worked at 
that time and traces the emergence of Bethel’s tobacco economy and culture.  
Tobacco work began in the winter and early spring of the year in Watauga County. 
Decades before farmers could drive to a greenhouse and buy hydroponic tobacco plants a few 
days before they set them, tobacco farmers raised their tobacco plants from seed themselves. 
This entailed making a plant bed to plant the tobacco seeds in to “start” the plants. “We’d 
find us a warm place in the holler somewhere where the wind didn’t hit,” recalls C.B. Reese. 
“We’d cut us a whole lot of brush and build us a brush heap. We’d dig up our ground good, 
you know, make our beds, then we’d pile a whole lot of brush on it and we’d burn that. To 
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kill the weed seeds in the ground.” Hite Reese, C.B. Reese’s son, remembers preparing 
tobacco beds the old way with his father and grandfather as a child. According to Hite Reese, 
burning the brush “wouldn’t kill everything [the weed seed], but it’d kill a lot of it.” After the 
brush pile had burned, then the bed was ready for seeds. C.B. Reese:  
We’d take planks and build us sort of a box around the great big space, about a 
50x50, and we’d sow our [tobacco] seed in that. That’s the way they started raising. 
We didn’t have no chemicals to kill the weed seed. That was pretty well on the start. 
Where I’m starting you raising them ‘baccer beds, burning them and sowing them, 
that’s the way they started raising tobacco. 
Mrs. Ruth Reese’s father, Jim Eggers, also raised tobacco in the 1920s and 1930s 
(Mrs. Reese is married to C.B. Reese). “I’ve always heard my dad raised the first tobacco 
that was ever grown in this country,” said Mrs. Reese. “Around that old barn up Fork Branch. 
I’ve always been told.” Fork Branch runs up a small valley off Beaver Dam Road in the 
Bethel community; it’s a mile or two from where she and her husband, C.B. Reese, live now. 
The idea that Mrs. Reese’s father would have raised the first tobacco in Beaverdam (or in 
Bethel) is consistent with tobacco statistics from the 1930 U.S. Census, which stated that 
only 54 farms raised tobacco in 1929 and that just eight acres of tobacco was grown in 1924. 
Clearly, tobacco emerged for the first time in Watauga County in the 1920s and early 1930s. 
Perhaps the next question to ask concerns why and how tobacco came to Watauga 
County. Where did Jim Eggers first get the idea to raise tobacco? Did someone from another 
county or state bring him seeds? Did he travel and bring purchased seeds back to Bethel, or 
was tobacco seed sold locally? A partial answer to this question is provided by Mr. R.G. 
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Shipley. At ninety-nine years old, Mr. Shipley remembers when tobacco first came to 
Watauga County, recalling that seed companies distributed seeds to local general stores for 
sale in the area. Mr. Shipley: “They would send their salesman out early [in the year] and 
supply the country stores with seed.” Mr. Shipley indicated that the seed companies were one 
of the main catalysts for the expansion of tobacco farming during this period. Furthermore, 
this recollection indicates Watauga County’s, and Bethel’s, participation in and further 
transition towards the market economy in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Returning to the story of how tobacco was grown in the early years in Bethel, once 
the seeds were planted in the plant bed, they were watered and looked after until late spring. 
Then, come the last of May/first of June, the tobacco plants were transplanted from the plant 
bed and set out in the field. In those days, “we’d take an old pair of horses and plow us up 
about a half-acre, acre, and fix it down with our horses,” remembers C.B. Reese. This work 
prepared the field for the tobacco transplants. Next, a hand setter was used to set the tobacco 
plants in the ground. They were watered after their setting, and from then on were ready to 
grow in the half-acre or acre field. As the plants grew, however, so did the bugs. “We’d have 
to catch the bugs and worms by hand, to kill them,” said Mr. Reese. In those days, farmers 
did not have chemical sprays to kill insects as they would in the decades soon to come. So, 
this work was done by hand. It was labor intensive, but at the same time, the work was done 
for free by children and families as part of their daily lives and chores. And as chores often 
are, not all these tasks were enjoyable. Mrs. Reese, good-naturedly recalling her sister’s 
distaste for picking tobacco worms during their childhood, remarked: “Those great big green 
worms. Some people killed them off with a clothespin!”  
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Over the summer months, farmers and families would hoe the tobacco plants and 
cultivate them with a horse-drawn cultivator. As the plants continued to grow late into the 
summer, blooms would form out of the tops of plants. To get the most energy into the leaves 
of the tobacco plants, these blooms were “topped,” or broken out of the tobacco plants. After 
topping, farmers next had to “sucker” the tobacco. As the plants grow late in the summer, 
they develop sprouts between the main stalk and the leaves in the top third of the plant. These 
sprouts, or “suckers,” produce small, low quality leaves if they are not broken out. Again, 
they take energy away from the main leaves. So, in the early years of tobacco work, people 
went through the tobacco field row by row and broke the sucker sprouts out by hand. 
Topping and suckering were two labor-intensive jobs, but since tobacco crops were a half 
acre or a little more, families, parents, and children could manage this work. 
After topping and suckering, the tobacco leaves began to ripen in the field in late 
summer. In late August/early September, the plants would be cut down in the field and then 
hung to cure. C.B. Reese recounts how this process was done in the first years of tobacco 
farming in Bethel:  
We built us a scaffold out in the field, in the patch. We cut it [the tobacco] and hung it 
on them scaffolds, and let it wilt down in the field. My dad, he didn’t even want it to 
touch the ground or nothing. The way we cut it, we didn’t spear it. We had a thing, 
we called it a horse, and carried it along by the row. And we’d split that ‘baccer stalk, 
and then we’d cut it off and hang it over that stick and put six stalks on the stick. 
We’d take it then and hang it on that scaffold in the field, let it wilt down a few days, 
and then we’d carry it and hang it up in the barns and old buildings.   
 
 
 
 115 
Several things are worth noting from the above passage. First, Mr. Reese mentions 
cutting the stalk rather than spearing it on to a stick. The advent of the spear technique, which 
I’ll discuss in more detail in the next section, made cutting tobacco somewhat faster but did 
not make it easier. The cutting work was still, and is still today, done by hand. This is one of 
the techniques/traditions that has changed little over time. Secondly, after cutting the 
tobacco, it needed to wilt down in the field before it was in the proper shape to hang. Once 
the tobacco had cured down some, and the green leaves had begun to fade yellow, then it was 
hauled to hang. Thirdly, the use of scaffolding and the carrying in of the sticks of tobacco 
indicates the great care farmers took with their crop. As Mr. Reese says, the scaffolding kept 
the tobacco off the ground during the week or so that it wilted down in the field, and this 
meant some extra work hanging the tobacco in the field. Similarly, carrying the tobacco in by 
hand meant not transporting it on sleds, wagons, or trailers, on the chance that it might bruise 
or damage the leaves. Mr. Reese’s comments illustrate the important roles that quality and 
pride in work played in the early years of the tobacco economy in Bethel. 
The tobacco cured in the barns all fall. Hung up slightly yellow, after wilting in the 
fields, the tobacco turns brown in the barns throughout the fall. Before stripping the leaves 
and grading could begin, the tobacco had to be just right. It had to get “in case.” “You have 
to let it get in good ‘case,’” says Larry Davis, 59, who still raises tobacco in Bethel. “It’s 
damp enough to where you can handle it. Because when it dries out it gets real brittle, when 
it’s dried. On a day like it rained today, you go check and see what ‘case’ it’s in. How much 
moisture’s in it.” When the tobacco gets in case, when there is enough moisture in the leaves 
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to make it workable, but not so much that it’s wet (which can ruin a crop after it’s graded and 
tied/baled), then the stripping and grading process can begin. 
Grading the tobacco started around the end of November/first of December once the 
tobacco was in case. Like other aspects of the tobacco work season, the method of grading 
has changed over time, in response to market demand. In the first decades of tobacco farming 
in Bethel, leaves were stripped from the stalk and sorted by color and quality (moving from 
the bottom of the stalk up toward the “tips” leaves at the top). Back then, six or seven grades 
of tobacco were the norm, and like cutting the tobacco, precision characterized this job. “My 
dad,” said C.B. Reese, “he was so particular about grading he wouldn’t hardly let us kids 
help him grade it. He’d make us carry it in, carry out the stalks [after they’d been stripped of 
leaves], do the work like that.” The grading process, like scaffolding to keeping the tobacco 
off the ground, was diligent and difficult work. These men and women took pride, or 
personal prestige, in doing this work, and these approaches taken in the tobacco field taught 
generations of men and women in Bethel the value and necessity of hard work.  
In the winter, tobacco leaves were stripped, graded, and tied into “hands.” These 
hands consisted of several leaves of a certain grade, about as many leaves as any one person 
could hold in their hand, which were then wrapped together with another tobacco leaf (van 
Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). The hands of tobacco were then packed in baskets and later 
hauled to an auction market where tobacco company representatives bid on respective crops 
of tobacco. After the crop was sold, the payout for the year’s work would be realized. If extra 
effort was taken to have the best quality tobacco, then, hopefully, a farmer could get a good 
price from the companies. “I remember one time dad had his fixed nice. He got the top dollar 
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out of it. Got $.50 a pound out of it,” said C.B. Reese. Before the permanent advent of the 
tobacco program in the late 1930s, tobacco companies had no obligation to pay a baseline 
price for tobacco at auction. As is discussed in previous chapters, the unregulated nature of 
tobacco auctions made prices fluctuate and kept farmers in competition with each other. For 
farmers operating in a tough selling environment, having the best quality crop was one way 
to (hopefully) guarantee the crop would bring a good price. 
As to the hard, long work involved in raising a tobacco crop, C.B. Reese says: “It was 
just about a year’s job.” In fact, the work overlapped: by the time tobacco was going to 
auction at the end of one year, farmers were already preparing plant beds for burning for the 
upcoming year. As part of a diversified work strategy, tobacco farming, from its nascence in 
Bethel, provided some cash income for families. At the outset, as evidenced by C.B. and 
Ruth Reese, the work was a family job, as children and parents worked in different capacities 
with the crop. In some ways, burley tobacco work has not changed that much over time in 
Bethel, but in other ways, it has changed a great deal. This section illustrates how tobacco 
was grown the old way, before modern inputs and equipment (i.e., chemical sprays, tractors, 
etc.) were available, and thus, it shows how Bethel’s subsistence-based moral economy 
began to transition to a more modern, market economy in the 1930s. While techniques such 
as preparing plant beds and hand tying tobacco have evolved over time, other aspects of 
tobacco farming from the early years have remained constant. Most notably, from the 1930s 
until today many tobacco crops in Bethel have remained small in size, allowing the 
continuation of family work in tobacco. Although this work pattern changed for some 
farmers and tobacco operations in the mountains (i.e., with hired labor and later migrant 
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labor), most farms continued to rely upon family labor throughout the years of the tobacco 
program. As is discussed in more detail later in the chapter, the use of family labor in tobacco 
work allowed parents and grandparents to pass on their farming traditions and teach hard 
work, responsibility, pride in a job well done, family reciprocity, and other life lessons to 
their children and grandchildren. This has been an important cultural tradition in Bethel, and 
its roots stem from the early days of tobacco farming. 
Raising tobacco in the mid- to late-twentieth century 
Tommy Lawrence grew up farming tobacco in the 1950s and 1960s. It remained “all 
hands work,” as he called it, but the movement towards mechanization was underway and 
technological advancements were changing how farmers raised tobacco. Whereas plant beds 
were piled with brush and burned out in the early years, by the mid- to late-century farmers 
were preparing their own beds by gassing them to kill the weed seeds. In Bethel, and in many 
other burley producing areas, technological/modern advancements sometimes overlapped 
with traditional practices held over from the early years. “People started buying sprays to kill 
the weeds or the seed. But we always had to hoe it pretty regular,” says Mr. Lawrence. “We 
set it by hand. We used hand setters. In our case daddy ran the setter, mother dropped the 
plants, and us younguns carried water to them and covered the plants after they set them in 
the ground.” Topping the plants and breaking off the suckers was still hard work. “It was 
pretty labor intense, that’s one reason people didn’t have out a whole lot, because it’s a 
family operation. About everything was family,” said Mr. Lawrence.  
At harvest, the tobacco was cut and put on speared sticks (an evolution from cutting 
the stalks described by C.B. Reese). The spear came along in the 1940s, and it is still used in 
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the field today. It’s a hollow metal cone with a sharp point that fits on top of the four-foot 
wood sticks that have been set in the ground. Bill Sherwood, a retired tobacco and dairy 
farmer from Bethel, recounts the harvesting process: “You cut the stalk off, and you’ve got 
sticks you drive in the ground, and you’ve got a spear that goes on top of that. Spear the stalk 
down across that spear, and put it on the stick. Put six stalks to a stick, when it cures down a 
little bit, take it and hang it in the barn.” 
By the mid-twentieth century, changes in market demands and mechanization trends 
had begun to change this process. In the winter, after the tobacco had cured during the fall, 
stripping and grading began (as the tobacco got in case). Bill Sherwood remembers, “When 
we first started raising it, we made six grades, and then we got down to four grades. Finally 
got down to where we were making three grades, the last I raised it.” Tommy Lawrence: “I 
can remember we had to do seven different grades. You had to know what you were doing. 
You had to be able to see it pretty good, the color difference up the stalk. Then we hand tied 
it.”  
“They bale it now,” says Mr. Sherwood. “Back when we first started, or when I was 
first started, you had to tie it in hands. Then they got to baling it. Didn’t have to tie it, I liked 
that pretty well.” Baling the tobacco, rather than hand tying it and making baskets, saved 
labor time for farmers. Describing the baling technique, Mr. Sherwood says, “You’ve got a 
box, you just lay the tobacco down in there. We’ve got an air cylinder that we packed it with, 
mashed it down in there. If you’re careful you can get by with putting about ninety or a 
hundred pounds [per bale].” The switch to baling also indicates how, by the mid- to late-
twentieth century, tobacco crops were becoming more efficient and less centered around the 
 
 
 
 120 
precise quality that drove farmers in the 1930s and 1940s. Whereas in the early years C.B. 
Reese’s father wouldn’t let his tobacco ever touch the ground, by the 1950s, 1960s, and 
onward, the general practice was for tobacco to cure on sticks in the field, touching the 
ground. Moreover, grading was becoming less particular, baling 80 to 100 pound bales saved 
some time, and using sprays and chemicals were becoming standard practice. By the 1970s 
and 1980s, the tobacco economy was a mixture of modern advances and traditional practices. 
In the years to come, this dynamic would continue to change. 
In 1979, an epidemic of the fungicide “blue mold” ruined tobacco crops in the United 
States and Canada, causing an estimated $250 million in losses for tobacco growers (Rufty & 
Main, 1989). “That first year that it hit, it just destroyed a lot of crops. I mean totally. The 
leaves just went away,” remembers Bill Sherwood. “We had topped it, and it was doing the 
best you ever saw, and then it hit. And all the bottom two-thirds of the leaves just dropped 
off. We had the top-third, maybe.” 
By 1979, now with a family of his own, Tommy Lawrence was running a meat 
market for an A&P food store in Abingdon, Virginia, “driving it,” and raising tobacco part-
time at home in Bethel. “I’d come home, and if I got home in time in the evening, I’d change 
clothes and run to that tobacco field and I’d hoe. Chop weeds, whatever needed to be done. 
Took days off, evenings and what not, was spent at that part-time job,” recalls Mr. Lawrence. 
“Well, that was when the first blue mold come. I went to my patch one day and it was all 
wilted down. Looked like you poured hot water on it, or diesel or something. And dead. 
“I decided then, after I had worked, took my days off, come in in the evening and 
grab a sandwich and go to work till dark, I quit then.” 
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The story of the blue mold outbreak indicates a few important points about the state 
of burley tobacco farming by the late 1970s. First, like many other burley growers in Bethel 
and in Watauga County, Mr. Lawrence was raising tobacco and farming part-time. “Most 
everybody then after that [by the 1970s] began to be pretty much part-time. But you still had 
a lot of full-time farmers that did tobacco and/or cattle, one or both,” said Mr. Lawrence.  
Sixty-two year old Hite Reese, C.B. and Ruth Reese’s son, worked two jobs as well. 
“I raised tobacco and went to logging on the side, too,” said Hite Reese. “Had a little portable 
mill, we sawed lumber, till they moved everything overseas.” Once furniture factories in 
nearby North Carolina counties began closing, the market for local timber started drying up, 
further changing the agrarian economy of Bethel and eroding another aspect of farmers’ 
multiple livelihood strategies.  
After the years of C.B. and Ruth Reese’s childhood, and after the war years of the 
1940s, small farming continued to become less of a subsistence economy as more families 
became integrated into the market economy. Regarding the changes in his lifetime, C.B. 
Reese says, “It’s a sight in the world how fast things is going. Ain’t no use of it,” Mrs. Ruth 
Reese: “People used to didn’t have all those expenses. You didn’t have a telephone, never 
had no light bills. Didn’t have all of today’s expenses.”  
C.B. Reese: “We had to cut our wood with an ax and a cross cut. Had to wash our 
washing on an old washboard and boil it out. And we had to carry our water from the spring. 
And now, we’ve got to work just as hard. We’ve got to work out enough money to buy that 
washing machine. And we’ve got to work out enough money to buy that dryer. And all this 
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fancy—refrigerators, freezers, all that stuff we gotta buy now, we didn’t have to pay for that 
them days.” 
As the twentieth century progressed, small farming in Appalachia was increasingly 
tied to the greater economic changes taking place across the modern American landscape. 
The above quote from Mr. Reese illustrates the differences between the cash-based economy 
of today and the subsistence-based economy of Bethel during his childhood. When tobacco 
farming arrived in Bethel, it came at a time when farmers were transitioning more towards 
the cash-based market economy, and even though tobacco farming provided a steady source 
of annual income for tobacco farmers, it became harder to live off of. “It wouldn’t sustain,” 
recalls Tommy Lawrence. “Their needs [tobacco farming families] got to be more than what 
their little crops would be.” And so by the 1960s, many farmers in Bethel were taking part-
time, off-farm jobs.  
The second point illustrated by mid-twentieth century burley farming concerns 
increasing problems with bugs and diseases and a growing reliance on sprays. The bugs, 
including budworms, flea beetles, and hornworms (or tobacco worms), could prove quite 
destructive to crops. Regarding hornworms, “They just eat it up, if you got a lot of them. 
They damage a crop a lot,” recalls Mr. Sherwood. To counter these bugs, a natural control 
was employed. “They came up with an insect that would kill those worms. It was a wasp type 
thing that would lay its eggs on these worms, and they in turn sucked the life out of the worm 
and killed it.” With regards to the use of chemicals and sprays, where sucker sprouts were 
once pinched out by hand, by the mid-twentieth century sucker spray could isolate the 
sprouts and stunt their growth. “They came out with sucker spray, you just squirt it in the top 
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of it and it kills the suckers, walk down through there and spray the top of it,” recalls Hite 
Reese. And the sprays proved effective: “It keeps them out, and saves you an awful lot of 
time,” says Bill Sherwood.  
The blue mold outbreak provides a good example of how the use of sprays increased 
in tobacco farming over the course of the twentieth century. After blue mold hit, Mr. 
Sherwood remembers, “They came out with a spray for that. You could spray it, put it in the 
ground when you set the plant out and it wouldn’t take blue mold.” But this strategy did not 
solve the problem long-term. Mr. Sherwood:  
The Ridomil [the spray] got to where it wouldn’t work and now they’ve got blue 
mold resistant varieties of tobacco to grow. Basically, they just don’t grow as fast. 
What happens is the blue mold gets it when it’s really growing it’s best, really 
growing a lot, tender. And it’s susceptible to it more. 
Today, blue mold is completely resistant to Ridomil, and the disease is still active 
(Ivors & Mila, 2007). In the summer of 2010, blue mold lightly infected a burley crop in 
eastern Ashe County, North Carolina, prompting Tennessee agricultural officials to warn 
upper east Tennessee farmers to be on the lookout for signs of the disease (Denton, 2010). As 
tobacco farming progressed throughout the twentieth century, the use of sprays and 
chemicals increased, and the success or failures of crops became further tied to these 
technological advancements.  
Using the sprays, then, is a complex situation. On the one hand, sprays such as sucker 
control save labor time in the field, and they work effectively. So, when farmers have 
multiple sources of income, working multiple jobs and raising tobacco on the side, a labor 
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saving control method is beneficial. In reality, the benefits of using sprays may have 
economically justified growing tobacco in an area where tobacco production was 
characterized by small acreages. Having saved time in the tobacco field, farmers were free to 
pursue other wage labor work.  
 But, on the other hand, what is the long-term cost of sprays, chemicals, and 
fertilizers, and is there some kind of middle ground between the old way and the more 
efficient way? Most obviously, the use of chemicals, sprays, and fertilizers has the potential 
to damage ecological and human health, and though these factors are outside the scope of this 
research, they are still important to note. For my purposes, the use of these inputs also point 
toward another problem: through the late 1990s and the 2000s, as burley prices dropped, 
input and labor costs rose, and because most farmers were dependent on sprays, fertilizers, 
and, increasingly, hired labor, the costs began to outweigh the profits. Shelby Eggers, a 
seventy-two year old tobacco farmer who grew 3,200 pounds for Burley Stabilization 
Corporation (BSC) in 2011, puts the inputs situation this way:  
Tobacco fertilize this year (2011), will probably run, now this is 12-18-24, it’s gonna 
be right at eight hundred dollars a ton. Fifteen years ago when were selling tobacco at 
$1.85 a pound we were giving around two hundred dollars a ton for fertilize. Now 
we’re selling tobacco for $1.83 a pound and we’re giving eight, eight hundred and 
fifty dollars for fertilize. Now that got out of hand. 
Tommy Lawrence recalls the 2010 burley crop: “Last year, there’s a lot of people that 
sold tobacco on the auction for $.95 and you cannot produce tobacco for $.95 a pound.” That 
is only $.45 cents a pound more than the price eighty-eight year old C.B. Reese’s father got 
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decades ago. With the price of inputs rising and the unsupported price of tobacco at auction 
selling for $.95 a pound, it is no wonder most farmers in the mountains have quit growing 
tobacco. “You can’t raise tobacco for that now days, [because of] sprays, fertilizer, plants,” 
says Hite Reese. “See people buy their plants now, used to we raised them ourselves. Now 
they buy water plants. So that’s another expense.”  
Thus, over the course of the twentieth century and through the rise and fall of the 
tobacco program, we glimpse some of the complex issues that surround burley tobacco 
farming today. Moreover, we see the transition from “all hands work” farming to more 
industrialized techniques and the benefits and deficiencies therein. The use of inputs and 
hired labor, among other things, has reached the point today to prompt Hite Reese to 
speculate, “They [farmers] could make a little more money on tobacco if they done it a little 
more the hard way like we used to.” But is there an economic incentive for the hard work, the 
“all hands work,” that it would take to raise a crop of tobacco the old way, without sprays, 
chemicals, and fertilizers? Would this attention to detail even matter? Would today’s market 
reward a small but high quality tobacco crop that has been grown without chemicals and 
sprays? As the next sections show, the answer is likely not. The material advantage that small 
farmers in Bethel had was the tobacco program, which limited the amount of tobacco on the 
market and made tobacco grown in small allotments price competitive with tobacco from 
larger farms. Without the safety nets of the program, the costs associated with a modern 
tobacco crop overwhelmed most mountain growers, forcing them to quit raising tobacco. 
 
 
 
 126 
Changes to the tobacco economy: 1990s and 2000s 
In 2004, the federal price support and marketing quota system for tobacco ended. 
After the “buyout” of the program, American grown tobacco joined the world tobacco 
market, competing with the price of tobacco from countries such as Zimbabwe and Brazil. 
Farmers with quota poundage cards received a payment, either lump sum or in ten-year 
installments, according to the amount of their poundage quota, and the tobacco market was 
deregulated. The buyout effectively ended nearly all tobacco production in the mountains. 
The few farmers who continued to raise tobacco in Bethel did so with direct 
manufacturer/company contracts and with significant uncertainty. Without tobacco, the 
remaining aspects of Bethel’s moral economy, held over from its subsistence-based past, 
were finally lost, and Bethel’s long transition to the modern economy was complete. 
In the last years of the tobacco program, the national climate concerning burley 
tobacco farming began to reach a boiling point as neoliberals sought free trade and 
deregulation and as health groups worked to end federal support of tobacco farming, among 
other factors. In the midst of turmoil, basic burley quota prices fell by over half their value 
from 1997 to 2001 (Tiller, 2002). “They started cutting the quotas down. Every year they 
dropped,” says Larry Davis. “You had a certain amount of poundage on each farm, and they 
started cutting that a percentage every year just about.”   
With quota values plummeting, the price of leasing quota began to rise as quota 
holders tried to compensate for lost income. Older farmers, and/or quota holders who no 
longer farmed, still participated in the tobacco economy by leasing their quota, land, and 
barns (van Willigen, 1989). And though leasing opportunities gave some tobacco farmers the 
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chance to grow more tobacco, with the dropping value of basic quota, raising a burley crop 
became even more difficult in the late 1990s and early 2000s. “The last year we grew 17 
acres, I would buy poundage off approximately 50 or 60 people. To get enough to grow that 
17 acres. I’d deal with that many people,” remarks Larry Davis. “They would have like two 
hundred pounds each, or two or three, four hundred pounds. We was growing between thirty 
and forty thousand pounds of tobacco, so you can imagine how many people I dealt with.” 
Because of the poundage restraints put in place by the program, for farmers such as Larry 
Davis, who wanted to grow more tobacco and who had a hired work crew, the obstacles of 
growing large crop began to outweigh the benefits.  “They would want $.25, $.30 a pound 
just to lease their base,” recalls Hite Reese, speaking of leasing the base (permanent 
poundage) of a quota holder. “It got up to about $.60, $.75 a lot of times, just about half what 
you got out of it. You couldn’t afford to do it.” For farmers, having to go to these lengths did 
little to encourage their continued support for the program. Clearly, the program was 
breaking and wasn’t going to get fixed, as had occurred in 1970/71 (see Chapter 3). 
Ironically, though the end of the program may have looked like relief for tobacco farmers, 
once U.S. tobacco was deregulated, the price of domestic tobacco dropped to price levels 
from twenty years earlier, and small farmers in the mountains were quickly out-produced by 
larger, more concentrated tobacco regions.  
The drop in quota values also indicates other changes in the burley tobacco economy. 
A more concentrated number of farmers in Watauga County were growing tobacco while 
fewer part-time farmers were raising any tobacco at all. The less valuable poundage cards 
systematically forced out part-time growers, because raising a couple of hundred pounds of 
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tobacco was not profitable or economically worthwhile. Then, because of the drop in quota 
value and as more part-time farmers stopped raising tobacco, more quota holders sold their 
basic quota, and this led, from a historical perspective of who grew tobacco, to an uneven 
distribution of buyout money once that time came. “On the last, there, people got to, like I 
say, they’d sell their whole base to somebody,” recalls Hite Reese. Mr. Reese:  
They might get $.75 and just sell it to you permanent. It was yours from then on. 
They put it on your card and it stays there. Then when the buyout come out, you 
could sell it just like it was yours. If you had a lot of big base bought up, see, you got 
a big check right there. But if you didn’t, you just had your own base, it wasn’t that 
much.  
Larry Davis speculates that the devalued poundage cards, which began in 1997, seem like a 
set-up for the buyout: 
They done that, I think, because of the buyout, because they based it on how many 
pounds you have and how many you grow. But they really cut it, more than half than 
what they started out with. Like me, I had I think 6,000 pounds, they called it 
permanent poundage on my farm, by the time the buyout came I had 3,000 pounds of 
permanent poundage.  
In just a few years, then, the value of Larry Davis’s base dropped by half, and when his 
buyout money came, it was essentially half of what it would have been just a few years 
before. Mr. Davis’ notion that quota values were intentionally lowered prior to the buyout is 
consistent with Benson’s (2012) claims that tobacco-state politicians after 1985, primarily in 
North Carolina, instead of working for the best interest of tobacco farmers and tobacco 
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communities (as they claimed they were), acted in collusion with tobacco companies to 
maximize tobacco company profit. Mr. Davis’ account of the drop in burley quota values is a 
local reflection of neoliberalism’s effects. 
In those last years of the program and then en masse after the buyout, burley farmers 
began contracting directly with the tobacco companies. Without a price supported market, the 
price of tobacco at auction, in competition with world tobacco prices, dropped significantly, 
an estimated 25% in 2005, post-buyout (Tiller, Snell, & Brown, 2007). Three years after the 
2004 buyout in Watauga County, only 11 farms reported raising tobacco. In 2002, 187 farms 
had reported (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 2007). This transition marked a new state (or 
system) in tobacco farming (Walker and Salt, 2006). The program was gone, and for those 
farmers still raising tobacco, they had to adapt to the structure of the new system, but for 
small farmers, this scenario continued to prove economically unfeasible.  
Why, in this new era of tobacco farming, are Bethel and other small farming 
communities in the mountains limited in their participation in the tobacco economy? For one, 
regarding the contracting system, contracts are made year-to-year between companies and 
farmers, and the contracting company has enough control over the crop and its selling price 
to make farmers perpetually uncertain about their incomes. Under the program, this was not 
the case. Furthermore, this uncertainty complicates investments in labor and equipment. 
Secondly, the deregulated system of growing tobacco, similar to other industrialized 
agricultural operations, necessitates larger farms with more tillable land, more 
mechanization, and more hired labor, and these factors effectively make tobacco from small 
farms, such as those in Bethel, obsolete.  
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For burley growers, selling and raising tobacco under contract with a tobacco 
company is starkly different from the days of selling at auctions. “Most farmers used to enjoy 
going to an auction, [to] take their tobacco,” recalls Tommy Lawrence. “It was always an 
interesting thing watching the auctioneer go down through, and the buyer’s following him, 
bidding on different piles of tobacco depending on what the company needed.”  
Tobacco auctions were a communal gathering place, and a part of the tobacco culture. 
Farmers had their routines, such as those who wanted to be first into the warehouse, and thus 
would park their load outside well in advance of the warehouse opening. Mr. Lawrence 
remembers trucks lined up for a half mile in Boone, trying to get in for the first day’s sale, in 
hopes of getting the best price. Once inside the warehouse, farmers still jockeyed for a high 
price: “I’ve seen people cut all kinds of signs, from setting their younguns on the bales of 
tobacco to get the buyer to get them a little extra,” remembers Tommy Lawrence.  
Even with the baseline support prices for tobacco, growers from across the region 
would take their crop to wherever they thought they could get the highest price. In the mid- 
to late-twentieth century, tobacco warehouses dotted the region. At one time, there were three 
warehouses in Boone and one in Mountain City, Tennessee. A price a penny higher at a 
warehouse could make a significant monetary difference—for the warehouse and the farmer. 
So, sometimes a warehouse worker might get on the radio and tell how tobacco was selling, 
as an advertisement, to get farmers to their auction. Other times, however, more direct 
marketing took place. For the farmer, if an auction in Tennessee would pay for a fuel bill, as 
was the case at times for Hite Reese, then that’s where he would go. “They’d do what they 
could to get you to bring your tobacco, because they got the sale bill off of it, you see,” 
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recalls Mr. Reese. One farmer also notes this point, and brings up the clout farmers 
sometimes had at auction: 
Warehouse people would actually kick big growers money back under the table, to 
bring your product over here. Because the more they sold the more money they made. 
They would go to the buyers and say ‘Now, this man needs a little more out of this 
tobacco,’ if you didn’t felt like you got a fair shake. He was your mediator.  
Since the buyout, most tobacco warehouses have closed, and farmers now sell their tobacco 
directly to companies. The cultural event of the auction sale, the culmination of the year’s 
work, is no longer a part of the tobacco economy. Farmers now sell straight to the company 
and receive whatever price the company deems appropriate.  
As the twenty-first century drew closer, the farming family of Bethel increasingly felt 
the impacts of the globalization of American agriculture. In turn, the emphasis on reciprocal 
exchange between neighbors declined as more community members participated in more off-
farm and less locally connected work. Specifically, fewer people were raising and working 
tobacco. As less people worked locally, local businesses had less incentive to be concerned 
about the locality. Somewhere along the way, people and businesses began to look after 
themselves, so to speak. This indicates a shift from the historic moral economy, whereby 
friends, family, and neighbors worked more closely together for the preservation/good of the 
community, to a modern economy, which emphasizes individual success and competition. 
For example, in 2010, Shelby Eggers bought his fertilizer in Shady Valley, Tennessee, 
instead of locally in Watauga County. In Shady Valley, the storeowner paid for the taxes on 
Mr. Eggers’ fertilizer, lowering the overall cost. Mr. Eggers:  
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You give seven hundred dollars a ton for it [fertilizer] and he takes care of the taxes, 
that helps you right smart there, compared to what it is if you bought it over here in 
Mountain City or over here in North Carolina. And I’ve about decided if you can save 
a hundred bucks you need to save a hundred bucks. I used to think that you gotta 
spend your money locally to keep everything in the local going, but whenever it gets 
out to—in a year’s time when you can go twenty five miles down the road and save 
yourself a thousand or so dollars over the year, well you just need to go on down 
there. Because these people you’ve been trying to keep going over the years, if 
you’ve got a bad year they don’t care one bit for it.  
Mr. Eggers’ comments reveal Bethel’s community-wide transition away from a moral 
economy, characterized by such things as reciprocal exchange, towards a fully modern 
economy whereby individual profit trumps community well-being. The historic stability of 
the tobacco program, which allowed for aspects of the moral economy to remain strong in 
Bethel, caused the total transition to the modern economy to occur much later in Bethel than 
it did in other American farming regions characterized by larger and more concentrated 
farms, such as those in the Midwest in the 1980s (Dudley, 2000). Bethel, and likely other 
agrarian mountain communities, held out longer against the full force of the modern 
economy than most other agricultural communities in the United States. Once the program 
began its decline in the late 1990s, however, the free market culture of the lowest price began 
to work its way into the farming culture and economy of Bethel.  
As fewer farmers in Watauga County raised tobacco into the 1990s, a handful of 
farmers tried expanding their operations, by leasing quotas and hiring more help. “Some 
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people tried it by putting out a whole lot and having to hire a lot of help, but that took about 
all of what they were making,” says Tommy Lawrence. “Through here it’s always been 
pretty much what you can handle and do yourself. If you tried to raise a two-acre crop and 
hire a lot of it done, you’d be wasting your time.”  
Into the late 1990s and up until the buyout, Larry Davis hired a few Mexican workers 
who worked first as seasonal labor, and then later, more permanently, working nine months 
out of the year and living on his farm. “Of course, we did other jobs besides tobacco, to fill in 
between,” says Larry Davis. “After the buyout, that’s when we downsized because the price 
of tobacco dropped so much. We had to eliminate labor and everything.” The larger 
operations in Watauga County, such as the 16 or 17 acres put out by Mr. Davis, did not 
compare to the size of the operations in nearby places such as the foothills of east Tennessee, 
where small or medium-sized tobacco farms often ranged from five to twenty acres 
(Donaldson, 2011). When the price of burley dropped after the buyout, the limited 
availability of arable land in the mountains curtailed the expansion of tobacco operations. 
Under the program, this mattered less, because farmers were ensured a competitive price for 
their crop, regardless of whether it was grown in a two acre patch or on a hundred acre farm.  
Now, for the handful of growers still active in Bethel, hiring migrant labor to help cut 
or hang a few acres of tobacco is typically not a viable economic option, even though most of 
the migrant labor did good work and knew how to work tobacco. And, since fewer people 
grow tobacco, the skills it requires have concomitantly declined. Tommy Lawrence: 
You have to have some help on occasions, like cutting or hauling it in. And that’s 
getting hard to find, somebody that knows how to cut tobacco’s getting real hard to 
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find. It’s not something that you can kind of teach somebody and afford to pay them. 
There’s a rhythm to it. You can find a few, especially some Hispanics that have done 
it a lot, that are very cost efficient. But a lot of the younger people don’t [can’t work 
the tobacco].” 
Finding good help, and finding people who can work seasonally, is one more challenge for 
today’s small burley farmers. One farmer notes the difficulty of hiring help from the local 
area, and perhaps speaks to a changing cultural and economic climate: “the help around here 
just got to where it wasn’t around. And what was around was either smoking ol’ wacky 
weed, [or] drinking beer.”  
Because of the small scale of tobacco farms in Bethel, and because the current market 
favors tobacco that can be grown the cheapest and most efficiently, tobacco farming now 
supports little more than family (or very small) operations in Bethel. Of the handful of 
growers left, Mr. Davis and his wife do most of their tobacco work themselves. Mr. 
Lawrence and his family do their own work and hire some help at cutting time. Shelby 
Eggers does his tobacco work with a local helper, Braxton Johnson, and in 2011, hired a 
migrant crew from Roan Mountain, Tennessee, to cut and hang his tobacco. Mr. Eggers: 
“They come over and cut it for you. They’d do it all if you wanted but you can’t afford to. 
The only thing you can make off tobacco now is what little you can do the work yourself, 
make pretty good wages for what you do yourself.”  
At the mercy of the buyer: Selling direct to the company 
Under the contracting system, the process of selling tobacco is quite different than the 
auction. “It’s simplified a whole lot, because you have an appointment now,” says Tommy 
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Lawrence. Well, simplified in the sense that, according to Larry Davis, “It’s got more 
complicated than it used to be.” If the same point can be from two opposing comments, then 
it is this passing remark from Tommy Lawrence: “The warehouse down there now is just as 
clean as a pin.” Mr. Lawrence’s remark to the cleanliness of the tobacco warehouse speaks a 
great deal to the new atmosphere of selling tobacco under contract, as identified by Benson 
(2008), both literally in the ultra-efficient (and antithesis of the auction) company receiving 
station and symbolically in regards to the tight control companies maintain over the terms of 
direct contracts. This new system of selling straight to the company is a major change in the 
burley culture and economy, and new rules and standards that increase efficiency at the 
receiving station might subsequently force smaller growers out of the tobacco economy. 
In the past, tobacco was tied in hands and then packed in baskets and sold at auction. 
In the mid-twentieth century, leaves were air compressed into 80 to 100 pound bales. 
Currently, receiving stations are transitioning towards a more efficient method of baling. 
“Now they’ve went to 400 to 700 pound bales. They’re forcing everybody to go to that now. 
They can handle it with a forklift,” says Larry Davis. The bigger bales enable the receiving 
stations to unload faster by eliminating hand-lifting the bales. Though this might be more 
efficient for the company, it puts a strain on small tobacco farmers who would need to invest 
in new baling equipment. Tommy Lawrence: 
When they innovate these new procedures, such as the big bales, it puts a hardship on 
a smaller farmer because he don’t know that he’s gonna have a contract next year—
well, large ones don’t either—but, you don’t always know. You may have to give 
eight, ten thousand dollars for a tobacco baler. Well, that’s a lot of money out of a 
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crop of tobacco. Now if you know you’re gonna be able to use it year after year, it’s 
an investment. But, the scary part is you don’t know…if you’re gonna be able to use 
it or not. 
For small tobacco farmers, the advent of the big bales might push those remaining out of the 
tobacco business. As Mr. Lawrence suggests, buying an expensive baler is a risky investment 
for farmers who have no long-term assurances about whether they can raise tobacco. It could 
be the step, and the risk, that many small farmers are not willing to take. As of 2011, the 80 
to 100 pound bales are still accepted by the receiving stations. 
Once the tobacco is unloaded at the company receiving station it is checked for 
moisture content. “Now,” says Larry Davis, “it’s electronic. It checks the moisture in it. It 
runs it between two electronic things and it scans it for moisture content in those bales. And 
it can’t be over 23% moisture.” Tommy Lawrence: “Most companies like 23% percent as 
your cutoff. A lot of the export people like it about 19 [%]. Just to make sure they don’t have 
any molding or heating.”  
After the moisture content is determined, the tobacco is assigned a price—in a much 
different fashion than the former bidding process at auction. Tommy Lawrence: 
Now, you take it [the tobacco] in, and when it goes through, of course the grader’s 
standing there and you’re looking at it. And he punches in your grade and it pops up 
on a screen. And you’re just standing there, you’re just looking at the screen. And he 
says ‘I’ll give you a DR1’ or whatever the grades may be, whatever he gives you. 
That price is already set. It’ll jump up and tell you how much it weighed, what the 
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moisture content was, and how much per pound you got. When you get through you 
go to the office and get your check. 
For a few years in the 2000s, Larry Davis took his tobacco to a Philip Morris receiving 
station in Gray, Tennessee: 
All they do, they unload your tobacco, the square bales and just band it up, run it 
through the machine that checks the moisture and it goes down a roller bed, and 
there’s a Philip Morris representative, he puts his grade on it, and it reflects a certain 
price. Either you take it or reject it. Just have to take it back home. You’re at the 
mercy of the buyer. Whatever he says he’ll give for it, that’s it. 
Whereas the tobacco program once provided farmers with a competitive minimum price for 
their crop, growers today have little choice but to take whatever price, with no predetermined 
minimum, that the company offers. And with the influx of foreign tobacco, prices are 
significantly lower now than before the buyout in 2004. In 2010, Larry Davis raised about 
17,000 pounds of tobacco. He sold the crop in Greenville, TN:  
The last load I took to Philip Morris, all they give me for it was a dollar and three 
cents average. I didn’t have no choice, either take it or bring it back home and keep it. 
And they don’t like left over tobacco. A dollar a pound is what it brought twenty-five 
years ago.  
Without government involvement in the price and supply of tobacco, small growers 
face a tenuous future. Receiving stations are moving to bigger bales; year-to-year contracts 
leave farmers uncertain about future crops and investments; tobacco prices have dropped; 
and input and labor costs continue to rise. Moreover, cooperative associations no longer 
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manage the pool and price of tobacco, and, as in the case of Burley Stabilization Corporation 
(BSC), they now contract and buy tobacco to resell it. As the number of contracts tobacco 
companies sign with farmers continues to decline, BSC has made up some of the difference 
by purchasing American burley for resell in other markets, primarily to China, according to 
BSC board member, R.G. Shipley. Under the program, growers had the cooperatives as an 
organization and advocate for their well-being. Now, with direct company to farmer contracts 
and the loss of the auction, farmers are isolated from one another regarding the marketing of 
their crop. They must take whatever price the company deems appropriate. Moreover, 
companies maintain more control over the tobacco growing process now than during the 
program years, stipulating in contracts what variety of plants and what sprays farmers must 
use. The companies, however, without the restraints of the program, operate with less 
oversight and regulation in regards to buying tobacco from growers. According to Shelby 
Eggers, “You’ve got nobody watching the big boys. The farmer’s at the mercy of the 
company now.” 
The new stable state of the tobacco economy 
With the influx of lower priced foreign tobacco, the loss of price supports and 
marketing quotas since the 2004 buyout, the loss of the auction, the changing role of the 
cooperatives, the increased cost of inputs and labor, the advent of big bales, and with 
uncertainty surrounding future tobacco contracts, among other things, the current state of 
tobacco farming in Bethel is drastically different from what it was just a decade or two ago. 
The end of the federal tobacco program in 2004 marked a critical transition period in the 
American tobacco economy. Prior to 2004, the tobacco economy operated within the sphere 
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of the tobacco program, and this was its “stable state” or, recalling Walker’s & Salt’s (2006) 
resilience thinking theory, its conservation state (K), whereby things change slowly over time 
and pressures are absorbed. If the pressures are absorbed and deflected, the system, in this 
case the tobacco farming economy under the program, proves its resiliency and maintains its 
basic functions and continues on, but once the system’s resiliency begins to weaken, it 
becomes increasingly susceptible to a release phase () where things change rapidly. In the 
tobacco economy, the buyout of the program corresponds to a release phase (). The next 
step in this process, then, involves the reorganization of the system (the tobacco economy) 
and the restarting of this adaptive cycle process. Since 2004, the tobacco economy has been 
in the reorganization () and growth (r) phase, whereby new innovations (), such as 
contracting, the use of big bales, electronic moisture checking, etc., emerge as part of a new 
tobacco economy (r).  
As it pertains to Bethel and to mountain tobacco farmers, this new system, and its 
new innovations that will eventually become standard (thus becoming the conservation 
phase), severely limits the participation of small tobacco growers. Because the new system 
favors efficiency in the growing and selling process of tobacco and prefers fewer contracts 
with farmers, larger and more concentrated tobacco operations will continue to characterize 
the American tobacco economy. Chiefly, this new tobacco economy developed because of 
the adoption of neoliberal market policies at the national and international levels (Benson, 
2012; Kingsolver, 2011). The push for free trade and deregulated markets, in tandem with 
tobacco companies’ backdoor establishment of foreign leaf production markets, and in 
concert with various health groups’ displeasure with the federal government’s support of 
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tobacco farming, paved the way for the complete erosion of the federal tobacco program in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s (Benson, 2012). This new deregulated state of the tobacco 
economy places the small U.S. burley grower, most critically those with less tillable land, in 
an ill-fated situation. From the viewpoint of a tobacco company that favors efficiency in 
tobacco production, for example, dealing with lots of farmers from Watauga County with a 
few thousand pounds of tobacco each is less desirable than dealing with one farmer from 
anywhere with a hundred thousand pounds of tobacco. This is what the market demands 
today: tobacco that can be grown in large quantities, cheaply and efficiently, for this 
produces the most profit for tobacco companies. For small growers, such as those in Bethel 
and in the mountains, this new tobacco economy likely signals the end of the tobacco 
growing era and the loss of a longstanding culture and way of life. 
Conclusion: Bethel’s culture and economy of burley tobacco 
In the 1930s and the developing years of Bethel’s tobacco economy, the market 
demanded something other than efficiency from small tobacco farmers. Tobacco at that time 
was grown with extreme care and caution, as evidenced by C.B. Reese’s recollections about 
his father’s “fixed nice” tobacco crop earlier in this chapter. Concerning the grading process, 
Mr. Reese’s father hardly let the children help grade, because that work had to be done right 
or the year’s work might not pay out. Back then, in the 1930s in Bethel, a high quality crop 
was one way for a small grower, if the auction went well, to get the best price out of their 
tobacco. Quality was a type of safety net. Remarking on this period in the tobacco economy, 
Wendell Berry (2004) writes in Tobacco Harvest: An Elegy: “There was a clear relation 
between quality and price, and the skill and effort that went into the production of fine 
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tobacco were repaid…The aim was no less than perfection” (p. 8). Over the course of the 
twentieth century, this emphasis on quality tobacco declined as time and labor saving 
devices, such as the advent of nitrogen fertilizer use, sucker spray, gassing plant beds, baling, 
and fewer grades of tobacco, to name a few things, were introduced and the market demand 
for the highest quality tobacco decreased. Before the establishment of the program and in the 
program’s early years, the risk in time and effort was likely too great for tobacco not to be as 
near perfect as possible. A quality crop enabled farmers to stay competitive. Inherently, 
though, with the onset of the program and the safety nets it provided farmers, there was less 
economic incentive for such time intensive methods. Furthermore, with regards to Bethel, as 
tobacco became more of a part-time job and a partial income source for small growers 
throughout the twentieth century, labor/time saving approaches helped farmers better manage 
multiple livelihood strategies.  
In the twentieth century, the program accomplished something in the tobacco 
economy that prior to the 1930s had been impossible: it provided long-term economic 
stability for tobacco farmers. In Bethel, the program actually ushered in the tobacco economy 
where no tobacco production had previously existed. And in so doing, with agrarian 
communities such as Bethel raising tobacco crops year after year, with the yearlong nature of 
the work cycle, with the yearly repetition of tasks and talk of tobacco, a culture of burley 
tobacco, and a culture of farming in general, developed and continued throughout the 
twentieth century. In Bethel, the culture of tobacco farming emerged in tandem with the rise 
of the tobacco economy in the 1930s. Even as the tobacco economy changed during the 
twentieth century, the culture of the crop continued on, and now, post-buyout, this culture, 
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and what it represents to the people who still grow tobacco, perpetuates a few remaining 
tobacco farms in Bethel in an uncertain economic climate. 
 After quitting tobacco for six years following the blue mold outbreak (1979-1985), in 
1985 Tommy Lawrence stopped working for A&P food stores, took over the Stone Mountain 
General Store in Bethel, and returned to tobacco farming part-time. “Those are choices you 
just have to make,” says Mr. Lawrence. For Mr. Lawrence the store provided an opportunity 
to watch the community grow up and to help neighbors. On returning to tobacco farming: 
It was more to give my children something to do. I’m not a hard person but I don’t 
believe in spending your time with the Wii games and that stuff. I actually look 
forward to getting my grandchildren out [working]. And of course my sons already do 
that. So they’re teaching theirs. It’s not so much about teaching somebody how to 
farm, but how to work with their hands. To think about things. If we could have 
grown anything else [besides tobacco], we would have. But farming, if it’s something 
you enjoy, you just like to do it. When you learn to be challenged by trying to grow a 
better product every year, or more pounds on the acre, or just the fact that you can get 
out and work in the ground, that’s a whole lot of what farming is. It’s not so much a 
livelihood as it is a way of life. 
Currently in the twenty-first century, there are other ways to make the money that 
tobacco farming income traditionally provided. Some people might work more off the farm, 
some might have left farming altogether, and some might raise more cattle, among other 
options. But, what is certain is that very few people who once raised tobacco in the 
mountains do so now. The tradition and economy of small scale mountain tobacco farming is 
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nearly gone. The old hanging barns still dot the landscape of mountain fields and farms but 
most no longer house tobacco. In this farming tradition, mothers and fathers have taught the 
skills required to raise tobacco to sons and daughters, and as Mr. Lawrence says, these 
children grow up to teach theirs. This is the culture of tobacco farming. Over the last eighty 
years in Bethel, raising tobacco has provided income and economic incentive for farm 
families, but increasingly, it has provided and perpetuated an agrarian way of life that 
otherwise would have fallen to the wayside long ago. For lots of people, it has been good 
work. Wendell Berry (1975) writes, “In the work is where my relation to this place comes 
alive. The real knowledge survives in the work, not in the memory. To love this place and 
hold out for its meanings and keep its memories, without undertaking any of the work, would 
be to falsify it” (p. 53). Over the years, then, the work of tobacco farming in Bethel has 
helped provide meaningful ways of life and kept the social capital of the community alive 
and active.  
Even though tobacco money in the mountains mostly provided partial incomes for 
farmers, it often went towards paying for things such as college tuitions, property taxes, 
weddings, and Christmas gifts, and thus served an important cultural function. Because of the 
structure and stability of the tobacco program, small scale tobacco farming allowed agrarian 
communities, such as Bethel, to maintain aspects of their traditional social connections and 
ways of life. Tobacco farming allowed these mountain communities to undertake the work of 
the place, and therefore, to “hold out for its meanings and keep its memories” (Berry, 1975, 
p. 53). With the loss of tobacco farming, that cultural connection is nearly gone in Bethel and 
in most other mountain tobacco communities. Going forward, as more people work in jobs 
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away from the community, these long-standing connections and the social capital they once 
provided will lessen. Furthermore, without tobacco farming, what will become of farming as 
a job and vocation in Bethel in the future? Logging has declined over the years. Dairy 
operations have consolidated across the country and are now non-existent in Bethel and 
Watauga County. Christmas tree farming is prevalent but increasingly dominated by large 
operations or absentee owners. Beef cattle, however, still provide some farm income. The 
farming economy of Bethel, which was once characterized by its diversified nature, has been 
severely weakened over the years. Until the buyout of 2004, nearly 200 people raised tobacco 
in Watauga County, producing close to one million pounds (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 
2007). Even though the tobacco economy of the mountains was comparatively small, it 
fostered a greater agrarian culture and economy. Now, without tobacco income and, perhaps 
more importantly, without the continuation of tobacco work, the agrarian culture and 
economy of Bethel is waning and its future is in doubt. Echoing Wendell Berry’s (1975) 
sentiment regarding knowledge surviving in the work, tobacco farming allowed farmers and 
farm families in Bethel to maintain their cultural traditions, holding out for their meanings 
and memories.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
Tobacco farming in the southern Appalachian Mountains has come and gone. Most 
tobacco warehouses in the mountains have closed and the majority of former tobacco farms 
are no longer producing tobacco (Jarrell, 2011; U.S. Census of Agriculture, 2007). In 
Watauga County, the tobacco economy is virtually extinct, and the only tobacco culture left 
is in Bethel, where a remnant of farmers still raise a few acres of tobacco. The future of 
tobacco farming in Bethel is doubtful. What’s left of Bethel’s tobacco economy and culture 
is a tobacco industry directive away from being gone for good. Philip Morris, the driver of 
the tobacco industry and tobacco policy, could permanently end small tobacco farming in the 
mountains if they mandated the use of big bales. As farmers in Bethel have said, small 
tobacco farmers can not economically justify purchasing big balers for their crops. With 
unguaranteed year-to-year contracts, a multi-thousand dollar big baler poses a serious 
economic risk. A policy mandating big bales would in all probability finally end the culture 
and economy of tobacco farming in the mountains, because the few farmers left likely would 
not be willing to take the economic risk.  
Even though tobacco farming largely died out after the termination of the federal 
tobacco program in 2004, a few mountain farmers continued to raise the crop in places where 
tobacco farming was most entrenched. Bethel is one of these places. Now, eight years after 
the buyout of the program, only three tobacco farmers remain in Bethel, signaling the end of 
Bethel’s agrarian culture and economy unless another alternative is found. With tobacco 
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gone, is there anything on the horizon that could help resuscitate this agrarian way of life in 
the mountains? In recent years, great strides have been made in sustainable agricultural 
movements and organic farm developments in Appalachia, and I find that this emerging 
agrarian movement shares commonalities with the historical development of the tobacco 
program. Emulating the methods used to develop the tobacco program could provide 
sustainable agriculture movements in Appalachia with long-term success, possibly reviving 
fading agrarian cultures and economies. 
Losing an agrarian way of life 
Over the course of tobacco’s run in Watauga County, from the 1930s to the early 
2000s, tobacco culture and the tobacco economy were not mutually exclusive. Although 
tobacco incomes in the mountains often came from small ½ acre to 2 acre crops, and thus 
only provided for portions of overall incomes, tobacco money helped perpetuate the culture 
and economy of tobacco farming. Historically in Bethel, the money that tobacco farming 
provided often went towards paying for important cultural items. Men and women raised 
tobacco to help pay for weddings. Tobacco income went towards paying for property taxes 
and Christmas gifts. Teenage children raised tobacco in partnerships with parents and 
grandparents, learning about life, responsibility, and making money. These are just a few 
examples of how the tobacco economy has influenced the tobacco culture and vice versa in 
Bethel and Watauga County over the years. 
Today, then, it is impossible for tobacco culture to exist without a tobacco economy. 
Without both parts working in concert with each other, either one alone represents just a 
hollow shell of the whole. There is the possibility that a tiny number of small tobacco 
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farmers will buy big balers and continue to raise tobacco as part of the “hobby” culture of 
farming. For example, one older east Tennessee tobacco farmer bought a large and expensive 
piece of tobacco equipment that was quite excessive in regards to the work required. He was 
essentially just “fooling around” with tobacco farming as a hobby (personal communication, 
Susanna Donaldson, 2012). He could have just as easily bought a bass boat, a motorcycle, or 
an RV, depending on his interests. I find this point significant, because it highlights the 
connections between the tobacco economy and tobacco culture. Without tobacco income, 
tobacco culture cannot survive. It will only become a characterization of itself and another 
activity preserved from the past that has no real meaning in the present. To refer again to 
Wendell Berry’s (1975) work, A Continuous Harmony, a place’s knowledge survives in its 
work. Memory alone will not perpetuate the social capital a place once held. It must be 
worked for.  
And so, without tobacco farming in the mountains, farming in general, as a way of 
life and livelihood, is in question going forward. Can farming in Watauga County, which 
now typically consists of only cattle and at times Christmas tree farms, survive in the years to 
come? As farming increasingly becomes more of a hobby and less of an important source of 
income, the agrarian culture that has traditionally characterized Bethel and other mountain 
communities will disappear. 
An emerging agrarian culture and economy 
In the midst of farming’s decline an interesting phenomenon is occurring: local, 
small-scale, sustainable, and organic agriculture is blossoming, with regards to both the 
consumer market and to farm livelihoods. Although some former tobacco farmers have 
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transitioned into organic operations, many more have not. What would it take for former 
farmers to return to farming via sustainable agriculture? Two groups in Appalachia, 
Community Farm Alliance in Kentucky and Appalachian Sustainable Development in 
southwestern Virginia, have been diligently working to expand small-scale sustainable 
agriculture in the region by creating structural conditions, spanning the local to the state and 
national levels, conducive to the success of organic, small-scale farms. Similar to the 
emergence of the tobacco program in the 1930s, for sustainable agriculture to take hold and 
find success long-term, meaningful national-level legislation and support must be attained. 
Although the current neoliberal political and economic climate makes this proposition 
questionable at best, the historic success of the tobacco program shows that a system of 
government support for small farms can be successful but that it must be worked for and 
maintained by key leaders from local, regional, state, and national levels. 
As a part of this new agricultural emergence, farm groups and cooperatives have been 
and are continuing to integrate former tobacco farmers into the fabric of sustainable 
agriculture. Some farmers, who are game to the challenge of growing and marketing new 
crops and practicing new techniques, have transitioned to organic or sustainable agriculture. 
Notably, in Watauga County, a former tobacco farmer switched his tobacco farm to an 
organic vegetable operation and has had success in this new venture. With help from grants, 
extension and university agents, and by cofounding cooperative organic marketing groups, 
this farmer has shown that transitioning from tobacco to organics is possible. Within the 
county and the region, he is often referenced as a success story in terms of transitioning from 
tobacco to organic farming. Still, not all farmers’ situations were the same and not every 
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tobacco farmer has followed this path. Moreover, the “gold rush” days of organic agriculture 
in the mid-2000s, when lots of new organic growers sought and found emerging markets, are 
over. But, it has been possible, at least for some in Watauga County, to continue farming as a 
livelihood and way of life in the mountains. 
What would it take for sustainable agriculture to extend to more former tobacco 
farmers, to the children and grandchildren of tobacco farmers, and to all others hoping to 
make a living from farming in the future? For organic and small scale farming to sustain long 
term, and subsequently for the agrarian culture and economy of the mountains to reorganize, 
organic growers, small farmers, cooperatives, marketing groups, buyers, and many others, 
must continue to work towards scaling up initiatives from the local level to state and national 
levels, fight for policy change, and connect with sympathetic key leaders holding influential 
positions. These initiatives correspond to the propositions put forth by Gaventa and McGee 
(2010) that outline the methods necessary to “making change happen.” With regard to 
Appalachia, two well established groups, the Community Farm Alliance (CFA) in Kentucky 
and Appalachian Sustainable Development (ASD) in southwestern Virginia, provide 
examples of how scaling up is currently being worked out.  
An active group since the 1980s, CFA has taken the lead in supporting sustainable 
agriculture in Kentucky. Having spent years organizing on the grassroots level, CFA 
initiatives have scaled up to make policy changes on the state level. As one example, CFA 
work in the 1990s led to the 2000 passage of a Kentucky House Legislature bill that 
dispersed tobacco settlement money (from the 1998 Master Settlement) to more farmers than 
would have been initially rewarded. At the start, counties in Kentucky were deemed “tobacco 
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dependent” based on the number of pounds of tobacco they produced. Obviously, this 
worked to the disadvantage of Appalachian counties where smaller farms predominated. In 
response, CFA held farmer meetings, engaged in dialogue with politicians on the state level, 
and succeeding in redefining tobacco dependency by mapping county dependency as the 
number of tobacco farms, tobacco per capita income, and the amount grown (pounds 
produced; Billings et al, 2010). County councils then awarded the settlement money to 
tobacco growers transitioning from tobacco to other crops. Building off this success, CFA 
has continued to scale up and engage the state level by working to increase the number of 
farmer’s markets across Kentucky and by working to get state laws passed that mandate or 
recommend local food purchases at state institutions. Building community/grassroots 
organizations, CFA has worked to establish a processing and marketing center in eastern 
Kentucky for local foods and supported the emergence of farmer’s markets and local food 
infrastructure in low-income urban areas. In all of their work for small farmers and Kentucky 
agriculture, CFA shows how a community-based organization that engages state politics can 
bring about change (Billings et al, 2010).
 
 
In southwestern Virginia, Appalachian Sustainable Development (ASD) works to 
transition tobacco farmers to sustainable agriculture, in part by providing processing and 
marketing infrastructure. In 1999, ASD began marketing local organic produce to the 
regional grocery store, Food City. Utilizing a standardization technique, ASD trademarked 
their produce “Appalachian Harvest,” demarcating their food as locally grown (Halweil, 
2003). Getting Appalachian Harvest food on the shelves of grocery stores added to the 
legitimacy of ASD’s work. More farmers signed up to participate in the succeeding years, 
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and in 2010, demand outpaced supply by over 200 percent (Flaccavento, 2010; Halweil, 
2003). As of today, ASD continues to help farmers transition to sustainable agriculture. They 
offer workshops and teaching seminars, and continue to market local food to area stores 
under the Appalachian Harvest trademark, among other things. 
Still, for ASD and similar programs to succeed long-term, they need local, state, and 
national government support. Leaders of these programs recognize this and are working to 
scale up—Flaccavento (2010) cites the Appalachian Regional Commission’s “Asset Based 
Development” program and the USDA’s Community Facilities Loan Program as good steps 
in this direction. But getting significant national support and state and university support for 
organic agriculture and research continues to be a difficult task (Halweil, 2003). To the point, 
many of these transition programs began with funding from the 1998 Tobacco Master 
Settlement plan, which used money won from tobacco companies to transition farmers out of 
tobacco. With that funding running out, and with the last tobacco buyout payment to quota 
holders coming in 2014, financial support for tobacco farmers and emerging organic farmers 
is dwindling. Though ASD has had successes, its financial situation and funding is not secure 
long term; without more government support, the future development and success of groups 
such as ASD is in question (“Presentation,” 2011). Scaling up, finding key leaders within 
state governments and the federal government, and building broad consensuses are critical 
for the success of these programs. 
The historic success of the tobacco program (see Chapter 3), with regard to stabilizing 
farm livelihoods and ways of life, opens the door to this question: could an initiative similar 
to the tobacco program work for sustainable agriculture today? Would a sustainable 
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agricultural program and a reworking of agricultural subsidies foster a stable and long term 
small farming economy in Appalachia? If it could, this would plausibly lead to the rebirth of 
the agrarian culture and economy of the mountains. Obviously an organic “program” could 
not be an exact replica of the tobacco program; there would be structural changes and new 
wrinkles added. But by paying attention to the way the program developed, much can be 
learned towards these ends.  
How could a sustainable agricultural program be achieved? As mentioned above, 
scaling up from the local to the national policy level and continuing to empower local and 
regional cooperatives and groups is a crucial first step towards any long term agrarian 
movement. Following the lead of groups such as CFA and ASD, developing regional and 
local distribution centers is an essential element with regards to growing and sustaining a 
new small farming economy. Simultaneously, investing in the infrastructure necessary for a 
successful sustainable agriculture economy is key. Extension agents, university programs, 
instructors, officials, grant/funding money, and growing and marketing standards are all 
important elements of this infrastructure factor (Gaventa & McGee, 2010). Without adequate 
infrastructure support, sustainable farming will not succeed long term.  
Perhaps most important, however, support must come from the national level. The 
central factor in the development of the tobacco economy and culture throughout the 
twentieth century was federal support for the creation of the tobacco program in the 1930s. 
The price supports and marketing quotas of the federal tobacco program absolutely sustained 
the culture and economy of tobacco farming in the United States. Without the program, 
tobacco farming in the mountains would have ended many years before 2004. In the case of 
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Watauga County, where tobacco production did not begin until the 1930s, a tobacco 
economy might never have started or sustained without the safety nets the program provided 
for farmers. In the 1930s, the federal government went to bat for American farmers. Though 
there are pertinent criticisms of New Deal agricultural legislation, namely, that the tobacco 
program, for instance, benefitted landowners over and above tenants, sharecroppers, small 
growers, black farmers, and non-landowning tobacco workers; the federal government and 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) successfully worked to create an 
equitable system for American farmers (Badger, 1980; Benson, 2012; Kingsolver, 2011). 
Although most commodity crops transitioned out of their federal price support 
programs in the 1950s, the tobacco program remained active until 2004. Despite the 
program’s own inherent instabilities, such as the burley program crisis of 1970, key leaders 
in the tobacco economy worked out these issues in order to sustain the program and to 
subsequently keep tobacco farmers farming. The program was not perfect, but no system is. 
It took work and effort, and support from key leaders in influential positions, to keep the 
program going. When support for the tobacco program eroded at the national level in the 
1980s and 1990s, the program began its descent, and farmers at the local level felt these 
effects. Tobacco prices dropped, quota allotments were reduced, and many farmers in places 
such as Bethel were forced to quit growing the crop. Without national level support, an 
initiative as egalitarian as the tobacco program stands little chance of success. Consequently, 
of the 187 Watauga County tobacco farms that reported raising tobacco in 2002, only 11 
remained in 2007, three years after the end of the federal tobacco program (U.S. Census of 
Agriculture, 2007). 
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The state of organic/sustainable farming in 2012 and the state of tobacco farming in 
the early years of the twentieth century are remarkably similar. Certainly, tobacco farming in 
the early twentieth century was more widespread and crucial to rural livelihoods than organic 
farming is now. But, from a structural standpoint, the two systems have much in common. 
Like the tobacco economy then, the sustainable agricultural economy today is in its 
organizational stages (r), whereby it seeks to reach a conservation phase (k) that is resilient 
and successful long-term. For sustainable agriculture to take that next step toward long-term 
success, there must be an ongoing dialogue between the national and local levels, and the 
national level must reach out to local and regional groups, incorporate, adopt, and enhance 
the initiatives of these groups, and create a system that safeguards the small farmer and 
provides a more egalitarian marketplace atmosphere. 
Unfortunately, though the time is ripe for national level investment in local/regional 
sustainable agricultural networks and infrastructure, the current national and international 
neoliberal economic climate stands starkly against any such proposal. On the one hand, this 
economic climate is the main reason for the downfall of the tobacco program. On the other 
hand, this climate inhibits the development of a similar movement/program concerning 
sustainable agriculture. Moreover, today’s neoliberal era shares similarities with the tobacco 
economy during the early twentieth century. Even after the tobacco monopoly, James B. 
Duke’s American Tobacco Company, was broken up by antitrust legislation in 1911, federal 
support for the tobacco program did not come until two decades later, and still then it did not 
take permanent effect for essentially eight years, until 1941 (van Willigen & Eastwood, 
1998). Regardless of national level support, years of contentious work, broad consensus 
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building, and garnering farmer support were required before the tobacco program became a 
successful fixture of American agriculture. 
What, then, can be done now to work towards creating a similar type of program that 
fosters the growth and health of small farms and farming communities, especially in the 
mountains? According to Gaventa & McGee (2010), creating broad alliances, finding key 
leaders who are sympathetic to the cause, placing leaders in positions of power, and 
reframing issues to avoid contentiousness are all necessary steps to take to cultivate change. 
The question as I see it is not whether price supports, marketing quotas, and a federally 
supported system favoring less concentrated farms would work for organic agriculture in 
Appalachia. I believe the historical success of the tobacco program shows that that system 
works. The challenge, as with tobacco in the 1920s and 1930s, is scaling up community-
based organizations to the national level and maintaining these gains. Efforts and inroads 
made by the CFA and ASD towards this goal are encouraging and worth emulating. Still, 
getting broad national recognition and support for sustainable agriculture has yet to occur. 
What will it take to get it? The tobacco program emerged out of the New Deal, which 
emerged in response to the Great Depression. Not to make light of economic failure, but hard 
economic times can bring about the opportunities for significant change. If the grassroots 
level is organized and prepared to scale up, they may have the opportunity to determine 
beneficial policies and laws in this scenario. Nonetheless, organic cooperatives and farmers’ 
groups should continue to build strong community-based initiatives, engage with county and 
state political levels, and work towards engaging in national level politics. According to 
Gaventa & McGee (2010), this should include getting leaders elected to office that are from 
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these organizations or at least sympathetic to their concerns. Concomitantly, finding like-
minded and sympathetic key leaders already in positions of power and influence at the 
national level is crucial. Furthermore, reframing the most contentious issues surrounding the 
establishment of a stronger organic farming infrastructure is a proven way to find success. 
After the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the first Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 
advocates of the AAA used the strategy of reframing to shift attention from the most 
contentious issues (i.e., price supports and marketing restrictions) to broader, more palatable 
goals (i.e., soil conservation) (Badger, 1980; van Willigen & Eastwood, 1998). For the 
agrarian culture and economy of the mountains to survive going forward, the propositions 
and steps outlined above must be implemented.  
Bethel without tobacco 
For small farmers in twenty-first century Appalachia, agrarian livelihoods and ways 
of life are waning, and this is due to the loss of tobacco farming as an economically viable 
aspect of multiple livelihood work strategies and due to the end of the tobacco program 
(Halperin, 1990). Combinations of cattle, tobacco, logging, dairy, off-farm employment, and 
other work once enabled the continuation of the agrarian economy and culture of Watauga 
County and Bethel. Now, without tobacco, farming in the mountains is less diversified and 
less a part of incomes and everyday lives. Moreover, the other aspects of these former 
multiple livelihood strategies have ended or been curtailed by economic changes brought on 
by neoliberalism. The dairy industry has consolidated and forced out small farmers, logging 
has slowed since nearby furniture factories have moved overseas, and off-farm employment 
has been harder to come by since the recession of 2008.  
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Ironically, because of these economic factors and the 2008 recession, some former 
tobacco farmers in Bethel have recently thought about raising tobacco again (personal 
communication, Tommy Lawrence, 2011). They have the skills, the land, the equipment, and 
so forth, and could use the supplemental income tobacco once brought. Yet, a direct tobacco 
company-to-farmer contract, which is the de facto method of selling tobacco today, is hard to 
come by, and moreover, the future possibilities of tobacco companies and manufacturers 
working with small farmers are doubtful. Since the 1980s, tobacco companies and tobacco 
state politicians have worked to undermine the U.S. tobacco farming economy in order to 
maximize the profits of the tobacco industry (Benson, 2012). With the establishment of 
foreign leaf markets and the calculated erosion of the tobacco program, the tobacco industry 
pushed for direct contracts with farmers in the early 2000s, an attractive alternative to 
warehouse auctions at that time (personal communication, Shelby Eggers, 2012; Benson, 
2012). However, when the program ended in 2004, the price of burley tobacco dropped 
precipitously, tobacco production immediately consolidated, and tobacco companies gained 
more control over tobacco production. Most small or part-time tobacco farmers, even if they 
wanted to, could no longer raise tobacco and hope to be profitable.  
The end of the program came at a time when farming in the mountains was on its last 
leg. Hundreds of farmers quit raising tobacco from the 1970s to the 2000s in Watauga 
County (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1969 and 2007). And of those farmers remaining, many 
were at or near retirement age in the years leading up to the buyout. For them, the end of the 
program came at a time when they could transition to retirement. Many others, who were 
raising tobacco part-time or on the side, transitioned to full-time, off-farm work. 
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Consequently, the agrarian culture and economy of Watauga County, and Bethel, where 
much of the county’s tobacco production was concentrated, declined steeply in the twenty-
first century. But, the fact that this economy and culture was there at all in 2004 speaks to the 
success and egalitarian nature of the tobacco program. The program allowed for the 
continuation of small farming as a part-time livelihood and full-time way of life in the 
mountains well past the years when other farming communities across the country, such as 
those in the Midwest, had met the full force of the free market. 
A new “old” way 
The tobacco culture and economy of the mountains is gone and likely will not return. 
And, with regard to both the culture and economy of the mountains, that is a sad thing. Social 
and community connections that once revolved around tobacco farming have changed and 
been lost. Pride in work and pride in community have changed, as well. Moving forward, 
once-deeply agrarian communities such as Bethel face difficult economic and cultural 
choices. Most former tobacco farmers are now fully integrated in to the market economy. 
They work away from home and the community and are less dependent on the social and 
economic connections that historically characterized Bethel. Although raising cattle can still 
be a profitable farming venture, the overall agrarian economy and culture of Bethel is 
diminishing.  
For small farming to once again foster livelihoods and ways of life in the mountains, 
in all likelihood through sustainable agricultural strategies, the tobacco program and the 
twentieth century tobacco economy, with its strengths and weaknesses, must be studied and 
taken into account. Moreover, many of the traditional techniques and practices that 
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characterized how tobacco was once grown, the “all hands work” of the early years, such as 
hoeing, suckering by hand (instead of spraying), raising plants from seed, using draft animals 
to plow and cultivate, and relying on family, friends, and neighbors for reciprocal exchange, 
among other things, are adaptable to the emerging culture and economy of sustainable 
agriculture. There are commonalities between these two systems. To take a shot at reframing 
an issue, maybe the conversation regarding the end of tobacco farming and the start of 
sustainable agriculture in Appalachia should concern “doing things more the old way.” 
Bethel’s history is rooted in the old way, and many Bethel farmers remember and can still 
utilize these traditional practices, such as using draft animals, a technique prized by many 
burgeoning and beginning organic farmers. Finding and illuminating these connections is 
critical for both the preservation of traditional agrarian communities, such as Bethel, and for 
the emergence of a culture and economy of sustainable agriculture. Perhaps a renewed 
agrarian culture and economy is just around the corner. 
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APPENDIX A. BETHEL IN PHOTOGRAPH 
 
 
PHOTO 1. A young burley tobacco crop and corn field, Bethel, Shelby Eggers’ farm. 
(All photographs, with one exception, were taken at Shelby Eggers’ farm in Bethel, by the 
author). 
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PHOTO 2. A young burley plant. 
 
 
PHOTO 3. Shelby Eggers’ tobacco patch and barn. 
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PHOTO 4. Shelby Eggers’ tobacco patch and corn field, late summer 2011. 
 
PHOTO 5. Down the row. 
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PHOTO 6. The beginning of the tobacco harvest, Tommy Lawrence’s tobacco field. 
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PHOTO 7. Cutting tobacco at Shelby Eggers’ farm, September 2011. 
 
In 2011, Mr. Eggers hired a Hispanic work crew from a nearby county to cut and hang his 
tobacco. This patch and another slightly larger field, roughly two acres of tobacco in total, 
were cut in one day. About a week later, after the tobacco cured down in the field, the crew 
came back to hang the tobacco.  
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PHOTOS 8 & 9. Laying out sticks, cutting tobacco plants, and spearing plants. 
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PHOTOS 10 & 11. A tobacco spear (above, PHOTO 10), and speared tobacco hanging in the 
barn (below, PHOTO 11).  
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PHOTO 12. Freshly cut and speared tobacco. 
PHOTO 12 is an example of the traditional way Bethel farmers cut, speared, and staked 
tobacco in the field. Bethel farmers drove/hammered the sticks into the ground and then 
speared six plants onto the stick. Each stick stood individually as the tobacco cured down in 
the field prior to hanging. As part of my fieldwork research, I helped Shelby Eggers cut and 
spear some of his tobacco. All of the photographs with hammered sticks, such as the above 
photograph, were done by Mr. Eggers and me.  
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PHOTO 13. Tobacco sticks, the migrant worker way. 
The tobacco sticks in this picture have been cut and staked by the Hispanic workers hired by 
Shelby Eggers. Whereas Bethel farmers hammer the sticks into the ground, the migrant 
workers lean two sticks, each with six stalks of tobacco, against each other, as one stick 
provides balance for the other. Also, note the color difference in the tobacco: the leaves have 
cured down in the field, turning more yellow, and are ready for hanging in the barn. 
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PHOTOS 14 & 15. Tobacco curing in the field. 
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PHOTO 16. Loading tobacco onto the trail.  
 
(As a side note, neither Shelby nor the migrant workers who spoke some English knew why 
one worker [pictured above] wore an old shirt around his head. He could have been going to 
great lengths to protect against nicotine poisoning [from handling too much tobacco] or green 
tobacco sickness [from handling wet tobacco], but considering the relatively small amount of 
tobacco worked, and the fact that the tobacco was dry, the chances of encountering these 
problems were unlikely. Perhaps he just took extra precaution or simply wanted to keep dust 
and dirt from the field and barn out of his face.) 
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PHOTOS 17 & 18. Loading tobacco onto the trailer. 
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PHOTO 19. With the trailer backed into the barn, the tobacco is ready to unload and hang. 
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PHOTO 20. Unloading and handing up tobacco sticks (Shelby Eggers, left). 
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PHOTO 21. Hanging tobacco on the second tier. 
Although it’s hard to tell, this worker is standing on the second tier of the tobacco barn, eight 
or nine feet off the ground. He’s bending over to grab the stick of tobacco as it is being 
handed up to him. He’ll take this tobacco stick and hang it on the rafters above his head. 
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PHOTO 22. Hanging tobacco on the second tier. 
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PHOTO 23. An unloaded trailer (Shelby Eggers, right). 
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PHOTO 24. Tobacco curing in the barn. 
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PHOTO 25. Tobacco curing in the barn. 
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